It’s almost become rote. Every five years we pro-Europeans say, "These European elections are the most important ever." For the record: A few months before the European elections in 2009, Lehman Brothers had gone bankrupt and a serious financial crisis hit first the United States, then the Old World. Having a united European Union seemed more important than ever for lending support to the wobbling banking sector. By 2014, the global financial crisis had long since morphed into a European sovereign-debt crisis, which had led to polarization and rifts within the EU itself. It therefore seemed all the more important for the EP elections to send a signal of European unity (which did not really happen). More recently, in 2019, Donald Trump had been US president for two years, the British had voted for Brexit, the "refugee crisis" had reached its peak and it was becoming increasingly clear that the EU had a problem upholding the rule of law within its own ranks. Yet again, according to the tenor of the times, the imminent European elections were the most important ever for countering centrifugal forces in a critical phase of the EU's development. Maintaining that the upcoming elections for the European Parliament are particularly important is therefore nothing new. Yet it’s true. Once again. This time, especially so.
Why? Let's take a look at where the EU stands today. The situation is serious. It was serious five years ago, but this time more is at stake. The EU is possibly in the most decisive phase of its 70-year history. The number and severity of the crises, challenges and upheavals it is facing all at once are unparalleled. Taken together, they have the potential to dislodge elementary pillars of the European order. Russia's invasion of Ukraine has made brutally clear that Europe's security and defense must be reconsidered from scratch. The EU must invest massively, both militarily and economically, if it is to reduce its critical dependencies. This is all the more true given that the future of its transatlantic relations is uncertain and that China is becoming an increasingly obvious systemic rival. In addition, the fight against climate change is requiring more effort than we have been previously prepared to accept. At the same time, we have considerable catching up to do when it comes to digital transformation, which, together with the pivot towards greater sustainability, will enormously change the European economic order. What is on the line here is nothing less than our future competitiveness and Europe's economic cohesion. The report on the Single Market recently published by former Italian Prime Minister Enrico Letta shows how great the need for action truly is.
All this on its own could be considered epoch-making. Yet the EU continues to shoulder burdens from the past. Several crises and problems we were discussing in 2009, 2014 and 2019 are still not adequately resolved. The eurozone is still not sufficiently crisis-proof, and the banking union and capital markets union remain incomplete. The latest compromise on asylum reform is probably not adequate for providing a long-term solution. Relations with the UK, which are becoming more important in this geopolitical age, are not being constructively managed. Last but not least, parts of the EU's system of governance are simply no longer up to addressing all these challenges effectively.
For example, relinquishing the principle of unanimity in foreign and security policy is no longer the dream of European federalists, but a political necessity. The same is true for enforcing the rule of law, which must serve as a non-negotiable nucleus of the EU's internal order. Both – an enforceable strengthening of rule of law and the expansion of majority decisions – are central pillars of a long overdue reform, along with a more flexible approach to cooperation ("coalitions of the willing"). This applies all the more if the EU, for good reason, wants to seriously push ahead with its enlargement in the next legislative period to include the Western Balkan states, the Republic of Moldova, Georgia and, hopefully, Ukraine. A report by independent French and German experts from last September made a very clear case for this link between enlargement and reform – and was fortunately heard at last year's European Council in Granada. But how long will it be before this insight reaches its expiration date, and how likely will it be to garner majority support in the coming legislative period? Will the EU really have the wherewithal in the next five years to tackle all the challenges and reforms on which its fate depends?