Bertelsmann Foundation

A European Defence Strategy

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Core Messages

- The security of the Union and that of its friends and allies requires a holistic, strategic civil-military vision that combines achievable means and ends. Military defence is but a small part of the effort and military power is most certainly not an end in itself. However, for the EU to be a legitimate and effective security actor, it must possess a limited but credible military defence component embedded firmly in the 'assertive multilateralism' of the Union's wider security responsibilities.

- The European Security Strategy (ESS) upon which this strategy is based is a pre-strategic concept. It must be rapidly hardened into a mechanism that defines when, where, why and how the European Union will act. Only such a strategic concept can generate the consensus that will in turn weld all the EU's security tools (aid and development, prevention of strategic intrusion by terrorists, robust policing and armed forces) into the single institutional framework that contemporary security demands.

The Strategy

- The Venusberg Strategy 2004 calls upon EU member-states to rapidly harden the European Security Strategy into a European strategic concept. A European Strategic Concept would represent a new departure in transnational security thinking and organisation, because it would meld into a single conceptual framework national, civil and military, as well as offensive and defensive security and defence efforts.

- To develop a strategic concept the European Security Strategy must be translated into security and defence missions with a detailed military task list developed thereafter that would form the basis for a strategic European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).

- The strategic ESDP military task list will in turn provide the framework for European force transformation, integration of European armed forces, planning for future missions, equipment programmes and defence financing requirements.

- The EU should be in a position to undertake all ESS-type missions at their most demanding by 2015.

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What a Strategic ESDP Needs to Do

- The security and defence missions implied in the European Security Strategy (ESS) call for the development of a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) that carries out a far broader range of missions than currently envisaged, over far greater distance, at potentially higher levels of conflict intensity and for longer periods. A *strategic ESDP* is essential to the achievement of the ESS.

- Political consolidation, EU enlargement and emerging threats reinforce the need for a *European security space* that in turn emphasises the importance of secure external borders of the EU and thus strengthened co-operation under the Schengen Agreement.

- The *European Security Strategy is a pre-strategic concept.* In light of the new threats the ESS must be rapidly consolidated into a European strategic concept that will formalise when, why, where and how the EU will act.

- *Military missions* implied by the ESS suggest the need for European armed forces to operate progressively higher up the conflict intensity scale from defence diplomacy at one end through to robust preventive missions, possibly anywhere in the world.

- An *EU Security Council* (EUSC) should be established incorporating the Political and Security Committee (PSC). The EUSC will balance security effectiveness with political legitimacy. The EUSC would be responsible for both military and civilian security and in time the defence of the Union. The EUSC will be co-chaired permanently by EU Foreign and Security Ministers. During a crisis, the Council will retain overall strategic direction, with control of EU operations under the EUSC. Military operational leadership will be the responsibility of a trirectoire of Britain, France and Germany prior to the establishment of an EU Permanent, Combined and Joint Headquarters (EUPCJHQ).

- Building on the 2004 decision to create an EU Counter-Terrorism Co-ordinator, an *EU Homeland Security Agency* (EUHSA) under the direct control of the EUSC and headed by a new

EU Security Minister will be essential to guarantee the protection of the European security space and to overcome national and bureaucratic constraints on security performance. The EUHSA will be empowered to co-ordinate the homeland security activities of all member-states, act as an ideas generator and information brokerage. Embedded within the EU Homeland Security Agency should be an EU Counter-Terrorism Intelligence Agency (EUCTIA). The developing civil/military structures within the EU Military Staff should provide the basis for the development of such an Agency.

- The concept of collective/common defence is changing. Territorial integrity no longer sufficiently explains the defence mission. A *new common defence strategy* is needed to protect European critical infrastructure such as power, food, health, IT and transportation systems, the effective defence of which can only be transnational.

- The missions implicit in the ESS and the enhanced Petersberg Tasks will require the progressive *broadening of the military task list* of EU armed forces over the next ten years.

- The ESS implies ongoing professionalisation of EU forces, together with 'cultural integration', through the harmonisation of language, training, exercising and doctrine.

What Europe Can and Cannot Do Now

- There are 1.7 million Europeans in uniform, but only 170,000 combat soldiers, of which only 40-50,000 can be used for robust combat operations at any one time. Equally, it is very difficult to envisage an ESS-type scenario that could not be managed by 170,000 well-equipped and well-trained European troops. *A strategic ESDP should have therefore two force planning objectives.* First, to increase the number of well-equipped, trained and properly supported forces to around 170,000. Second, to improve the usability of the other forces to better enable them to undertake lower-intensity, follow-on missions, such as peacekeeping. Such a force level and force structure would enable the military fulfilment of ESS-type missions.

With Whom a Strategic ESDP Should Work

- The EU-NATO relationship must build on the Berlin-plus arrangements through a *strategic dialogue* that confirms the roles and functions of the two organisations, supported by political and operational transparency to ensure effective cohesion and co-ordination. The commitment to create in time an EU-NATO Operational Planning and Command Centre (EUNOPS) that would eventually replace SHAPE would provide a focus for the strategic dialogue.

- *European forces must develop a degree of 'co-operability' with US armed forces,* i.e. differences in equipment, training and doctrine are accepted, but flexible command and control arrangements are developed to enable European forces to plug into US networks. Europeans will need in time to develop their own interoperability mechanism and standards.

- A reformed NATO will remain for the foreseeable future the cornerstone of Europe's collective defence and the platform for the projection of European, higher-intensity military capability worldwide.

- Senior officers of non-NATO, EU countries or countries that are not within the integrated military structure (IMS) of the Alliance must be able to assume command of EU-led operations using NATO assets. This reinforces the need for an embedded EU planning and command capability at SHAPE.

- At the political level a reformed NATO will remain an important forum for transatlantic policy co-ordination. The Alliance must also retain its Article 5 mission, which because of American presence will be essential to prevent defence re-nationalisation, particularly in Eastern Europe.

- A reformed NATO must also be re-structured to better enable it to manage the consequences of inevitable and unavoidable differences in US and European strategic perceptions and policy by bridging the gaps in force structure and capabilities that result from such differing policy perceptions.

How to Close the Gap Between the European Security Strategy and the ESDP

- Strategic ESDP missions will be organised through coalitions of the willing and able. The EU itself should progressively assume the responsibilities of a *coalition leader.*

- The ESS must become the strategic benchmark for European defence planning. Europeans must therefore use the ESS to close the gap between Europe's strategic environment and its security and defence capabilities. Simplistic comparisons between European and US military capabilities are misleading, confusing and often wrong.

- As the progressive increase in capabilities enables the expansion of military tasks, the number of missions and tasks must be further widened with the objective that by 2010 the EU would cover 75% of all collective security missions both stated and implied in the ESS and 100% by 2015.

- The need for rapid and marked improvement in European military effectiveness emphasises the need for a distinct *European Force Transformation Concept* that merges some American-style concepts for electronically 'joined up' forces with European experience of 'muddy boots' peacemaking and peacekeeping. Such a concept will need to be developed in parallel with limited new doctrine that provides a common base not just for operations, i.e. the way militaries do things, but also other military software, such as training, and procurement.

- *A European Network Enabling Capability* (ENEC) is needed to electronically integrate European forces and improve both their strategic 'eyes' and 'ears'. Such a capability will need to be developed within the framework of a European Force Transformation Concept tailored specifically to European needs. Necessarily, European forces will operate at lower levels of situational awareness and with forces less networked than their American counterparts.

- The ENEC will enable linkages between European forces rather than provide a single advanced network. Consequently, the ENEC would need to be developed in parallel with *a specifically European interoperability concept* to ensure European interoperability dominance over all operations likely to be generated by the European Security Strategy.

- Europeans must press the United States to consider new thinking on traditional 'muddy boots' peacekeeping and *new warfighting/peacemaking transitional conflict evident in Iraq in its transformation concept.* Experience in Iraq suggests that US forces can learn from their European counterparts in the day to day management of complex security situations

- As EU forces find themselves deployed on ever higher intensity missions, planning and command of flexible coalitions will need to be formalised. The robust development of EU planning and command cells at both SHAPE and the EU Military Staff (EUMS) into NATO-compatible headquarters will ensure autonomous EU control over medium to high-intensity operations.

- European strategic self-confidence will only be realised when Europe has sufficient strategic eyes and ears. Europeans will only act promptly and in a determined manner when they are sure that they control both the quality and flow of strategic intelligence. Some duplication with US and NATO assets and capabilities is both essential and unavoidable.

- To offset problems associated with the generation and management of variable coalitions undertaking variable ESS-missions, the EU needs its own *EU Force Generation Database* (EUFGD) of available forces. Such a database will support what in time will become an EU Permanent Combined and Joint Headquarters (EUPCJHQ).

- The EU Force Generation Database will need to include those forces on non-EU member-states allocated (or that could be allocated) through the Committee of Contributors system.

- A particularly important role for EUPCJHQ will be to familiarise officers from non EU-NATO members and non-EU partner states with EU multinational coalition operations at all levels of intensity.

- In spite of the differences that emerged in 2003 there is no point in the EU developing entirely new warfighting doctrine and methods of co-operability and interoperability at higher levels of mission intensity that would reduce the ability of EU forces to work with US armed forces. That is unless US force transformation leaves Europeans with no other option.

- The *European Rapid Reaction Force* (ERRF) and the *NATO Response Force (NRF)* must be developed in parallel so that they are interchangeable at different levels of conflict intensity. Each force must be designed to augment and/or follow-on the other if overall command between the EU and NATO changes during a crisis.

- In the interim between EU coalition management and defence integration the *military leadership by the major Europeans will be essential.* Smaller states must become specialised and organised around an autonomous EU planning and command capability.

- Given the extensive military infrastructure autonomous high-end capabilities require (and prior to the establishment of EUNOPS), Europeans should work through SHAPE to ensure escalation dominance over military operations involving complex European coalitions engaged on medium to high intensity operations. For less robust operations they can rely on national headquarters of the larger European states and in time the EUPCJHQ.

- The ESS implies the need for an *EU Strategic Defence Planning Concept (EUSDPC)* essential for the harmonisation and co-ordination of the defence planning cycles of EU member-states based upon the elaborated military task list of the ESS.

- A *limited European C4ISR capability will be required* to support the European Network Enabling Concept. The inclusion of the European C4ISR network into the EU-NATO Operational Planning and Command Centre (that would be physically located at SHAPE in Mons, Belgium) would enhance the Union's political and operational autonomy and ensure transparency between the two organisations.

- In addition to limited strategic intelligence satellites and other air-breathing systems (such as global reach unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)), advanced communications and effective ground surveillance (C4ISR), EU forces need effective suppression of enemy air defences (SEAD), offensive electronic warfare (OEW) capabilities, fast strategic lift (air and sea), force protection capabilities, and precision-guided munitions (PGMs). The European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP) and the Prague Capabilities Commitments must be harmonised, co-ordinated and strengthened to ensure fulfilment of vital capability goals.

- Europeans need to enhance battlefield intelligence using Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, improved identification of friend or foe (IFF) through improved digitised radar surveillance of the battle-space and personalised advanced surveillance technologies for individual combat troops. Such capabilities should be included within an ECAP re-configured to meet the needs of a strategic ESDP.

- European Special Forces have proved themselves particularly effective and adaptable. However, their training and doctrine makes it difficult for them to operate effectively with each other. A *combined EU-NATO Special Forces Training Concept and Programme* would significantly enhance their ability to operate together.

- Combat troops do not make good police officers. Gendarmerie, Guardia Civil and Carabinieri-type forces that can bridge the gap between combat soldiering and policing will be essential for the reconstruction of societies in the immediate post-conflict phase and the re-establishment of norms of civil society. The French proposal to establish a *European Gendarmerie* Force is therefore to be welcomed and strengthened. The EU needs a force of at least 10,000 'European Gendarmes' directly answerable to it.

- The EU must also develop a cadre of specialists in the reconstruction of infrastructure, such as sewage systems, electrical and water supply, health services, as well as better co-ordinated policy and implementation with non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Such a capability will be vital if having won a war Europe is not to lose the peace. It must be integrated into overall EU civil-military crisis management planning and co-ordinated through the EU crisis management system.

- The needs of the EU as a holistic security actor will highlight the vital contribution made by the European Commission as a channel for what are essentially civilian skills and capabilities into overall crisis management planning and implementation.

How to Support a Strategic ESDP

- The *EU Satellite Interpretation Centre* at Torrejon will become an invaluable support for the command chain. In the interim greater utilisation of open and commercial information sources, particularly in support of lower intensity peace operations, need to be explored. Civilian technology is available, advanced and flexible.

- *Europe's developing high-speed rail network* must be better employed to move EU forces rapidly in support of EU operations, either adjacent to a theatre (such as the Adriatic coast of Italy) or to a port (UK forces from southern England to Marseilles, for example).

- The *EU must also explore the feasibility of legally requisitioning ships* of member-states for service during a time of crisis by adapting European law to enable the use of ships under flag to EU member-states.

- An *EU Joint Intelligence Committee (EJIC)* working directly into the office of the EU Security Minister will help to co-ordinate and safeguard shared intelligence, staffed by national intelligence officers who will process and evaluate raw intelligence, supported by national intelligence agencies.

- In time the proposed *European Security and Defence College* (ESDC) will be the logical place to develop command language, doctrine and training expertise and harmonization. In the interim existing national resources should be harmonized and co-ordinated.

- The political base of any European force is essential, because it is vital that a strong constituency of European public opinion supports both the concept of European defence and the operations implied by the ESS. Indeed, a clear linkage exists between the security of the European home base and Europe's ability to project serious force. That is the dilemma of European defence. A parallel public information campaign is needed that both informs and involves European public opinion. It is inconceivable that a strategic ESDP can develop without the active support and commitment of European citizens.

- The nature of contemporary security also raises fears about excessive intrusion by security agencies, a degree of which is inevitable in an age of strategic terror. Protection against over-intrusion would be improved by the appointment of a European Security Ombudsman closely linked to the European Court of Justice (ECJ).

- Use of the wider academic and policy community is critical to effective strategic clarity and planning. EU agencies such as the EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) must be more closely involved with longer-term forecasting in support of the Policy Planning Unit of the Council Secretariat. In particular, EUISS should act as a focal point for the better use of Europe's academic community in support of EU security planning.

How to Equip a Strategic ESDP

- Once a European strategic concept is in place and it becomes clear what will be expected of European forces, European defence procurement will need to become more like that of a single state, i.e. a single European defence procurement framework, in which the only debate that matters is that between strategy and the needs of Europe's land, sea and air forces.

- The European common defence market, supported by a common Research & Technology budget and co-ordinated through a strong European Defence Agency (EDA) would undoubtedly improve cost-effectiveness for European armed forces undergoing transformation.

- The need for a single European defence market is self-evident. If the US follows a 'Buy American First' strategy, the EU must adopt a *'Buy European First' strategy* to safeguard procurement for European armed forces. Securing Europe's autonomous supply of advanced military technology and equipment (and its re-supply) is a pre-requisite for a strategic ESDP. However, it may be cheaper on occasions to buy American, particularly if they alone have the technology required.

- In the longer run the EU will need a strategic EU Defence Research and Technology Development Fund (EUDRTDF) for the development of 'big ticket' common security and defence items.

- The European Defence Agency must prompt member-states to better promote convergence of military requirements and be further empowered to rationalise the current multifaceted and over-ly complex approach to armaments co-operation. A first step will be to provide an easier and more effective transfer of defence technology and equipment between EU member-states, as well as the exchange of sensitive information and technologies, joint research and development.

- If the trirectoire will lead EU military coalitions on the behalf of the EU, BAe Systems, EADS and Thales should evolve into a European defence-industrial trirectoire as prime contractors that can lead procurement projects under the aegis of the EDA.

How to Afford a Strategic ESDP

- For the EU to develop forces able to fulfil ESS-type missions will require that all EU member-states spend a minimum of 2% GDP per annum on defence. At least 10% of respective national defence budgets must be earmarked for transformation projects.

- Given the back-log in capital defence expenditure caused by years of neglect of many of Europe's militaries, a significant level of up-front capital re-investment will be required if an effective stra-tegic ESDP is ever to be realised.

- European governments will only overcome the ever increasing unit cost of equipment, research and development associated with the digitisation of future conflict and the switch from platforms to systems essential to transformation through significant, pooled defence financing. Equally, as many platforms are 'beds' for stand-off systems within the context of ESS-type operations they are likely to last significantly longer than hitherto. This should assist financing, especially if it can be spread across the life of a platform. To that end, platform financing should be separated where possible from system financing.

- Whilst modest real increases in European defence budgets are essential, existing defence resour-ces must be used more effectively. Too many defence resources are wasted through duplicated infrastructure, redundant fixed assets and duplication of effort in non-essential areas.

- A *Defence Business Affairs Programme (DBAP)* would transfer best practice from the commercial sector, including the use of commercial techniques, such as outsourcing of non-core activities, leasing of equipment and just-in-time/focused logistics. Such an approach would build on experience gained around Europe in smart procurement and financing programmes.

- A *new analysis of defence financing techniques is required.* Too many programmes are cut or shelved because a significant portion of the life-cycle cost of assets and capabilities comes in the R&D and production phases occur at the beginning. Spreading cost across the life-cycle is essential. This could take place in partnership with commercial banks through leasing and other arrangements that build on existing public-private partnerships in both the civil and defence sectors.

1. What a Strategic ESDP Needs to Do

The Lesson from Madrid

The awful loss of life in Madrid on March 11th, 2004 and the renewed violence in the Balkans should finally convince Europeans that they are in the front-line in a world marked by fracture, insecurity and instability. Moreover, the nature of the new threats and the structure of Europe demand of Europeans a creative approach to their own security. Consequently, the role and ambition of the European Union as a security and defence actor must be transformed, reformed and advanced. Decisions taken now by the member-states over the future role of the EU as a security and defence actor will thus have an impact not just on the European order, but also on the global order. Given the complexity and uncertainty of the global security environment the role the Union eventually assumes will significantly shape the world in which Europe resides.

The European Security Strategy

The December 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) establishes as its objective, "A Secure Europe In A Better World". The ESS emphasises the interconnectedness of global security by stating that, "large-scale aggression against any member-state is now improbable. Instead Europe faces new threats which are more diverse, less visible and less predictable". There are five such threat areas specified:

- *Terrorism:* Imposes costs on society by undermining contemporary 'Europeanness', the openness and tolerance of European societies and uncertainty over Europe's role in the world. Terrorism emerges from the complex interaction between old and new, and as such is a phenomenon that is part of European society as well as external to it. However, contemporary strategic terrorism marks a step change in the scope and ambition of terrorism and must be actively confronted.

- *Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD):* Nuclear, biological, chemical and radiological weapons pose "potentially the greatest threat to our security". Indeed, it may be possible for "a small group (…) to inflict damage on a scale previously possible only for states and armies". The sophistication

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and seriousness of Europe's response must be commensurate with the challenge posed.

- *Regional Conflicts:* Undermine the foundations of stability and security and create the pre-conditions for terrorism and organised crime and the hopelessness and despair that can contribute to WMD proliferation. Successful security management requires a long-term commitment to stability as well as short-term consequence management.
- *State Failure:* Bad governance, corruption, abuse of power, weak institutions and lack of accountability corrode states from within and can also generate the conditions for the new threats. Europe must act as an example.
- *Organised Crime:* Targets Europe through drug-trafficking, human trafficking, illegal migration and the illegal trade in small arms. The links between transnational terrorism and organised crime are self-evident. In the first instance, the traditional divide between military and criminal intelligence must be overcome.

The ESS goes on to say that, "taking these different elements together – terrorism committed to maximum violence, the availability of weapons of mass destruction, organised crime, the weakness of the state system and the privatisation of force – we would be confronted with a very radical threat indeed". This strategy is intrinsically linked to empowerment of the ESS through not least the development of a more capable European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), through the enhancement of the Peters-berg Tasks of rescue and humanitarian missions, peacekeeping and the role of combat troops in peacemaking around which European security and defence have thus far been organised.

In 2003 the Draft Constitutional Treaty of the EU expanded the Petersberg Tasks to include, "joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention, peacekeeping, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking, and post-conflict stabilisation…". What is needed therefore is a strategic ESDP with a focus on the EU's capacity to undertake ESS-type missions across the conflict intensity spectrum:

- Defence diplomacy: confidence-building and dispelling hostility, such as assistance in the development of democratically-accountable armed forces under the EU banner;

- Peacetime security: counter-terrorism, counter-crime and counter-drugs;

- Support to civilian authorities in the event of emergencies, such as attacks on European critical infrastructure.

- Rapid deployment of troops either in support of EU homeland security or as part of a European counter terrorism strategy.

- Peace support and humanitarian operations: operations other than war in support of European citizens and interests, international order and humanitarian principles.

- Support for EU conflict prevention, economic security and diplomatic efforts;

- Regional conflict inside the EU area: to respond to a request from an EU member state for assistance in the face of such conflict, including peacemaking.

- Regional conflict outside EU area: control of such a conflict that could affect European security or international security, including peacemaking;

- Preventive missions world-wide to stop attacks in Europe or on European interests by strategic terrorists, possibly armed with weapons of mass destruction.

Catastrophic Intrusion   Implicit in the ESS is a new relationship between rapidly changing societies and the new threats. Indeed, modern European societies are characterised by networked economies, territory and the complex interaction of critical infrastructures. Security and defence are therefore merging because the functioning of a state can be damaged as much by catastrophic intrusion as by territorial loss. If the twentieth century was the era of industrialised warfare and total war, conflict in the twenty-first century will be at least partly defined by small groups attempting to inflict great damage on highly-tuned, electronically-reliant societies within borders that henceforth will be as much three-dimensional and virtual as physical. In other words it will be an age of comprehensive security, requiring the organisation of states, as well as civil and military resources and capabilities into an effective, transnational holistic security whole.

It is particularly important to draw a distinction between tactical terrorism, of which Europe has significant experience and strategic terrorism. Tactical terrorism seeks to change the shape of a European state, normally by promoting secession of a region. Strategic terrorism not only seeks to change the direction of a state but also in time the nature of society itself. Consequently, the relationship between attack and political effect is very different between the two types of terrorism. For strategic terrorists only great effect, i.e. mass murder, can leverage their terrifyingly ambitious goal.

By its very nature ESDP will be the mechanism by which the EU confronts danger. It must, therefore, be both relevant and capable. In the new environment effectiveness emphasises integration of national security and defence efforts that in turn demands continued political cohesion within the EU. The EU must be politically cohesive and militarily effective if it is to secure the European citizen. For these powerful reasons, even though the Heads of State and Government could not agree on a European Constitution in December 2003, the development of a strategic ESDP has not stopped. Important elements continue to be developed, such as the ESS and the European Defence Agency (EDA). Most importantly, the ESS spells out for the first time the EU's vital, general and essential interests. This is important, because political consolidation will inevitably lead to a strengthened sense of solidarity and a shared strategic culture upon which the necessary development of a strategic ESDP will be founded. The creation of a European security space in turn emphasises the need for secure external borders of the EU and thus strengthened co-operation under the Schengen Agreement. However, much more needs to be done.

Only a progressively stronger, global reach ESDP will enable the EU to close the gap between Europe's security environment and its still inadequate security resources. That gap cannot be closed until EU member-states converge and harmonise national strategic concepts into a single EU strategic concept. The ESS represents the first step towards such an objective and as such is a pre-strategic concept. Indeed, agreement over why, when, where and how Europeans will act is the foundation of effective security and defence. Consequently, decisions taken by EU member-states today over the scope and

scale of their commitment to security will decide whether Europe passes or fails the test of security leadership implicit in the ESS.

A first step will be to strengthen security co-ordination at the supreme political level. To that end an EU Security Council (EUSC) should be established incorporating the Political and Security Committee (PSC). The EUSC would be designed to balance operational effectiveness with political legitimacy and would be responsible for both the military and civilian security and defence of the Union. The EUSC would be co-chaired permanently by the EU Foreign Minister, together with a new colleague, an EU Security Minister, the creation of which would reflect a strengthening of current High Representative role. During a crisis the Council would retain overall strategic direction, with the strategic control of EU operations under the EUSC. However, EU military operations will for the foreseeable future involve the generation and management of coalitions of the willing and able. Military-operational leadership must, therefore, be exercised by a 'trirectoire', made up of Britain, France and Germany for operations undertaken without recourse to NATO assets. In time an EU Permanent, Combined and Joint Headquarters (EUPCJHQ) should be established to supersede the planning and command role of the trirectoire, possibly within the framework of an EU-NATO Operational Planning and Command Centre (EUNOPS).

Implementation of the European Security Strategy and military effectiveness therefore will not simply be a function of institutional efficiency, military capability or even defence transformation. Transformation will also require the fostering of a distinct European strategic culture and above all a clear set of guidelines for the credible use of European coercion.

Recent operations have also demonstrated the need for better organisation of more capable European forces and resources across the national and civil-military divide. Events since September 11, 2001 have at least in theory validated an EU approach that emphasises a broad and balanced understanding of security. The first duty of the EU and its member-states must therefore be the genuine fulfilment of the military capabilities commitments explicit in the Headline Goal and implicit in the ESS and their further development. Any pretensions to

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have fulfilled those commitments when it is patently not the case will only serve to weaken the security and defence of Europeans by undermining the credibility of the ESDP. Moreover, given Europe's security environment, such security pretence will inevitably lead to ill-equipped and under-trained Europeans finding themselves in very dangerous places.

The ESS also reinforces the vision set out in the 1999 Helsinki Declaration and the 2003 Draft Constitutional Treaty for an autonomous, capable and cohesive 'defence Europe'. The Declaration called for a European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) to be "…militarily self-sustaining with the necessary command, control and intelligence capabilities, logistics, other combat support services and additionally, as appropriate, air and naval elements". Headline Goal 2003 has at best been partially fulfilled. The ESS thus reinforces the need for a Headline Goal 2010 and its proper fulfilment in addition to the full operationalisation of the ERRF by 2008. The ESS implicitly emphasises linkage between a strategic ESDP and the European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP). The ECAP also needs to be strengthened and harmonised with NATO's Prague Capabilities Commitments (PCC). True autonomy demands (as opposed to autonomy pretence) that EU forces possess both the necessary direct capabilities for effective firepower, mobility and intelligence, together with sufficient support elements or framework capabilities to sustain operations that the ESS will indirectly generate over distance and time. If the force is to be "militarily self-sustaining", i.e. does not need US support, it will also require a range of support capabilities in addition to the Rapid Reaction Force itself.

At the same time, Europe's halting progress towards the creation of such a force underlines the challenge the EU member-states face. The ERRF is a corps-sized land force (50-60,000) supported by 100 ships and 400 aircraft capable of fulfilling at their most robust the original Petersberg Tasks of rescue and humanitarian missions, peacekeeping and the role of combat troops in peacemaking. The full force of 60,000 was to be ready by 2003, deployable within 60 days with smaller rapid response elements (high readiness forces) deployable in 7 days and special force (very high readiness) deployable between 1 and 3 days. Whilst the very high readiness and high readiness components of the ERRF

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could be constituted today only elements of the larger force exist. Moreover, given the need to rotate forces (a force deployed must be matched by a roughly equal force on standby and a force standing down) a fully deployed and sustained ERRF would need to draw from a pool of between 180,000 and 200,000 that can cover its broad range of missions.

The EU is a new security actor capable of applying the broadest set of civilian and military security tools yet known. Whether it is projecting security and stability beyond Europe, protecting Europe against terrorism or other threats or undertaking sustained diplomatic engagement, only effective co-ordination at the European level will provide effective security to the European citizen. In other words, holistic security in pursuit of complex security in a complex world.

2. What Europe Can and Cannot Do Now

The military objective implied in the ESS is to ensure conflict dominance in most scenarios short of state to state war. EU forces will thus require significant air superiority and strike capabilities able to operate from land and maritime platforms, such as aircraft carriers to dominate the littoral, protect the force, provide additional firepower as well as a conduit for augmentation forces. What Europe needs therefore is a force that can get anywhere, fight anywhere, eat anywhere, stay anywhere, be augmented and get back all organised by an autonomous command and control system under the sovereign political control of the EU.

Europe's first duty therefore is to close the gap between increasing operational intensity and the limited critical mass, availability and readiness of European forces. In the immediate future Europe must increase usability and move to further integrate its armed forces at every level of the command chain. EU forces must also work towards a better balance between military transformation, task generation, deployability and sustainability if they are to fulfil the military task list implicit in the ESS and the enhanced Petersberg Tasks.

2.1. What Europe Can Do

Whilst absolute deficiencies clearly do exist in European capabilities, one of the problems for European defence planners is the conceptual paralysis caused by uncertainty over which gap to close; that with Europe's security environment or that with US armed forces. The comparison with the scope and structure of US armed forces is by and large misplaced. There are 1.7 million Europeans in uniform but only 170,000 soldiers, of which 40-50,000 could be used for robust combat operations at any one time. Equally, it is very difficult to envisage an ESS-type scenario that could not be managed by 170,000 well-equipped and well-trained European troops. A strategic ESDP should therefore have two force planning objectives. First, to increase the number of well-equipped, trained and supported forces to around 170,000. Second, to improve the usability of the other forces to better enable them to undertake lower-intensity, follow-on missions, such as peacekeeping. Such a force level and force structure would enable the military fulfilment of ESS-type missions.

European armed forces possess sufficient air and naval forces for most operations envisaged in the ESS. The Laeken Summit declared that the ERRF would have 400 aircraft and 100 ships available for such operations. Included in that figure of 400 aircraft are significant numbers of battlefield helicopters to enhance mobility under the command of a deployable force headquarters. The creative generation of specific forces (force packaging) for specific missions would no doubt increase the effectiveness of the complex coalitions that by necessity the EU will have to generate and manage. However, there is no insuperable obstacle to sufficient effectiveness against the kind of adversaries the ESS envisages by the air and naval forces of EU armed forces. Simply because Europeans do not possess everything that US forces possess does not by any means render them useless. However, operations against organised air or sea defences or projecting air and sea power beyond the littoral against organised forces would increase the challenges and risks European forces would face. Political leaders would then have to weigh the political risks involved. At the same time, use of new force combinations (e.g. special forces, air and naval/

maritime packages) would help to maximise the likelihood of operational success and minimise the risks, particularly against the types of adversaries the ESS envisages. Creative thinking must be the order of the day.

Appendix 3 reinforces the message herein that in spite of the problems of usability the sheer numbers of personnel, assets and capabilities means that Europeans should be able to undertake a significant number of the missions implied in the European Security Strategy. At the very least Europeans should certainly be able to sustain significant deployments undertaking low-to-medium intensity missions near the European home base. However, the further away the operation, the higher the intensity of the conflict and longer it takes to resolve, the greater risk that European forces will take and the greater the likelihood of mission failure. Moreover, it is extremely unlikely that Europeans could run two medium intensity, extended operations at the same time, i.e. concurrently.

Forces of EU member-states can undertake significant rescues and humanitarian missions. Moreover, EU forces should make virtue out of necessity. For example, existing territorial forces could be re-employed over a relatively short period for peacetime homeland security functions, such as consequence management and support for the civilian authorities in emergencies, such as attacks on European critical infrastructure.

Certainly, forces of EU member-states can also undertake significant scale peacekeeping operations in and around Europe in permissive and, indeed, not so permissive environments. They also have sufficient forces to undertake limited medium intensity peacemaking, but again as the intensity level of conflict increases, so does the risk to EU forces and indeed the likelihood that such forces will cause significant collateral damage to civilians and infrastructure due to a lack of sufficient precision capabilities. Moreover, as the time for a deployment increases, the larger the force and the greater the distance over which it must be deployed the weaker the effect of European forces become. Therefore, Europe could only conduct limited operations to prevent or stop regional conflict beyond Europe, i.e. the immediate neighbourhood and very little beyond.

The EU possesses sufficient Special Forces to undertake small to medium scale counterinsurgency strikes almost anywhere in the world against terrorists.

Larger operations would be risky, not least because of a lack of a proven ability to operate together (interoperability) between these by necessity secretive forces.

Europeans could undertake some limited, high-intensity warfighting against organised forces. However, for major sustained operations the lack of key assets and capabilities, such as command, control, communications and computers capabilities (C4), intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), fast sea and air lift, adequate force protection, suppression of enemy air defences, precision-guided munitions and combat search and rescue (CSAR) would make operations ever more risky for Europeans the higher up the intensity scale and the greater the distance over which Europeans are deployed. At this level of conflict and mission intensity the linkage with US forces through NATO remains vital. The EU itself possesses very little of the operational command and control capabilities required to run any operations and has either to rely on its major member-states or use NATO. **Warfighting**

In other words, whilst Europeans possess the nucleus of a significant warfighting force, they will need significantly more of the limited types of capability they already possess, as well as a range of new capabilities and forces. The capabilities of EU member-states are not negligible and already include special forces, specialised infantry, armoured, mechanised and airmobile ground units. Interestingly, the development of a cadre of EU-employed gendarmerie-type forces would not only complement the EU's distinct and comprehensive security model, but significantly improve Europe's ability to undertake the conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction missions implicit in the ESS. **New Capabilities**

Force protection also needs to be enhanced by tactical missile defences and nuclear, chemical, biological and radiological (NBCR) protection, although it is open to debate how many ESS-type missions would require such capabilities. Equally, Europe is not without programmes, but needs more and better of the same. The Patriot missile defence system (PAC-3), which the Dutch Air Force already operates and the Italian-German-American Medium Extended Air Defence System (MEADS), which is still in development phase are important examples. More anti-tank guided missiles (ATGM) would enhance force pro- **Force Protection**

tection and several such man-portable systems are already in service with European armed forces (Eryx, Milan, Javelin), with further programmes on the way (Trigat-PARS-3). NBCR protection is weak given that European forces could well need such a capability against strategic terrorists. Specifically, Europe lacks protection suits for deployed forces and deployable de-contamination units.

Projection, protection and professionalisation will be essential for European coalitions undertaking higher-end ESS-type missions. The European Rapid Reaction Force and the NATO Response Force (NRF) are vital to the successful development of European forces that can act, be augmented and rotate other forces across a broad range of missions at several levels of conflict intensity over time and distance.

Therefore, Europeans are military-security actors of significant regional effect but only limited global effect. Able to fulfil a significant number of ESS-type missions a gap still remains between Europe's interests and values and its ability to affect them positively. EU forces lack the combination of projection, mobility, precision firepower and force protection together with a sophisticated, robust command chain and communications network capable of operating for sustained periods in dangerous environments. Many of these deficiencies are historical because during the Cold War European armed forces were by and large structured around US command and control.

2.2. The Three Tiers of Capability

Britain, France and Germany

At the same time there are three tiers of national armed forces within the EU that have important implications for the organisation of ESS-type missions. In some respects force structuring and packaging should be relatively straightforward because there is a natural division between the bigger states with significant capabilities, smaller EU member-states with some limited medium and even high-intensity capabilities and the rest, the forces of which are better suited to lower-to-medium intensity missions. Only Britain and France possess

strategic headquarters staffed by experienced officers that could plan and command operations across the enhanced Petersberg Tasks. Britain and France can also furnish the EU with significant forces for forced entry, high-end stabilisation and peacemaking operations. Moreover, because some ESS-type missions imply at their high end intense, short duration conflicts using highly specialised forces are at a premium. To that end Britain, France and Germany have recently proposed Battle Groups to enhance Europe's initial response to such contingencies.

The Dutch, Italians, Spanish and Poles represent the second tier of conflict spectrum capabilities, capable of projecting some elements and providing lower numbers of stabilisation and peacekeeping forces. It should be noted that the Italians have had some 10,000 troops stationed abroad for the past ten years, albeit on mainly peacekeeping missions. Second-tier countries could deploy field headquarters and some component commands for coalitions. However, only the major powers are able to provide high-level commands or forces across the European mission spectrum. Equally, Spain and Italy (in addition to France) could play a vital role by providing special police forces, such as Guardia Civil and Carabinieri essential to the successful management of transition between the tasks of combat troops in peacemaking, peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction and civil policing.

Netherlands, Italy, Spain and Poland

The third tier of forces (or niche forces) would be provided by other EU member-states. Specialisation would be the key, with each country progressively concentrating on areas of relative expertise. The newer member-states, grappling as they are with economic and defence reform, could add significantly to the overall effort by providing through aggregation a pool of forces specifically trained for lower-to-medium intensity operations, such as robust peacekeeping. Over time the high intensity/low intensity balance would change as defence investment patterns of the smaller member-states improve. However, such a division of labour would ensure that the enhanced Petersberg Tasks can not only be met but that a degree of operational redundancy is built into them. Whilst the nature of ESS-type missions implies some degree of military hierarchy between member-states, specialisation does not imply a political hierar-

The wider EU

chy within EU operations, but rather that every member state contributes in its own way and at its own level to successful EU operations. The EUSC will ensure equitable political leadership.

2.3. What Europe Cannot Do

European Limitations The grey area for European armed forces is where peacemaking meets warfighting and then lasts for a significant period. Iraq is demonstrating the very thin dividing line between high-end peacemaking and low-end warfighting that even Europe's major states would find difficult to sustain over time and distance. For example, the British took 70 days to deploy a force of 46,000 (of which 25,000 were combat troops) to the Gulf and would have difficulty sustaining a peacemaking force of around 15,000 in southern Iraq (current estimate 10,000). Out of a standing force of some 270,000 the German Army is under intense pressure deploying between 7-10,000 troops beyond the German border. France could probably have deployed no more that 15,000 combat troops to the Gulf.

Usability Again, Europe's basic problem (and by extension that of the ERRF) is the usability of its forces. To re-iterate, of the 1.7 million uniforms 10% (or around 170,000) are 'usable'. Of that 170,000 or so only between 40-50,000 could be used for peacemaking missions, or medium to high-intensity missions of the kind being undertaken in Iraq today, let alone some of the more dangerous high-intensity operations implied by the ESS and the enhanced Petersberg Tasks.

The Peacekeeping Gap An ever increasing operational tempo has further eroded the usability of European forces as the number of missions make greater demands on static or falling personnel numbers and defence budgets. To undertake effective peacemaking operations ideally a force should represent no less than ten percent of the population, especially in dangerous environments. Indeed, during the worst times in Northern Ireland there were roughly 10 British soldiers for every 1,000 citizens. In Bosnia today there are roughly 3.6 troops per 1,000 citizens, whilst

in Kosovo it is 12.5 per 1,000 . If the Northern Ireland model were to be adopted, coalition forces would need a force of at least 250,000 as opposed to the 160,000 or so in Iraq today. There are roughly 135,000 US forces in Iraq supported by some 180,00 Europeans. Given other deployments world-wide, even the US Army will find it difficult to significantly increase the size of its force in Iraq without extending the time of deployments. Therefore, Europeans would need to be able to contribute between 100,000 and 130,000 troops to achieve what is an effective balance between size of population and the peacemaking force on the ground. Europe could contribute at most 30,000. In Afghanistan there are around 0.2 troops per thousand citizens which raises serious questions about that mission, particularly beyond Kabul.

Europe's most capable army, that of the British, is a case in point. The entire regular British Army is 106,600 strong. Of that 106,600 around 17,000 are already deployed on missions overseas, including Iraq. The UK will need additionally a further force deployable of around 30,000 to rotate 15,000 in Iraq and the Balkans. Thus, the British have 45,000 of their army committed, or 40% of the headline force. Given that the British Army is a wholly professional force they could probably deploy at any one time around 60,000 during a national emergency short of all out war that threatened the home base. Moreover, the British have to rely increasingly on reserves and volunteer reserves for much of their combat support and combat support services. Nearly one third of the Royal Logistic Corps taking part in 'Operation Telic' in Iraq were Territorial Army or reserve soldiers. This places great strains on part-time forces, the sustained use of which is meant only for national emergencies.

The British Dilemma

The British dilemma is repeated in every EU member-state, only more so. Effective rapid reaction forces require that at least 40% of an overall force is deployable. In 2003 the Dutch were 9% deployed, with around 25% of their force usable. The Germans are roughly 3.9% deployed, with only 12% of the force usable, and that is at the very limit of the capacity of the Bundeswehr. The Belgians at 2.8% deployed are at their limit, with only 9% of the Belgian Army usable on operations. The French have 3.8% of their army deployed and could deploy up to 25% of their force. These shortfalls are repeated across Europe.

The Dilemma of Other Europeans

Poland, which took over command of a sector in Iraq in September 2003, has 41,000 professional soldiers in an army totalling 105,000, of which 2,000 are deployed in Iraq. A force of 2,000 requires at least 6,000 usable troops to ensure an adequate rotation of forces, or 15% of the usable professional Polish force, which is at the upper end of Polish capacity. In other words, only 7.5% of the entire Polish Army is available for deployment on operations.

<div style="float:left; font-weight:bold; text-align:right;">The Mission
Intensity Scale</div>

This structural weakness becomes more acute the higher up the mission intensity scale (Appendix 3). On a conflict intensity scale of one to ten in which one is the most permissive and ten the most dangerous, the ESS implies forces that can deploy and sustain operations up to at least level 8. Only the US can undertake operations and sustain them from conflict intensity levels 8 to 10, although the US Army is not comfortable undertaking complex peacemaking and peacekeeping operations. Britain and France are the key Europeans because of their ability to project professional forces capable of operating and sustaining some missions at the higher end of intensity even though that capability is limited given the wider security environment. Germany seeks to progressively develop such a capacity but is currently prevented from so doing by its limited defence expenditure. Thus German forces may be able to undertake operations at conflict levels 1 to 6 albeit with some very limited level of sustainability over time and distance. Other EU member-states, whilst possessing some useful forces and capabilities, find it difficult to sustain operations above level 4, and cannot operate over time and distance without US, UK and/or French support. Unfortunately, most EU member-states are at the end of a defence planning cycle that reflects decisions taken in 1991/2 in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War. At that time defence budgets were cut between 25% and 35% whilst only limited reforms were undertaken of force structure and capabilities. Consequently, too many EU militaries remain conscript-based and because they also remain committed to territorial defence, too static for contemporary security and defence needs. It will take a significant period of time before these countries generate a robust, projectable capability that will support high-end ESS-type missions.

<div style="float:left; font-weight:bold; text-align:right;">Hollowing Out</div>

Weaknesses are not only confined to front-line forces. Almost all of the EU's armed forces have been 'hollowed out' since the end of the Cold War with logi-

stical and other support being particularly badly eroded. The British logistical strategy allowed for a force of 9,000 deployed over three months at full combat strength. The strategy was founded upon the belief that during times of crisis when larger and more sustained deployments would be required, civilian contractors would replenish military stores with a 'just in time' strategy similar to that used by major civilian retailers. It did not and does not work. During the Iraq operation the UK's Defence Logistics Organisation (DLO) came close to collapse. Given that the UK represents roughly 30-40% of Europe's experienced advanced expeditionary warfare capability, with the partial exception of France, the ability of EU forces to sustain medium to high levels of conflict intensity is limited.

Consequently, for all the ambitions implicit in the ESS, EU forces are still structured to reflect decisions taken at the end of the Cold War. It is therefore imperative in this post-9/11 world that if Europeans are to effectively promote security and stability and realise the ESS that decisions are taken and commitments maintained and further developed. The forces of EU member-states must close the gap between the changing security environment in which Europe finds itself and the ability of the EU to play its part to effect. Therefore, Europeans will not only need more forces, but forces of a new type. The generation of usable, networked, precision and protected forces is vital. That will take time and cost money.

Closing the European Capabilities Gap

3. With Whom a Strategic ESDP Should Work

In many ways, the European Security Strategy was a response to the US National Security Strategy of 2002 offering both support to America's aims and yet implicitly questioning the American security method. That said, the United States will remain the EU's main strategic partner with NATO remaining the guardian of the military link with American forces. However, the nature of the relationship between Europeans and Americans has changed fundamentally since the end of the Cold War. Iraq has further reinforced a perception of gro-

The United States and NATO

wing divergence in the strategic cultures and methods of Europeans and Americans, even those Europeans that are taking part in the US-led coalition. This basic political reality can no longer be avoided. At the same time such divergence has been exaggerated in some European capitals for factional, opportunistic and parochial political gain, which has done as much damage to the EU's security and defence ambitions as it has to the transatlantic relationship.

The transatlantic relationship will inevitably become increasingly informal as the Union develops its own strategic culture and political autonomy. However, a significant degree of formality remains essential and guaranteeing effective transatlantic military co-ordination will be a vital mission for a reformed NATO. The most important planning assumption for both Americans and Europeans is to preserve the ability to operate together when they so choose and to avoid over-reaction when Americans and Europeans either choose to abstain or act alone. Operation Concordia in Macedonia and Operation Artemis in Congo demonstrated that not only is there more than enough for the partners to do, but that on occasions the EU's emerging strategic concept with its greater emphasis on holistic civil-military security is better suited to complex contingencies than the American emphasis on firepower and manoeuvre. NATO must therefore reflect a new balance between formality and informality in the transatlantic relationship.

Transatlantic Military Co-operation

A reformed NATO must be re-focused. First, the Alliance will remain the cornerstone for Europe's collective defence. Second, NATO must become the mechanism for the generation of transatlantic coalitions and projection of Europe's higher-intensity military capability world-wide. This new role has been demonstrated by ISAF in Afghanistan and NATO's support for Polish and Spanish forces in Iraq. NATO will also remain an important but not exclusive forum for policy co-ordination between the two sides of the Atlantic. The Alliance must also retain its Article 5 mission, which remains essential for the prevention of security re-nationalisation particularly in Eastern Europe. Additionally, NATO will also provide the primary forum for discussion of nuclear policy, even though the UK and France might in time have to discuss the role of their nuclear forces within the context of a strategic ESDP.

A reformed NATO will also be better able to act as a conduit for US techno- logy supporting the transformation of Europe's armed forces, particularly where it concerns enhancing the ability of European and US forces to work together. Even if Europe adopts a common European defence market, it must not lead to a fortress Europe. However, because the forces of EU member-states will necessarily employ by and large a lower level of military technology than their American counterparts, the EU and NATO must work together to establish common technology and procurement criteria. The formal co-ordination of the ECAP and the Prague Capabilities Commitments would be an important step down that road.

The strategic dialogue between the EU and NATO must build on and iron out the remaining ambiguities of the Berlin-plus arrangements agreed at NATO's November 2002 Prague Summit by confirming the roles and functions of the two organisations, emphasising transparency in planning to ensure effective cohesion and co-ordination. Such a dialogue is vital, because in the event of the EU being unable to manage an escalating crisis it will be NATO – by extension the US – that will ensure escalation dominance. That role cannot be over-emphasised, because for the foreseeable future European forces are and will be over-extended and over-stretched. Berlin-plus is designed to offset such dangers. Indeed, escalation dominance is the essence of Berlin-plus. In effect, NATO will remain the 'big stick', the ultimate sanction that will reinforce the 'softer voice' of the EU in security and defence, whilst at the same time providing a military conduit through which Europeans can contribute more effectively to sharing the burdens of global security. To re-iterate, NATO's primary role will be to manage the inevitable and unavoidable difference in US and European strategic perceptions and policy, and to bridge the gaps in force structure and capabilities that result from such differing policy perceptions.

One particular emphasis of the strategic EU-NATO dialogue must be to ensure that the NATO Response Force and the ERRF are developed in parallel with clear agreement over when, how, where and why the two forces are deployed. It is important to note that the two forces by and large draw from the same pool of forces and the danger exists that competition between the two will reduce the utility of both.

NATO Standards

NATO will also continue to set the standards for the rules, guidelines and mechanisms that ensure effective interoperability and co-operability and the standardisation procedures for global reach, high-intensity operations. Interoperability and co-operability are vital to successful coalition operations in the future and NATO remains the best forum for the technical development of planning and operational convergence within the transatlantic and broader European frameworks. Strategic ESDP developments must at the very least be compatible with that objective.

Autonomy and Capability

The EU has proposed the establishment of two EU planning and command cells, one at SHAPE and one at the EU Military Staff (EUMS) to help overcome the lack of specific EU operational planning and command capabilities essential to autonomous EU-led operations. EU autonomy and compatibility with NATO must be reflected in the planning concept of a strategic ESDP.

New Arrangements

The new arrangements assure EU access to NATO planning and command capabilities, confirms availability of pre-identified NATO capabilities and common assets for EU-led operations and formalises European command options for EU-led operations It also confirms the command role of the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR) for EU-led operations and adapts NATO's defence planning system at SHAPE to ensure availability of forces for EU-led operations. Senior officers of non-NATO, EU countries or countries that are not within the integrated military structure of the Alliance must also be able to assume that role, reinforcing the need for an embedded EU planning and command capability at SHAPE.

Inter-operability or Co-operability

In theory there are two avenues open to Europeans to maintain military cohesion with the Americans. First, European forces could aim for full interoperability with US forces by ensuring that European and US forces are trained on the same warfighting principles and use similar technology, equipment and doctrines and to that end the role of the so-called Military Interoperability Council is important. Second, European forces could develop a degree of 'co-operability' with the Americans, i.e. differences in equipment, training and doctrine are accepted, but through flexible command and control arrangements European forces remain able to plug into US networks. Whilst a mixture of the

two approaches is to some extent inevitable given the technology gap between American and European forces, co-operability represents a better focus for European planning goals.

Amongst the other major powers that are either affected or to a certain degree involved in a strategic ESDP, Russia is vital. At the very least it is clear that Russia must be convinced of the value of a strategic ESDP and encouraged to deepen its relationship with the EU. The development of a strategic ESDP also represents a new structure within the broad European security architecture that must be compatible with and acceptable to new partners. The Cold War is over and the ESS implies new partnerships, not only with Russia but others, such as Canada, China, India, Japan and Ukraine. Moreover, strong regional partnerships will be essential. Indeed, a strategic ESDP will have significant influence in regions as widely separated as the Americas, Asia, the Middle East and Africa. A strategic ESDP will also require a direct EU diplomatic presence around the world under the control of the EU Foreign Minister.

The legality afforded by the United Nations is a central tenet of the ESS. Throughout the 1990s and beyond the debate over the role and function of the UN has gained momentum. In several international crises the legitimising role of the UN has appeared to weaken. However, it is clear that the UN will continue to be essential to the legitimisation and legality of EU operations, even though the EU will not formally subordinate itself to the UN. Therefore, reform of the UN Security Council (UNSC) is a matter of both sensitivity and urgency for the EU. At the very least European positions on the UNSC must be co-ordinated through the EU Security Council.

4. How to Close the Gap Between the European Security Strategy and the ESDP

Europe's security environment will not wait. The EU must be in a position to undertake all ESS-type missions at their most demanding by 2015 at the latest. A European strategic concept would define not just what is important for

Europe to uphold but when, why, where and how the EU would act in the defence of European interests and values. A first step on the road to turning the European Security Strategy into a strategic concept must be to translate the ESS into security and defence missions with a detailed military task list developed thereafter. Indeed, only through such an approach will a strategic ESDP be defined. Moreover, a strategic ESDP military task list would in turn provide the framework for European force transformation, integration of European armed forces, planning for future missions, equipment programmes and defence financing requirements. However, a strategic ESDP will not just be a mechanism to enable the EU to act, but the essential platform upon which Europe's strategic self-confidence will be re-generated. Structure follows power, but only effective structure can in turn render power effective and just. Both of which are of equal importance in this age.

Political Control & Strategic Direction

Therefore, political control and strategic direction of operations emphasises commonality, equality and legality through the Council and the EU Security Council. To that end, the Political and Security Committee must be incorporated into the EUSC with a strengthened secretariat. The EU Military Committee (EUMC) should be supported by a beefed up Situation Centre and in time an EU Permanent Combined and Joint Planning and Command Headquarters, possibly within the framework of an EU-NATO Operational planning and Command Centre that could eventually replace SHAPE. Such a structure will promote a balance between political legitimacy, legality, military effectiveness, decision-making and decision-shaping over EU security operations.

Coalition Leadership

Prior to defence integration military operations of a strategic ESDP will be founded upon the generation and management of coalitions. The need for both lead and framework nations to underpin coalition planning for military operations was demonstrated during the Gulf War (1991), the Kosovo War (1999), Afghanistan (2001), Iraq (2003) and Congo (2003). Indeed, military effectiveness rests upon a lead nation, especially one that can provide the operational framework that enables others to 'plug in' to operations. Before any operation a clearly agreed desired political and military end-state must be identified, as well as rules of engagement, because discretionary operations by their very nature are

intensely political. During such operations units of other nations must be subordinated to the overall military leadership of the lead nation(s), allowing them to carry out operations effectively. Among EU member-states there is no nation that can lead and provide a framework for large-scale combat operations, nor is there a natural political core. The EU, in particular the EUSC, must in time develop into a coalition leader, adopting the role hitherto associated with a lead nation. Once agreement in the Council had been reached, contributing countries would commit troops for the entirety of an EU operation or until the Council formally declares a crisis to be at an end. The role of the EUSC will therefore be vital.

At the same time, given the role of coalitions in a strategic ESDP, the three major European military actors Britain, France and Germany will by necessity lead EU military operations but not exclusively so. Inevitably, coalition operations will therefore emphasise a hub and spoke command structure. Thus, EU member-states will be faced with a choice. Whether a state is seen as a 'hub' state or a 'spoke' state will be very much down to the ability of a member-state to plan, command and undertake advanced expeditionary coalition warfare and medium to high intensity operations envisaged for the European Rapid Reaction Force and implied by the ESS. Therefore, the EU must formalise capability thresholds, so that states can decide whether they seek the role of hub or spoke. The need for such a capability is self-evident. Italy, Poland and Spain could become hub powers but will need to thoroughly re-invest in and re-organise their armed forces, as well as improve their headquarters capabilities. The Netherlands also stands on the cusp between the hub and the spokes and could lead smaller operations. Whilst organised reasonably efficiently and possessing fully professional armed forces, the under-funding of Dutch forces inevitably relegates them to the second tier of European armed forces.

The need for a rapid and marked improvement in Europe's ability to generate complex coalitions for complex missions places particular emphasis on a European approach to force transformation. Indeed, the management of coalitions for ESS-type missions will inevitably require some new types of forces and doctrine to provide a common base not just for operations, i.e. the way militaries do things, but also so-called military software, such as training, and procurement.

The Trirectoire & Hub and Spokes

Force Trans- formation

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Strategic European Command and Control Hub

If the EU is to play a coalition leadership role, a strategic European command and control hub will in time be required. For the time being that hub will be furnished informally by the power hub of the trirectoire. However, as EU forces find themselves deployed on ever higher intensity missions, planning and command will need to be formalised and institutionalised through the development of EU planning and command cells at both SHAPE and the EU Military Staff into NATO-compatible headquarters that will ensure autonomous EU control, hence the need for an EU-NATO Operational Planning and Command Centre. The development of such a capability should take place in parallel with improvements in European capabilities and only operationalised when relevant capabilities commitments and force level thresholds have been fulfilled.

EU Intelligence Capabilities

Essential to European strategic self-confidence are sufficient, autonomous strategic European eyes and ears. Not only will such self-confidence make the EU a more effective security and defence actor, it will make Europeans better allies of the United States. Indeed, Europeans are only likely to act promptly and in a determined manner when they are sure that they control both the quality and flow of intelligence. The failure of US intelligence in the run-up to the Iraq war has severely dented European confidence in American sources. The EU must therefore further develop a strategic intelligence identity in the fields of both signals intelligence (SIGINT) and human intelligence (HUMINT). Europe needs in the first instance limited SIGINT assets that enhance both imagery and technical intelligence-gathering capacities of the EU, building upon the satellite imagery capabilities that the French, Germans and Italians have developed and air-breathing capabilities, such as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), both strategic and tactical. The EU must also move to enhance the sharing of intelligence and the dissemination of classified information within the EU. An EU Joint Intelligence Committee (EJIC) working directly into the offices of the EU Foreign and Security Ministers could help to co-ordinate and safeguard shared raw intelligence, staffed by national intelligence officers, supported by national intelligence agencies and in time by new EU co-ordinated human intelligence capabilities that combine military and criminal intelligence, essential to a successful counter strategic terrorism strategy. Under

the EU Homeland Security Agency a specific EU counter-terrorism human intelligence agency should be established. In time, autonomous military satellite communications and geo-positioning systems, such as Galileo will further enhance European operational autonomy and self-confidence.

EU military transformation must also take place at a time when a fundamental shift is taking place in American doctrine from platform centric warfare to system centric warfare. For this forces are linked into a complex IT network throughout the command, founded upon the desire for ever greater situational awareness at both strategic and tactical levels and ever shorter sensor to shooter cycles. Whilst the Europeans are unlikely to develop a network centric concept as complex as the Americans, there are components therein that should be developed to better enable and link European forces into one electronic command. This includes a control and communications virtual battlespace linking all European forces engaged on ESS-type missions. In other words, European forces will not be as extensively or intensively networked as their American counterparts. A European Network Enabling Capability (ENEC) will thus enable linkages between European forces rather than provide a single advanced network. It will necessarily operate at a lower level of situational awareness and with forces less networked than their American counterparts. However, the ENEC would need to be developed in parallel with a specifically European interoperability concept to ensure European interoperability dominance over all operations likely to be generated by the European Security Strategy. Ironically, the NRF is in many ways a test bed for the European Network Enabling Concept and the ERRF needs to be developed more with such a concept in mind. However, as the NRF uses assets from the same pool of capabilities as the ERF, the development of future European capabilities will have to take developments in US warfighting concepts fully into account. At the same time, Europeans must press the United States to consider new thinking on traditional 'muddy boots' peacekeeping and new warfighting/peacemaking transitional conflict as part of its transformation concept.

At a practical level the manner by which the EU draws on forces answerable to it is also likely to be significantly different to that of the Alliance. EU

European Network Enabling Concept

Complex Coalition Generation

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force packages, although 'top ended' by a full deployment of the ERRF will doubtlessly involve a majority of missions requiring smaller force packages. The 1,500 strong Battle Groups, although conceived for rapid entry and high intensity missions, could also be deployed at lower levels of intensity over shorter distances. Indeed, Battle Groups could become the basic building block of EU force packaging, not least because the EU is likely to have to organise complex coalitions over relatively short time frames.

Force Planning

Since being declared partially operational at the Laeken Summit in 2001, a systematic if somewhat fitful approach to force planning has continued. This has been based upon the sustained and progressive development of force packages to 'elaborate' the Headline Goal, even though the EU does not possess a system for effective force packaging. It is a bottom-up approach intended to provide a link between the ESDP and the broader framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). There are six key steps in the process that have been developed by the EU Military Committee; definition of the overall strategic context as a foundation for force planning, the articulation of key planning assumptions, the selection of realistic planning scenarios for the deployment of forces, the identification of the forces that would be required to support such scenarios, the development of 'force packages' that could take on such missions and identification of those forces necessary to meet the full range of requirements implicit in the Headline Goal. This theoretical paper exercise has been reinforced by the practical experience of command, control and operational handling gained through Operation Concordia in Macedonia and Operation Artemis in the Congo.

Force Generation Database

However, to offset inevitable problems with the generation and management of such complex coalitions, the EU will need a Force Generation Database (FGD) of available forces under the control of the EU Permanent Combined and Joint Headquarters. In effect, such a database would enable European commanders to rapidly identify the optimum force structure given variable coalitions undertaking varied missions. Therefore, it would reinforce the ability of commanders to advice political leaders what is feasible or not. The EU Force Generation Database would also include those forces allocated (or that could

be allocated) by partners and associate nations through the Committee of Contributors system.

The Committee of Contributors is an important element in generating coalitions of the willing and able that ESDP relies upon. It is designed to enable both member-states and non-EU states to participate in EU-led operations. The Committee is organised around those member states participating in a military operation and decided at a force generation conference and thus emphasises flexibility. Closely connected to the Operation Commander and the Political and Security Committee, the Committee of Contributors takes decisions on the day-to-day management, discussing reports from the Operation Commander and expressing its views to the PSC and the European Military Committee. However, flexibility can lead to uncertainty. The committee structure therefore needs to be strengthened and in time a direct link to the EUSC established to give larger contributing non-EU member-states a strong say over the political direction of operations.

Committee of Contributors

A particularly important role for EUPJHQ will be to familiarise officers from non-EU-NATO members and non-NATO, non-EU states with multinational coalition operations founded upon shared operational concepts and doctrine in a varied mission environment.

New Doctrine

Whilst interoperability and co-operability between forces should be based upon best NATO practice, especially in terms of standardisation of practice and equipping and certification of forces, the nature of contemporary European coalition generation will probably require some new doctrine and, as indicated above, a new approach to interoperability. However, in spite of the differences that emerged in 2003 there is no point militarily in the EU developing entirely new warfighting doctrine that would reduce the ability of EU forces to work with the United States at higher levels of intensity.

Ad hoc attempts are underway at limited force integration, albeit driven too often by defence cuts rather than strategic planning. Germany and Poland have agreed on broad logistical co-operation for their Leopard 2 main battle tank fleets, as part of the integration of the German 7th Tank Division and the Polish

Force Integration

10th Tank/Cavalry Brigade. Belgium and the Netherlands have integrated their naval forces. However, the most ambitious project thus far is the proposal for a European Strategic Airlift Command. A co-ordinated approach to force integration would maximise military effect and the EU Military Staff would seem best placed to develop such a plan. At the same time a strategic ESDP is likely to generate greater effect if common elements therein are developed through the integration of tail or rear elements, rather than teeth elements. Pooled logistics and lift will be an essential part of a strategic ESDP.

In time some multinational formations could become the focus for future integration efforts of teeth elements. Eurocorps could certainly play such a role. It is already certificated by the Alliance (it has been formally approved for a command role) as one of NATO´s High Readiness Force Headquarters and all NATO members have been invited to send personnel to its Headquarters. Equally, there are other formations that could play such a role. The Multinational Corps North-East (Germany, Poland, Denmark), the European Rapid Operation Force (EUROFOR – France, Italy, Spain, Portugal) and the United Kingdom-Netherlands Amphibious Force (UKINLAF) have already proved their value. Clearly, both the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) and the Eurocorps will be important cohesive mechanisms in the generation and command of European coalitions.

Neither the ERRF nor NRF are forces in isolation but part of an emerging array of military infrastructures. Moreover, because they are 'paper forces', rather than standing forces their compositions reflect the existing inventories of member-states and a diverse range of equipment-types and operational procedures. Harmonisation is therefore vital. Member-states must permit the EU Military Staff to begin a long-term planning exercise aimed at harmonising equipment types and operational procedures using the operational needs of both the ERRF and NRF as baselines for such an exercise.

The use of the Helsinki Force Catalogue and the development of a well-defined military task list has enabled Europeans to set some autonomous benchmarks for the development of effective capabilities. These goals are reflected in the European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP). However, a lot more needs to

be done if the organisation of a strategic ESDP is to be supported by adequate capabilities. Indeed, that has traditionally been the European dilemma. Both the approach and the thresholds implied therein must be developed. However, only fulfilment of these commitments will ensure Europeans will close the gap between what it is able to do and what the ESS implies it needs to do. Failure will not only undermine the ESS but the European Union itself at a time when the sense of vulnerability amongst European citizens is as high as at any time since the end of the Cold War.

5. How to Support a Strategic ESDP

A strategic ESDP will require significantly more robust combat support (CS) and combat support services (CSS) than currently available to European forces. Clearly, for a strategic ESDP to underpin European strategic self-confidence, such capabilities would need to be available and autonomous. This is particularly important for combat support services which enable coalitions to get there, stay there, do what they have to do whilst they are there and get back. These capabilities include advanced communications, air and sea transport and logistics. Europe already possesses significant assets and capabilities, but it will take time and investment before bespoke assets can be procured that can support projected European forces operating at the higher-levels of conflict intensity. Thus, a particular emphasis must be placed on creative, interim solutions.

Framework Capabilities

As indicated above, the EU must develop access to sources of real-time strategic and tactical intelligence to reinforce the political autonomy of its decision-making. Again, the development of such assets and capabilities should be seen not as duplication but rather an enhancement of overall Western security capabilities. For example, the EU Satellite Interpretation Centre at Torrejon must become part of the European Network Enabling Concept. To that end greater utilisation of open and commercial information sources, particularly in support of peace operations, need to be explored, because civilian technology

Strategic & Tactical Intelligence

is available, highly advanced and can provide cost-effective support. Ultimately, the EU itself must be developed into an effective framework provider for coalition operations.

Creative Mobility Solutions

The problem of mobility will remain with EU forces for some time to come, but in the interim solutions could be found if a more flexible approach to problem-solving was adopted. For example, Europe's developing high-speed rail network could be employed to move EU forces rapidly in support of EU operations, either adjacent to a theatre (such as the Adriatic coast of Italy) or to a port (UK forces from southern England to Marseilles, for example). High-speed rail systems are broader and stronger than traditional railways and with specially designed wagons the possibility of rapid transit even of armoured formations should not be discounted, particularly as the Trans European Network (TEN) develops. The EU should also explore the feasibility of legally requisitioning ships of member-states for service during a time of crisis by adapting European law to enable the use of ships under flag to EU member-states.

European Security and Defence College

The integration of national elements into several multinational forces over the past decade has generated significant experience within the EU over the coalition management of transnational coalitions. These not only include the obvious issues such as doctrine, command language and joint training, but also harmonisation of mission culture, such as objectives, differing perspectives over the nature of operations, acceptable levels of risk, rules of engagement and the use of force, as well as cultural attitudes to local populations. Whilst existing national defence colleges should be better harmonised as a first step, the proposed European Security and Defence College (ESDC) would be the logical place to develop command language, doctrine and training expertise, as well as further harmonisation. It should also include a strong civil-military training component, such as that employed by the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP).

European Public Opinion

The 'passive' aspects of defence are becoming ever more important in the face of strategic asymmetric threats. Indeed, the projection of European forces is unlikely without effective 'homeland' security and strong public support. Political will and military capability are inextricably linked and dependent on

the support of public opinion. For the EU this has both positive and negative aspects. On the one hand, if the EU has a secure home base then it will be more willing to participate actively as a cohesive and coherent element in operations and eventually to take the lead in security operations. On the other hand, an insecure home base will mean that the EU is less able and less willing to participate energetically in security operations. Thus, the political base of any European force is essential. To that end, it is vital that a strong constituency of European public opinion supports both the concept of a strategic ESDP and the operations implied by the ESS. To date, much of the development work of the ESDP has taken place behind closed doors involving policy-makers and experts without any reference to European publics. A public relations campaign is needed that informs, reassures and involves European public opinion. It is inconceivable that a strategic ESDP can develop without the active support and commitment of European citizens. Now is the time to act. The alternative is unattractive; the detachment of the European defence and security effort from the ordinary citizen. Given the inevitable need to professionalise EU forces, this is a very real danger. A strategic ESDP must be explained to the European citizen to indicate both the scope of the challenge Europe confronts and the security that is being organised on his and her behalf. The nature of contemporary security raises fears about excessive intrusion by security agencies, a degree of which is inevitable in an age of strategic terror. Protection against over-intrusion would be improved by the appointment of a European Security Ombudsman closely linked to the European Court of Justice (ECJ).

One of Europe's weaknesses is that the official strategic community fails both to share intelligence effectively and make adequate use of civilian and academic expertise in building up strategic situational awareness. Political, cultural and socio-economic understanding will be of particular importance to successful counter-terrorism and strategic peace support operations. Much of this knowledge exists in knowledge communities that span government, academia, NGOs, the media and the private sector. Access to this range of specialist knowledge could provide Europe with a major advantage when planning such operations. Indeed, having accurate and timely expertise on tap when unexpec-

Knowledge Communities

ted crises occur can accelerate the speed and improve the reliability of the decision-making process. Use of the wider academic and policy community must also be seen as critical to strategic situational awareness. EU agencies, such as the EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), must be more closely involved with longer-term forecasting and better equipped to act as a focal point for bringing together Europe-wide expertise. Furthermore, the EU needs to develop closer relationships with the emerging network of think-tanks. The United States is far more effective in the use of such extra-governmental expertise and thus has a far stronger conceptual base for its longer-term security and defence planning.

6. How to Equip and Afford a Strategic ESDP

6.1. Equipping ESDP

European Defence Agency

A truism of military effectiveness is that command autonomy requires direct control over equipment. At their meeting in Thessaloniki in June 2003 the European Council agreed to create a European Defence Agency to better harmonise national efforts in the development, research, production and acquisition of armaments.

Macro-Defence Convergence Criteria

Implicit in the EDA concept is the further integration of support elements mentioned above and it is essential that such integration be placed within a longer-term conceptual framework. There are two approaches, an amalgam of which is almost inevitable; top-down and bottom-up. Macro-Defence Convergence Criteria (MDCC) is a top-down approach that draws its inspiration from the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) that led to the Euro. This approach partly underpinned the 'Tervuren Concept' put forward by France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg at their meeting on 29 May, 2003. Although not in itself a blueprint for a European Army it argues that to increase military effectiveness functional integration of key support elements is vital. Consequently, there are a range of rear or tail elements of military formations

that should become common at an early stage to enhance the effectiveness and military cost effectiveness of a strategic ESDP and that might in time lead to Defence and Military Union (DMU).

Defence convergence criteria can be divided into two main categories: economic criteria and military criteria. The main economic criteria include adopting agreed defence spending levels, more balanced defence budget, a common European defence budget for some capital and operational expenditure, rationalisation and re-grouping of defence industries, establishment of a common European defence market and a Europe-first approach towards defence industry restructuring and procurement. The establishment of the EDA falls broadly within such an approach but as it is currently constituted it is only part of the solution and will not solve Europe's many problems at a stroke. Organisation is one thing, money another. Like it or not, Europeans will have to spend better and spend more if they are to close the gap between ESS-type missions and current European capabilities. Spending better would be a start. There is a pressing need to achieve a better balance between personnel and equipment budgets that result in too much being spent on non-vital personnel by too many European forces. For example, the United Kingdom invests up to 184,000 Euros per year on the training, transport and equipment of each front-line soldier, which is roughly twice the amount that Germany invests.

On the other hand, the European Capability Action Plan is a bottom-up approach that seeks to progressively enhance the capabilities of EU member-states. In phase one of the ECAP 144 military related targets were identified. Over 100 of them have already been achieved by European forces. The deficit areas have been analysed by 19 Working Panels, the results of which were presented to the Council in final reports in summer 2003. In the current phase eight Project Groups are working on the implementation of concrete co-operative projects; air-to-air refuelling, headquarters, combat search and rescue, NBC-protection, theatre ballistic missile defence (TBMD), unmanned aerial vehicles, strategic airlift, space based assets, and interoperability issues concerning evacuation and humanitarian operations. Unfortunately, there are also key areas not addressed by the ECAP including attack helicopters, support helico-

<div style="text-align: right">**Spending Better**</div>

<div style="text-align: right">**European Capabilities Action Plan**</div>

pters, cruise missiles and precision guided munitions, strategic sea lift, and intelligence surveillance target acquisition and reconnaissance (ISTAR). Thus, whilst the co-operative approach of Project Groups enables every member-state to choose specific capability areas that emphasise expertise or specialisation, most of the capabilities will not enter service until 2008 at the earliest. Moreover, the process is not binding. In effect, European defence capitalisation and procurement reflects two approaches, both of which are being addressed inadequately in the context of the ESS and a strategic ESDP.

Buy Europe First Strategy

European defence industries are very much in the news as rationalisation gathers pace. Not as a function of EU policy but more the result of corporate and commercial pressure. Unfortunately, compared with the United States the failure to modernise and rationalise the European defence industry verges on the shameful. The irony is that institutional developments give a completely different impression. With the European Defence Agency it would appear that a secure, co-ordinated and cost-effective supply of equipment and material is almost assured. That is not the case. At the very least, a common European defence market is vital. If the US follows a 'Buy American First' strategy the EU must adopt a 'Buy European First' strategy to safeguard supply and re-supply. An EU Common Defence, Research and Technology Development Fund (EUDRTDF) would help generate R&T funding and moreover help to prevent the plundering of R&T budgets to meet operational costs. Clearly, European R&T expenditure needs to grow significantly if Europeans are to meet their own equipment needs.

Better Co-ordination?

The European procurement process remains too poorly co-ordinated and lacks effective sanction on those states that fail to meet their commitments. Whilst the European Defence Agency will be institutionally assigned to the Council, it will be organised around a two-tier system that reflects structured co-operation between activist core groups and thus will tend to follow rather than lead the process. A first tier will include all those member-states that support basic research efforts and the implementation of the ECAP Project Groups. A second tier will promote participation of member-states in specific weapons programmes. This builds on the structure at OCCAR, an 'informal'

armaments co-operation organisation founded by Britain, France, Germany and Italy in 1996 and emphasises the role of OCCAR as the continuing focus for project management essential to the all-important cost effectiveness. At the very least thresholds must be established to enable member-states to be fully involved in both tiers if they achieve agreed R&T expenditure levels, but some form of sanction will also be required.

The EU Commission has already signalled its desire to take the leading role in the research sector, particularly for 'big-ticket' items such as the Galileo global positioning system. The Commission and the EDA should take the lead in re-shaping European defence industries to improve costs and timelines of deliveries. To that end, the will to create a common defence market should be written into the Constitutional Treaty. At the same time the respective roles of the Commission and the EDA remain unclear.

The Role of the European Commission

Consequently, whilst more flexibility is being introduced into European procurement practice, particularly in areas of project management, European procurement still remains fundamentally dirigiste in its essence, too often reflecting inefficient, nationally-biased approaches, which leads to over-sized project teams, bloated costs and production schedules that overrun targets by significant periods and amounts. European defence industries are not cost-effective, uncompetitive and poorly organised. The obsession with national champions has served the European taxpayer poorly. The result is that Europe spends too much of the defence money it has not got on equipment that is not worth the money spent on it.

European Procurement Practice

The A-400M strategic lift aircraft is a case in point. The length of time the A-400M has taken to develop reflects the European procurement dilemma; not enough money or clear agreement on specifications funding over-priced and multi-role equipment, inefficiently produced, which whilst able to do quite a lot of things does few if any of them very well. The EDA must be given sufficient authority to overcome Europe's self-defeating procurement process.

A-400 M

Therefore, the first task for the EDA must be to prompt the member states to better harmonise military requirements and rationalise the current multifaceted and overly complex approach to armaments co-operation. In particular, the

Rationalisation and Convergence

agency should work with the Commission to provide the basis for promoting industrial rationalisation, and a forum for the dialogue needed to manage the political and technical issues that will inevitably emerge from the rationalisation of the European defence-industrial base. The EDA should also help to promote an easier and more effective transfer of defence technology and equipment between EU member-states, the exchange of sensitive information and technologies, as well as promote joint research and development.

European Prime Contractors

However, specialisation and effective co-ordination is only part of the solution. The US 'prime contractor' model is more efficient because it focuses programmes on a single lead industrial actor that manages all aspects of procurement programmes, thus encouraging flexible and effective project management. BAe Systems, EADS and Thales must evolve into European prime contractors in close collaboration with OCCAR. In time the EDA should become a European Armaments Agency, i.e. the main client.

Standardisation

In the longer-run European defence procurement will need to become more like that of a single state in which the only debate that matters is between strategy and the needs of Europe's land, sea and air forces together with its new security sector, rather than the process of inefficient horse-trading between states that serves Europe's citizens so poorly. Through harmonisation of equipment requirements and standardisation the EDA could enjoy many of the advantages of US procurement policy, i.e. larger research and development budgets, longer production runs and centralised project management. Indeed, only through such economies of scale can European governments overcome the ever-increasing unit cost of equipment, research and development costs associated with the digitisation of future conflict, the switch from platforms to systems and the need for expensive mid-life upgrades. Equally, it must be clearly understood that the defence market is unlike any other industrial sector. Therefore, a balance will have to be struck between the monopolistic tendencies of prime contractors, the need for effective co-ordination by the EDA, competition and value for money for the European taxpayer.

A Question of Trust

Ultimately, European procurement is a question of trust because of the intrinsic and often contradictory link between national defence procurement

policies and industrial policies. Only an effective EDA will promote trust between European governments and trust between European national champions. If the EDA becomes another paper tiger, the damage done to co-ordinated European procurement and by extension a strategic ESDP will be incalculable. For a strategic ESDP to be effective it must therefore have access to a secure and independent supply of equipment and technology to ensure that European policy remains free of restrictions or undue influence. As such, an autonomous procurement process is pivotal to European defence. It would certainly be unhealthy for the US or any other power to control the 'tap' of supplies to EU forces because the temptation to use such a means of control to influence European policy will undoubtedly prove too strong to resist on occasions. In conclusion, securing Europe's autonomous supply of advanced military technology and equipment (and its re-supply) is a pre-requisite for a strategic ESDP.

6.2. Affording ESDP

A strategic ESDP is also going to cost money. Indeed, fulfilling ESS-type missions will require that EU member-states to spend a minimum of 2% GDP per annum on defence, and spend it well.

The 2% Benchmark

Affording European defence has always been one of the most daunting challenges that confronts the EU. It has become axiomatic that European governments do not spend enough on defence. Much of the debate is fuelled by American frustration over what they see as inadequate burden-sharing, which is based in itself upon a false assumption that the US defence budget, some 3.2% of GDP, should be matched by its European allies. In fact, a lot of the money invested in recent years in high-tech defence projects by the Bush Administration has yet to show effective results, and the level of waste in US defence spending is at a level European can only dream of.

Affording European Defence

However, it is clear that a direct correlation exists between defence expenditure and an effective strategic ESDP that no clever re-allocation of existing resources can resolve. At some point, new money will be needed to meet ESS-

Spending Better, Spending More

type missions. Indeed, whilst a lot of resources could be released from existing budgets by better targeted expenditure, given the back-log in capital defence expenditure caused by the years of neglect of many of Europe's militaries, a significant level of up-front capital re-investment will be required if an effective strategic ESDP is ever to be realised.

<div style="float:left; width:30%; text-align:right; font-weight:bold;">Defence Business Affairs Programme</div>

Therefore, in parallel with modest real increases in European defence budgets the EDA should be charged with examining how existing resources could be used more effectively. For example, a lot of resources are wasted through redundant fixed assets and infrastructure and duplication of effort both nationally and transnationally in non-essential areas. A Defence Business Affairs Programme (DBAP) could help transfer best practice from the commercial sector, including the use of commercial techniques, such as outsourcing of non-core activities, leasing of equipment and just-in-time/focused logistics. Such an approach would build on experience gained around Europe in smart procurement and financing programmes. Better spending could also be promoted by the establishment of a European Security and Defence Audit Office (EUSDAO)

Defence Financing

Certainly, a new approach to defence financing is required. Many programmes are cut because most of the life-cycle cost of assets and capabilities comes in the initial R&D and production phases. Spreading cost across the life-cycle would make far more sense. Such an initiative could take place in partnership with commercial banks through leasing and other arrangements that build on existing public-private partnerships in both the civil and defence sectors.Traditionally, defence expenditure has been based upon a narrow national calculation of interest, threat and affordability and it is clear that this will continue for some time. Given other pressures on national treasuries a balance between affordability and capability will be unavoidable. This reinforces the need for common funding for common 'big ticket' items such as strategic intelligence and fast sea and heavy air-lift to maximise the effect of each Euro spent on a strategic ESDP. Ultimately it is up to political leaders to convince public opinion that security investment is vital and that in a dangerous age there will be a security return on security investment from increases in expenditure. There is no question that the process of professionalisation and

'projectionalisation' implied in the ESS will mean significant up-front expenditure that will be hard to justify without demonstrating that in the longer run such an investment will lead to more security. Certainly, every effort must be made to reduce the burden of such investment upon the taxpayer through a robust analysis of current expenditure and the adoption of new cost management techniques. However, Europeans must face up to two realities. First, it is no longer tenable for Europeans to rely on Americans for their security, particularly at a time when so many Europeans disagree with the way America 'does' security. Second, it is the duty of every European taxpayer to fund their own security and defence.

7. Agenda for the Future

The Second Venusberg Report has endeavoured to look beyond the immediate challenges faced by the European Union and to consider the security and defence implications of the European Security Strategy. However, it has stopped short of discussing some of the more esoteric issues that will no doubt one day have to be confronted. A European Security and Defence Union (ESDU), a European Army, the role of Nuclear Forces in a common defence and the role of Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty (i.e. collective and common defence) are all logical items on the future agenda of European defence, even if they remain controversial for the time being.

The implications of ever closer co-operation over security and defence between EU member-states and the progressive integration of the security and defence effort does suggest that in time the issue of a European Security and Defence Union might one day have to be confronted.

European Security and Defence Union

Much the same could be said for a European Army that today might have some attraction for smaller EU member-states as a cost-effective contribution to Europe's security and defence. However, whilst it is very hard to see a time when the major Europeans would be willing to completely submerge their military identities in such an entity, it can never be discounted, particularly if the

European Army

threats Europe faces become far bigger than Europe's ability to deal with them piecemeal. A vision for the future?

Although Anglo-French nuclear forces have no formal ESDP role they afford a de facto extended deterrence to all EU and NATO partners, even though neither London nor Paris would be willing to admit as much. In time it may be that the role of these forces might have to be formalised within an EU framework as they are within the NATO framework. Again, given the current strategic environment it will clearly not be for some time yet, but it is an issue that is unlikely to be avoided indefinitely.

Certainly, the logical implication of ever more intensive security co-operation is that one day there will be a common defence. That is hard to deny. However, what form of common defence will it be in a new age? Given the nature of the new threats and the vulnerability of critical infrastructure what is it that is being defended? In the wake of 9/11 NATO invoked Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. The invoking of Article 5 would almost certainly have triggered nuclear war a mere twenty years ago. There is a need to re-consider automatic armed assistance in an age of strategic intrusion.

For all its many challenges the deepening and widening of the EU has provided the main political dynamic in Europe for more than a decade. Reconciling these two powerful forces and the paradoxes they generate is more important than ever as the EU embraces ten new member-states. In principle, an EU with new members lays the groundwork for a strategic ESDP as the EU grasps with the implications of new threats to its enlarged security footprint in a complex Europe in a fractured world. One thing is clear; ever closer co-operation and ever wider involvement will inevitably lead to institutional and security and defence reform. Indeed, such reform is implicit in the European Security Strategy. Part of the rationale for the enlargement of the EU is security through the extension of stability to Central and Eastern Europe. Thus the fate of a strategic ESDP will be intrinsically linked to the political success of enlargement and mutatis mutandis impact upon its success. At the same time there is an inherent paradox in the enlargement process, because Central and Eastern Europe needs true security and defence integration far more urgently

in some respects than Western Europe. However, the many petty nationalisms inherent in the region are likely to resist the kind of co-operation implicit in a strategic ESDP. Unfortunately, failure to develop a shared vision of a Europe that stands tall and strong in the world also risks the very real spectre of defence re-nationalisation and with it the very insecurity, both economic and military, that the Union is committed to eradicate. EU enlargement thus represents for European defence what the Americans call the 'tipping point'.

An effective strategic ESDP is an integral part of the European Security Strategy. As Europe faces up to its unique vision of security so will the responsibilities that will inevitably accrue to a rich and stable Europe in a poor and instable world. The days when Europeans could be spectators of security are at an end. As Madrid so tragically demonstrated, a Europe that stands aside will be no less secure. Renewed conflict in the Balkans has also reminded Europeans that an inability to guarantee a stable Europe undermines any pretensions Europe might have to stabilise the world beyond. Thus, the only questions to which Europeans must find an answer concern the nature and scope of Europe's re-engagement in global security and the role the EU eventually plays within it. That is why the ESS is so important.

A More Secure Europe

For more than half a century Europeans have by and large witnessed non-Europeans answering Europe's security questions on Europe's behalf. Those days are over. The Second Venusberg Report started with the European Security Strategy and such is its importance it is only appropriate that the last word rests with it. "This is a world of new dangers but also of new opportunities. The European Union has the potential to make a major contribution, both in dealing with the threats and in helping realise the opportunities. An active and capable European Union would make an impact on a global scale. In doing so, it would contribute to an effective multilateral system leading to a fairer, safer and more united world". A visionary European Security Strategy needs a visionary European Defence Strategy.

A Secure Europe in a Better World

The Venusberg Group 2004

8. Glossary

ABM	Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
AD GUNS	Air Defence Guns
AEW	Advanced Expeditionary Warfare
AGM	Air-to-Ground Missile
AIFV	Armoured Infantry Fighting Vehicle
APC	Armoured Personnel Carrier
ARTY	Artillery
ATGM	Anti Tank Guided Missile
ATGW	Anti Tank Guided Weapon
BMD	Ballistic Missile Defence
BWC	Biological Weapons Convention
C4	Command, Control, Communication, Computer
C4ISR	Command, Control, Communication, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
C4ISTAR	Command, Control, Communication, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance and Target Acquisition
CCHQ	Component Commands Headquarters
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CS	Combat Support
CSAR	Combat Search and Rescue
CSS	Combat Support Services
CWC	Chemical Weapons Convention
DBAP	Defence Business Affairs Programme
DCI	Defence Capabilities Initiative
DSACEUR	Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe
EAA	European Armaments Agency
EAC	External Affairs Council
EADS	European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company
EAG	European Air Group Agency
ECAP	European Capabilities Action Plan

ECJ	European Court of Justice
ECM	European Common Market
EDA	European Defence Agency
EDTC	European Defence Transformation Concept
EFTC	European Force Transformation Concept
EJIC	European Joint Intelligence Committee
ElInt	Electronic Intelligence
ENAC	European Network Enabling Concept
ERRF	European Rapid Reaction Force
ESDC	European Security and Defence College
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
ESS	European Security Strategy
EU	European Union
EUAO	European Union Audit Office
EUCTIA	EU Counter Terrorism Intelligence Agency
EUDS	EU Diplomatic Service
EUFGD	European Force Generation Database
EUHSA	EU Homeland Security Agency
EUISS	EU Institute for Security Studies
EUJIC	EU Joint Intelligence Committee
EUMC	Military Committee of the European Union
EUMS	Military Staff of the European Union
EUNOPs	EU-NATO Operational Planning & Command Centre
EUPCJHQ	EU Permanent Combined and Joint Headquarters
EUROFOR	European Rapid Operation Force
EURTDF	EU Research and Technology Development Fund
EUSC	EU Security Council
EUSDAO	EU Security and Defence Audit Office
EUSPC	EU Strategic Planning Concept
FGD	Force Generation Database
FHQ	Field Headquarters

GAO	General Accounting Office
GBU	Glide Bomb Unit
GCSP	Geneva Centre for Security Policy
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HALE	High Altitude Long Endurance (UAV)
HHG	Helsinki Headline Goal
HumInt	Human Intelligence
ICC	International Criminal Court
IFF	Identification Friend or Foe
IFV	Infantry Fighting Vehicle
ImInt	Image Intelligence (surveillance and reconnaissance satellite)
IPTF	International Police Task Force (Balkans)
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
ISR	Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
ISTAR	Intelligence, Surveillance and Target Acquisition
JDAM	Joint Direct Attack Munition (GPS-guided precision bomb)
JSF	Joint Strike Fighter
LAM	Land Attack Missile
LGB	Laser Guided Bomb
LoI	Letter of Intent (on armaments cooperation)
LPD	Landing Platform Dock (naval forces)
LSM	Landing Ship Medium (naval forces)
LST	Landing Ship Tank (naval forces)
LT TK	Light Tank
MALE	Medium Altitude Long Endurance (UAV)
MANPADS	Man-portable Air Defence Systems
MBT	Main Battle Tank
MDCC	Macro Defence Convergence Criteria
MEADS	Medium Extended Air Defence Systems
MEDEVAC	Medical Evacuation
MIC	Military Interoperability Council

MOR	Mortar
MRL	Mobile Rocket Launcher
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NBCR	Nuclear, Biological, Chemical and Radiological
NCW	Network Centric Warfare
NEW	Network Enabling Warfare
NMD	National Missile Defence
NRF	NATO Response Force
NSSG	New Strategic Security Goal
OCCAR	Organisation Conjoint de Coopération en Matière d'Armement
OEW	Offensive Electronic Warfare
PADS	Patriot Air Defence Systems
PCC	Prague Capabilities Commitments
PGM	Precision Guided Munitions
PPEWU	Policy Planning & Early Warning Unit
PSC	EU Political and Security Committee
PSO	Peace Support Operations
QMV	Qualified Majority Voting
R&D	Research and Development
R&T	Research and Technology
RBA	Revolution in Business Affairs
RCL	Recoilless Launcher
RECCE	Reconnaissance
RL	Rocket Launcher
RMA	Revolution in Military Affairs
RTDF	Research and Technology Development Fund
SAM	Surface to Air Missile
SatCom	Satellite Communication
SEAD	Suppression of Enemy Air Defence
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe

SigInt	Signal Intelligence
SP ARTY	Self-propelled Artillery
SSBN	Nuclear-fuelled Submarine with Ballistic Missiles
SSK	Conventional-fuelled Submarine for Anti-submarine Warfare
SSM	Ship-to-Ship Missile
TBMD	Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence
TEN	Trans-European Network
TEU	Treaty on European Union
tkr	Tanker
TOWED	Towed Artillery
tpt	Transport
UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UCAV	Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
WEAG	Western European Armaments Group
WEAO	Western European Armaments Organisation
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

9. Appendices

Appendix 1: The Grand Strategic Level Tasks of ESDP

The development of such a system would direct and provide coherence to overall ESDP policy, including all military and non-military aspects. In specific terms, this would entail the designation of ESDP missions and the identification of the military tasks. As such, it would confirm the high level of systems, currently in place for the ESDP. The Council would retain supreme political control and would delegate responsibility to the High Representative, possibly working in harness with Deputy SACEUR, acting in capacity as Chief of ESDP operations. The Political and Security Committee (PSC) would control the strategic direction of operations day-to-day, advised by the EU Military Committee (EUMC), in turn supported by the EUPJHQ & the EU Military Staff.

The Military Strategic Tasks of ESDP: This phase of the operational development of the ESDP would involve determining the military strategic objectives and desired end-states, outlining the military action needed, allocating resources and applying constraints. The command and control hierarchy at this level would be focused upon designated ESDP Chiefs of Staff at the European Union Permanent Joint Headquarters (EUPJHQ). Agencies involved: Political and Security Committee (PSC), EU Military Committee, EUPJHQ and EU Military Staff.

ESDP Operational Level Tasks: This would build upon much of the work already completed by the EU Military Staff and would see the development of ESDP campaign plans which would synchronise military and other resources to achieve the desired end state and military strategic objectives. Operational planning and command would take place and be situated at the EUPJHQ. Agencies involved: EU Military Committee, EUPJHQ, EU Military Staff (SHAPE if recourse to NATO assets).

ESDP Tactical Level Tasks: Would involve the development of a capability to plan and direct ESDP military resources in battles and engagements within a sequence of major operations to achieve operational objectives. The command and control hierarchy would again be at the level of the EUPJHQ as the Operational Headquarters but also be delegated through the various national Field

Headquarters (FHQs) that would be subordinated to EUPJHQ during crises. Agencies involved: EUPJHQ, EU Military Staff , national Field or Component Commands (FHQs and CCHQs).

ESDP Support Commands: Would be responsible for resourcing, training and providing front-line capability (including fighting effectiveness, efficiency, multilingual communication skills and morale) and advice at the military strategic, operational & tactical levels and directing and supervising combined single service operations when required. The command and control hierarchy would be at the level of component and subordinate commands. Agencies involved: EU PJHQ, national Field Headquarters and Component Commands (FHQs & CCHQs), the European Security and Defence College (particularly for EU security policy training).

Appendix 2: Commitment of EU Member-states to the ERRF

	Maritime	Ground	Air
Austria		1 mechanised infantry battalion; 1 light infantry battalion; 1 NBC unit (2.000);	1 transport helicopter squadron;
Belgium	2 frigates; 6 mine countermeasure vessels; 1 command ship;	1 mechanised infantry brigade;	1 squadron F-16 (24); 8 C-130 HERCULES; 2 AIRBUS A-310;
Finland		1 mechanised infantry brigade; 1 transport company; 1 CIMIC company (2.000);	
France	1 SSN; 2 aircraft carrier (22 combat aircraft each); 2 amphibious ships; 4 frigates; 3 support ships;	Headquarters and C^{4}ISR; 1 light infantry brigade; 1 armed division ; 1 air borne division; 1 amphibious division; special forces (12.000);	1 air-naval group; 75 combat aircraft; 1 AWACS; 8 tanker aircraft; 3 transport aircraft (long range); 24 transport aircraft (mid-range);
Germany	13 ships; 1 amphibious transport ship;	German-Netherlands Corps HQ; 18.000 (all elements) including 7 combat battalions;	6 squadrons combat aircraft; 8 Air defence squadrons ;
Greece	8 ships;	1 operational headquarter; 1 mechanised infantry brigade; 1 light infantry brigade;	1 combat helicopter unit; 1 transport helicopter unit; 42 combat aircraft; 4 transport aircraft; 1 PATRIOT air defence battalion; 1 SHORAD squadron;
Ireland		1 light infantry battalion; special forces group (850);	
Italy	1 maritime headquarter; 1 aircraft carrier (6 combat aircraft, 8 helicopter); 1 destroyer; 3 frigates; 4 patrol ships; 1 submarine; 4 mine countermeasure vessels; 2 amphibious ships;	Operational level headquarters and C^{3}I; Corps level headquarters; 1 CIMIC group; special forces (12.500-14.500);	26 TORNADO; and AMX combat aircraft; 6 CSAR helicopter; 4 C-130J HERCULES; 2 tanker aircraft ; 3 maritime patrol aircraft ; 2 SHORAD units;
Luxembourg		1 light reconnaissance unit	1 A-400M ;
Netherlands	1 LPD ; Air defence and command frigates	German-Netherlands Corps HQ; 1 mechanised infantry brigade; 1 air-mobile brigade; 1 amphibious battalion;	1 air brigade with F-16 aircraft;
Portugal	1 frigate ; 1 submarine ; 1 patrol ship ; 1 support ship; 1 survey ship;	1 infantry brigade (4.000);	12 –F-16; 4 C-130 HERCULES; 12 C-212 tactical transport aircraft; 3 maritime patrol aircraft; 4 PUMA helicopter;
Spain		1 division and brigade headquarter; 1 mechanised brigade; mountain units; 1 light infantry group; special forces;	Air-navy unit; 2 squadrons F-1/F-18 combat aircraft (24 in total); 1 transport squadron;
Sweden	2 corvettes; 1 support ship;	1 mechanised infantry brigade (900); 1 engineer unit (175); 1 military police unit (160); 1 marine unit (206);	4 AJS 37 aircraft (to be 8 JAS 39 in 2004); 4 C-130;
United Kingdom	1 aircraft carrier; 2 SSN; 4 destroyer/ frigate; 1 helicopter carrier;	1 mobile Joint headquarter; 1 armed/mechanised brigade; 1 amphibious brigade (12.500);	72 combat aircraft; 58 transport aircraft and CHINOOK/ MERLIN helicopter;

Appendix 3: The Conflict Intensity Scale

Level of intensity	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Type of operation	Petersberg tasks with low intensity			Petersberg tasks with medium intensity			Advanced Expeditionary Warfare		Full scale Warfare	
Required Capabilities	- general purpose ground forces			- NBC protection - specialised forces - CIMC - MEDEVAC			- special forces - sea control - air support - air-to-air refuelling - strategic lift - PGM - TBMD		- C4ISTAR (NCW) - satellite intelligence - sensor-to-shooter network - nuclear deterrence	

USA
- USA

EU 15
- Austria
- Belgium
- Denmark
- Finland
- France
- Germany
- Greece
- Ireland
- Italy
- Luxembourg
- Netherlands
- Portugal
- Spain
- Sweden
- UK

EU +10
- Cyprus
- Czech Republic
- Estonia
- Hungary
- Latvia
- Lithuania
- Malta
- Poland
- Slovakia
- Slovenia

Appendix 4: Definition of Military Capabilities

military capabilities	definition	military hardware
Air power	Air power describes the ability to control a specific airspace using surveillance-, strike- and fighter-aircrafts. Own sorties are well protected while enemy attempts are being repelled. For this, intelligence and surveillance systems gain all information necessary for a secure operation planning. As a result, enemy planes and air-defence become ineffective. Air power usually results in the ability for free movement of friendly ground forces.	• Airborne Early Warning System (AWACS). • Air Superiority Fighters. • Strike-Fighter Aircraft. • High Anti-Radiation Missiles (HARM)
Air-to-air refuelling	Air-to-air-refuelling requires the ability to transport an estimated amount of fuel (kerosene) over a long range to a preset rendezvous point with the strike- or transport-aircraft or helicopter. This allows long range sorties, starting from secure and fully equipped home bases.	• tanker aircraft or helicopter.
Combat search and rescue	The primary operational task of combat search and rescue (CSAR) includes three functions: • Locating the aircrew or isolated personnel (survivors) by visual or electronic search methods in order to get the exact position for the following recovery-action. • Communicating with the survivor by radio or visual signals for authentication. • Recovery of the survivor and returning him to friendly controlled area for medical treatment.	• Surveillance system for locating grounded personnel. • Helicopter specialised on CSAR. • Air support during CSAR mission provided by air superiority fighters.
Deep strike	The Deep strike (or deep attack) function requires the ability to strike rapidly, intensively and accurately against enemy centres of gravity. These are critical points in the opponents order of battle and infrastructure against which the use of force has greater effect than if the same force were applied elsewhere. These targets tend to lie deep in enemy territory. Ballistic and cruise Missiles as well as high altitude Bombing aircrafts are capable of dealing with this task.	• stand-off weapons (cruise missiles), usually fired off by bomber or strike-fighter aircraft or from vessels of the Naval forces (over- and under-water).
Deployable theatre air defence	Theatre Air defence (or Tactical Air defence) depends on newly developed missile defence systems, which are capable of destroying a broad range of targets (helicopter; aircraft; cruise missile; ballistic missile). They close the gap between the short range man portable systems (e.g. STINGER) and strategic high altitude defence. They can be deployed by sea or air lift.	• PATRIOT missile defence system (only with PAC-3 missile).

military capabilities	definition	military hardware
Electronic warfare	The main function of electronic warfare is to jam or destroy enemy C^4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) and combat capabilities concerning offensive or defensive missions: • Electronic attack: use of electromagnetic or directed energy in order to attack personnel, facilities, or equipment with the intent of degrading, neutralizing, or destroying enemy combat capability. • Electronic protection: protection of personnel, facilities, and equipment from any effects of friendly or enemy employment of electronic warfare that degrade, neutralize, or destroy friendly combat capability • Electronic warfare support: Interception, identification and locating of sources of intentional and unintentional radiated electromagnetic energy for the purpose of immediate threat recognition. Thus, electronic warfare support provides information required for immediate decisions involving electronic warfare operations and other tactical actions such as threat avoidance, targeting, and homing.	• mainly airborne systems.
Medical support	Medical support in action can be achieved by a broad linkage of mobile and static medical facilities. This includes the ability to get wounded personnel out of the combat area and directly to technological highly equipped facilities for further treatment. Medical support is the linkage between the Combat search and rescue task and the medical treatment in homeland medical facilities.	
Nuclear deterrence	Nuclear deterrence depends on two basic factors. First, it is necessary to gain the technological and theoretical capability for building a nuclear warhead. This also involves the possession of special nuclear material (SNM) like Plutonium and enriched Uranium. Second, specific carriage or delivery systems are needed to achieve the deterrence effect by having the capability to transport the nuclear warhead over a long rang to an enemy territory or enemy troops. These carriage systems include ballistic missiles or cruise missiles – fired either from ground-, air- or naval forces – and bombing aircrafts.	• nuclear warheads (single or multiple). • carrier systems, such as cruise missiles, bombs, or surface-to-surface missiles.
Protection against weapons of mass destruction	This task requires a broad spectrum of specialized personnel and equipment. It combines several sub-functions: • Protection suits and secure facilities in the case of an attack with WMD. • Detection systems for scientific examinations after the use of WMD. • Decontamination facilities and personnel. • Sufficient supply with non-contaminated resources (e.g. water, food). • Medical support.	• vehicles and special equipped personnel for NBC detection. • decontamination systems for personnel and equipment. • personnel NBC-protection (mask and suits).

military capabilities	definition	military hardware
PSYOPS	By definition of the US Department of Defence, PSYOPS are planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behaviour of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behaviour favourable to the originator's objectives.	
Sea control	This task deals with the control of a specific sea-space using own naval- and air-forces. Domination of a regional sea-space secures the free movement for over- or underwater activities. This requires the existence of effective and accurate intelligence and surveillance systems as well as sufficient naval- or air-strike capabilities.	
Special operation forces	Special operation forces are well equipped and highly trained armed forces personnel. Their main task is to support or prepare regular armed forces operations. Mainly deployed behind enemy lines, special operation forces • report surveillance and reconnaissance information, • locate and mark targets for deep-strike attacks or the use of precision guided missiles, • rescue and recover civil or military personnel, • carry out sneak attacks on enemy personnel, inventory or facilities.	• All kind of small arms and explosives. • Secure Communication systems.
Strategic Air and Sea lift	Mobility and flexibility of modern armed forces depend on the ability to deploy enough personnel and equipment even over long ranges, and to maintain a constant flow of support and reinforcements to the area of operation in the appropriate amount.	• Strategic Heavy Lift Aircraft. • Heavy Sea Lift Vessels with Roll-on-Roll-Off capability (loading and unloading at the same time).
Surveillance and target reconnaissance	Due to the increasing deployment of precision guided ammunition in order to hit enemy targets accurately and without causing collateral damage, the value of effective surveillance and target reconnaissance can no longer be underestimated. The main task is to locate a valuable target and get its precise position for a strike-attack. Apart from that, battlefield surveillance has become more important for command and control of armed forces. Gaining rapid and precise information about location and status of friendly or enemy forces has become even more important than the use of force itself. This task can only be fulfilled if all surveillance and reconnaissance systems (Satellite, UAV, reconnaissance ground forces) are linked together for fast and sufficient information interchange and update.	network capable hardware: • space based satellite systems. • UAV´s (MALE and HALE). • Airborne Ground Surveillance systems (AGS). • Ground forces for reconnaissance.
Technical and strategic intelligence	Information about technical status and the strategic planning of enemy nations or forces is indispensable for effective mission building. Therefore civil and military intelligence services work on gaining important facts and status reports, creating a realistic and reliable picture of the region of interest	

military capabilities	definition	military hardware
Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (TBMD)	The main task for extended TBMD is to secure friendly forces from the effects of ballistic or cruise missiles with medium or long range. Especially the growing threat of weapons of mass destruction lead to the development of this defence system. During the Gulf war it became clear, that even the missiles, that were hit by the air defence, were still a threat to personnel and equipment due to the harmful effects of the rocket parts falling down. A biological, chemical or nuclear warhead would nearly have had the same effect no matter if shot down or not. Therefore the interception of incoming missiles or bombing aircrafts was set to a more extended range. Faster reaction time and the capability to shoot down low-altitude/high-velocity targets are further demands for extended air defence.	• PATRIOT missile defence system (only with PAC-3 missile).
Precision Guided Munitions (PGM)	So called "dumb bombs" often cause a lot of civilian casualties without providing the accuracy for hitting the target aimed at. Therefore "smart bombs" are being used in a greater extends in recent operations. Linked to a combination of radar, infrared imaging and GPS-data these weapons have a more precise hit capability while at the same time civilian casualties in the surrounding of the target can be minimized. The group of deep strike capable weapons can also be counted to PGM.	• Joint direct attack munitions (JDAM, guided by GPS-data) • Laser guided bombs (e.g. PAVEWAY bombs) • Laser guided air-to-ground missiles (e.g. MAVERICK)

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Appendix 5: Military Capabilities of EU Member-states

Comments to tables and the data shown:

The data used in the tables below has mainly been taken from the 2003/2004 edition of Military Balance published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). Additional information came from the national Departments of Defence and various print and online resources dealing with armed forces.

The tables below reflect judgements based on data available to the editors at the time the paper came to completion. Where possible information on structure and quantity of units is presented. Nevertheless, in some cases data and numbers had to be interpreted differently in order to make quality-based judgements on specific capabilities. Many armed forces in Europe are experiencing major changes due to a transformation process. This can sometimes lead to differences between the data shown and the actual capacities. In several cases an upgrading process of a specific weapon system does not relate to the whole inventory, leading to a deactivation of the not-upgraded models.

Data on Special or Specialised Forces is always hard to get. The information shown in the table is to be seen as approximate numbers. Additionally it has to be mentioned that very often the personnel strength of those forces are shown in battalion- or regiment-size, despite the fact that the actual manpower is very much below regiment or battalion strength.

The tables do not provide a final picture of how good or how strong armed forces of the various countries are. Modern warfare is strongly influenced by the way weapon systems and troops are able to interact in battle. The establishment of network-capable units and crafts is therefore currently the major task for all European forces. But by providing data on the quantity of platforms and systems fulfilling specific tasks (transport, refuelling, reconnaissance, sea basing, precision strike,…) it is possible to analyse whether force restructuring and task-based procurement have already affected the capabilities of European Defence.

The tables have been used for finalizing the Conflict Intensity List (Appendix 3).

PLANNING (EU-15)

	Force generation	Force structuring	Operational Planning
Austria	Arrangements between NATO and the EU have secured the full support of NATO planning resources. The "Berlin-Plus" arrangements concern a vast spectrum of cooperation. Strategic and operative planning for EU military missions will be done in the NATO military Headquarter in Mons (Belgium) by SHAPE and CJPS. The ongoing struggle about a European headquarter has not yet led to a final decision. Currently the proposal of a "EU-planning cell" is in favour.		
Belgium			
Denmark			
France			
Finland			
Germany			
Greece			
Ireland			
Italy			
Luxembourg			
Netherlands			
Portugal			
Spain			
Sweden			
United Kingdom			
NATO			

PLANNING (+ 10)

	Force generation	Force structuring	Operational planning
Cyprus	Arrangements between NATO and the EU have secure the full support of NATO planning resources. The "Berlin-Plus" arrangements concern a vast spectrum of cooperation. Strategic and operative planning for EU military missions will be done in the NATO military Headquarter in Mons (Belgium) by SHAPE and CJPS. The ongoing struggle about a European headquarter has not yet led to a final decision. Currently the proposal of a "EU-planning cell" is in favour.		
Czech Republic			
Estonia			
Hungary			
Latvia			
Lithuania			
Malta			
Poland			
Slovakia			
Slovenia			

ENABLING (EU-15)

	C⁴ISTAR	Joint deployable headquarters	CIMIC
Austria	**C⁴ (satellite):** no capability; **EllInt-SigInt:** no capability; **Surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance:** 1 air surveillance regiment (only radar); 3 army reconnaissance battalions;	no capability	**CIMIC** (Civil Military Cooperation) capacities exist in various forms in the European Union. There is no specific information available regarding the HumInt aspect.
Belgium	**C⁴ (satellite):** no capability; **EllInt-SigInt:** no capability; **Surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance:** 1 surveillance/ observation helicopter battalion with A-109A (observation helicopter); 2 reconnaissance battalions and 1 reconnaissance squadron (of the para-commando) equipped with SCIMITAR reconnaissance vehicle and B-HUNTER UAV systems; 1 ground attack/ reconnaissance squadron with F-16A(R)/B FALCON;	no capability	Concerning a common approach, the signing of the Letter of Understanding by six NATO member countries (Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Poland) in Brussels on the 7th of April 2003 is important to mention. The Foundation of a CIMIC Group North, located in Budel, Netherlands, could become a NATO asset the EU could use regarding the Berlin-plus arrangements.
Denmark	**C⁴ (satellite):** no capability; **EllInt-SigInt:** no capability; **Surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance:** 1 reconnaissance battalion and 1 reconnaissance company equipped with MOWAG EAGLE reconnaissance vehicle and SPERWER UAV system;	no capability	
France	**C⁴ (satellite):** SYRACUSE III (SatCom); **EllInt-SigInt:** 1 squadron with 4 E-3F SENTRY aircraft (airborne early warning); 1 Intelligence and Electronic warfare brigade with UAV´s; 1 electronic warfare squadron with C-160G GABRIEL (EllInt aircraft); 1 electronic warfare squadron with DC-8 SARIGUE (EllInt aircraft); 1 airborne early warning flight with 2 E-2C HAWKEYE aircraft; **Surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance:** 2 HELIOS reconnaissance and surveillance satellites (ImInt); 1 reconnaissance company (Euro-Korps) with UAV´s; 2 squadrons with 43 MIRAGE F1-CR (reconnaissance aircraft); 1 maritime reconnaissance flight with 13 NORD 262 (maritime reconnaissance aircraft); 2 maritime patrol squadrons with 14 ATLANTIQUE 2 (maritime patrol aircraft);	HQ Eurocorps in Strasbourg (contributed also to the 6 High-Readiness Force Land deployable Headquarters of NATO);	
Finland	**C⁴ (satellite):** no capability; **EllInt-SigInt:** 1 F-27 ESM ELINT (ESM/EllInt aircraft); **Surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance:** no capability	no capability	
Germany	**C⁴ (satellite):** no capability; (SAR LUPE satellite system for surveillance and reconnaissance planned to be put in space from 2005-2007); **EllInt-SigInt:** 1 army SigInt-EllInt brigade; 4 Breguet ATLANTIC (EllInt aircraft) in maritime patrol squadron; **Surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance:** 6 armoured reconnaissance battalions equipped with SPz-LUCHS, SPz FUCHS; Reconnaissance units for artillery (Artillerietruppe) equipped with CL-289 (UAV) and FENNEK (being delivered); 2 naval attack/ reconnaissance squadrons with 49 TORNADO aircraft; 2 air force squadrons with 41 TORNADO aircraft; 2 naval maritime patrol squadrons with Breguet ATLANTIC (13 armed maritime reconnaissance aircraft + 4 EllInt aircraft);	no capability	
Greece	**C⁴ (satellite):** no capability; **EllInt-SigInt:** 1 squadron with 2 Saab 340H ERIEYE (airborne early warning aircraft); **Surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance:** 4 reconnaissance battalions equipped with M-8, VBL and HMMWV vehicle; 1 air force squadron with 40 RF-4E PHANTOM II aircraft;	no capability	
Ireland	**C⁴ (satellite):** no capability; **EllInt-SigInt:** no capability; **Surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance:** 3 reconnaissance companies with some reconnaissance vehicles;	no capability	

	C^{4}ISTAR	Joint deployable headquarters	CIMIC
Italy	**C^4 (satellite):** SICRAL communication satellite (SatCom); **ElInt-SigInt:** **Surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance:** 1 NBC reconnaissance brigade; 1 CIS-EW command with 2 signals brigades and 1 IEW brigade; $^1/_2$ air force squadron with AMX reconnaissance aircraft; 1 ECM/ reconnaissance squadron with some G-222 aircraft; 1 maritime reconnaissance squadrons with 13 Breguet ATLANTIC aircraft;	no capability	CIMIC (Civil Military Cooperation) capacities exist in various forms in the European Union. There is no specific information available regarding the HumInt aspect. Concerning a common approach, the signing of the Letter of Understanding by six NATO member countries (Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Poland) in Brussels on the 7th of April 2003 is important to mention. The Foundation of a CIMIC Group North, located in Budel, Netherlands, could become a NATO asset the EU could use regarding the Berlin-plus arrangements.
Luxembourg	**C^4 (satellite):** no capability; **ElInt-SigInt:** no capability, but for legal purposes 1 squadron with 17 E-3A SENTRY with LU-registration; **Surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance:** no capability;	no capability	
Netherlands	**C^4 (satellite):** no capability; **ElInt-SigInt:** no capability; **Surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance:** Swing role squadrons of the Air Force equipped with F-16M FALCON; 1 armed reconnaissance battalion equipped with some FENNEK vehicles and SPERWER UAV; 10 P-3C ORION maritime patrol aircraft;	no capability	
Portugal	**C^4 (satellite):** no capability; **ElInt-SigInt:** no capability; **Surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance:** 1 reconnaissance squadron in mechanised infantry brigade; 1 reconnaissance squadron in airborne brigade; 1 maritime reconnaissance squadron with 6 P-3P ORION aircraft;	no capability	
Spain	**C^4 (satellite):** no capability; **ElInt-SigInt:** no capability; **Surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance:** 1 mixed reconnaissance battalion in Spanish Legion; 1 maritime patrol squadron with 7 P-3A/B ORION maritime reconnaissance aircraft;	no capability	
Sweden	**C^4 (satellite):** no capability; **ElInt-SigInt:** 6 S100B ARGUS (airborne early warning aircraft); 2 S-102B KORPEN (= GULFSTREAM IV); **Surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance:** 1 ground attack/ reconnaissance squadron with 16 SAAB-37 VIGGEN; 5 multirole squadrons with a total of 135 Saab JAS-39 GRIPEN;	no capability	
United Kingdom	**C^4 (satellite):** SKYNET 4 communication satellite (SatCom); **ElInt-SigInt:** 2 squadrons with 6 E3-D SENTRY (airborne early warning aircraft); 1 ElInt squadron with 3 NOMROD R-1; 1 naval aviation squadron with 13 SEA KINKG helicopter (airborne early warning); 1 naval aviation reconnaissance flight with 8 GAZELLE AH-1 helicopter; **Surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance:** 4 armed reconnaissance regiments equipped with SCIMITAR, SABRE and FUCHS vehicle; PHOENIX (UAV) for artillery reconnaissance; 3 maritime reconnaissance squadrons with 20 NIMROD MR-2 4 reconnaissance squadrons with TORNADO, CANBERRA and JAGUAR aircraft;	HQ 3rd (UK) Division (contributed to HQ ARRC);	

	C^{4}ISTAR	Joint deployable headquarters	CIMIC
NATO	<u>C^4 (satellite):</u> Allied Command Europe; <u>ElInt-SigInt:</u> 1 squadron with 17 E-3A SENTRY with LU-registration; <u>**Surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance:**</u> 3 NATO (3D, 4A, 4B) communication satellites (SatCom);	**6 High-Readiness Force Land deployable Headquarters:** HQ NRDC-IT in Milan; HQ NRDC-TU in Istanbul; HQ NDRC-S in Valencia; HQ NDRC-Germany-Netherlands in Munster; HQ ARRC in Rheindalen; HQ Eurocorps in Strasbourg; **2 additional Force Land deployable Headquarters with lower readiness;** **3 maritime High-Readiness Force Headquarters;**	**CIMIC** (Civil Military Cooperation) capacities exist in various forms in the European Union. There is no specific information available regarding the HumInt aspect. Concerning a common approach, the signing of the Letter of Understanding by six NATO member countries (Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Poland) in Brussels on the 7th of April 2003 is important to mention. The Foundation of a CIMIC Group North, located in Budel, Netherlands, could become a NATO asset the EU could use regarding the Berlin-plus arrangements.

ENABLING (+ 10)

	C⁴ISTAR	Joint deployable headquarters	CIMIC
Cyprus	**C⁴ (satellite):** no capability; **ElInt-SigInt:** no capability; **Surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance:** no capability;	no capability	**CIMIC** (Civil Military Cooperation) capacities exist in various forms in the European Union. There is no specific information available regarding the HumInt aspect. Concerning a common approach, the signing of the Letter of Understanding by six NATO member countries (Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Poland) in Brussels on the 7ᵗʰ of April 2003 is important to mention. The Foundation of a CIMIC Group North, located in Budel, Netherlands, could become a NATO asset the EU could use regarding the Berlin-plus arrangements.
Czech Republic	**C⁴ (satellite):** no capability; **ElInt-SigInt:** no capability; **Surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance:** 1 reconnaissance battalion in rapid reaction brigade with reconnaissance vehicle; 2 reconnaissance battalions in 2 mechanised brigades with reconnaissance vehicle;	no capability	
Estonia	**C⁴ (satellite):** no capability; **ElInt-SigInt:** no capability; **Surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance:** 1 reconnaissance battalion with some BRDM-2 vehicle;	no capability	
Hungary	**C⁴ (satellite):** no capability; **ElInt-SigInt:** no capability; **Surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance:** 3 reconnaissance companies equipped with reconnaissance vehicle; 2 reconnaissance battalions with reconnaissance vehicle;	no capability	
Latvia	**C⁴ (satellite):** no capability; **ElInt-SigInt:** no capability; **Surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance:** 1 reconnaissance battalion with some BRDM-2 vehicle;	no capability	
Lithuania	**C⁴ (satellite):** no capability; **ElInt-SigInt:** no capability; **Surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance:** no capability;	no capability	
Malta	**C⁴ (satellite):** no capability; **ElInt-SigInt:** no capability; **Surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance:** no capability;	no capability	
Poland	**C⁴ (satellite):** no capability; **ElInt-SigInt:** no capability; **Surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance:** 1 air mechanised reconnaissance regiment with BRDM-2 vehicle; 3 mechanised reconnaissance brigades with BRDM-2 vehicle; 1 reconnaissance squadron with 12 PZL TS-11 ISKRA aircraft; 1 reconnaissance squadron with 7 Su-22M-4 FITTER aircraft;	**Army:** 1 air-mechanised corps HQ;	
Slovakia	**C⁴ (satellite):** no capability; **ElInt-SigInt:** no capability; **Surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance:** 1 reconnaissance battalions equipped with BRDM, OT-65 and BPVZ vehicles; 1 ground attack/ reconnaissance wing with some SU-22 and SU-25 aircraft;	no capability	
Slovenia	**C⁴ (satellite):** no capability; **ElInt-SigInt:** no capability; **Surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance:** no capability;	no capability	

CS – CSS (EU-15)

	Deployable Theatre Air Defence	CSAR	Extended Air Defence	Sea/ Air lift	Air-to-air-refuelling
Austria	no capability	no capability	no capability	no capability	no capability
Belgium	no capability	no capability	no capability	**Air Lift:** 2 squadrons (total amount of equipment): 11 C-130H HERCULES; 2 Airbus A 310-200;	no capability
Denmark	2 battalions: 36 HAWK missile launchers;	no capability	no capability	**Air Lift:** 1 squadron: 3 C-130H HERCULES; **Sea Lift:** 1 transport vessel;	no capability
France	1 regiment: 26 HAWK missile launchers;	4 AS-532 COUGAR helicopter;	no capability	**Air Lift:** 1 heavy squadron: 3 Airbus A 310-300; 2 DC-8F; 6 tactical squadrons (total amount of equipment): 14 C-130H HERCULES; 67 C-160 TRANSALL; **Sea Lift:** 2 FOUDRE-Class LPD (landing platform dock); 2 OURAGAN-Class LPD; 5 CHAMPLAIN-Class LSM (landing ship medium);	11 C-135FR; 5 KC-135;
Finland	no capability	no capability	no capability	**Sea Lift:** 16 transport vessels	no capability
Germany	36 squadrons: PATRIOT missile system; 24 squadrons: HAWK missile system;	no capability	no capability	**Air Lift:** 4 squadrons (total amount of equipment): 83 TRANSALL C-160; 1 special air mission wing: 7 Airbus A 310 (3 MRT tpt; 1 MRTT tpt/tkr);	1 Airbus A 310 MRTT tpt/tkr;
Greece	2 battalion: 42 HAWK missile launchers; 1 squadron: PATRIOT PAC-3 missile system	In delivery: 6 AS-532 COUGAR;	1 squadron: PATRIOT PAC-3 missile system;	**Air Lift :** 3 squadrons (total amount of equipment): 5 C-130B HERCULES; 10 C-130H HERCULES ; **Sea Lift:** 6 LST (landing ship tank); 2 personnel transport vessels;	no capability
Ireland	no capability	no capability	no capability	no capability	no capability
Italy	2 regiments: 66 HAWK missile systems;	1 squadron: 6 HH-3F helicopter;	no capability	**Air Lift:** 3 squadrons (total amount of equipment): G-222; C-130J HERCULES (tpt/tkr); C-130H HERCULES; **Sea Lift:** 2 SAN-GIORGIO Class LPD (landing platform dock); 1 SAN-GIUSTO Class LPD.	3 Boeing 707-320 tpt/tkr aircraft; 5 C-130J HERCULES (tpt/tkr);
Luxembourg	no capability	no capability	no capability	no capability	no capability
Netherlands	4 squadrons: PATRIOT PAC-3 missile system;	no capability	4 squadrons: PATRIOT PAC-3 missile system;	**Air Lift:** 1 squadron: 2 Fokker F-50; 4 Fokker F-60; 2 C-130H HERCULES; 2 KDC-10 (tpt/tkr); **Sea Lift:** 1 ROTTERDAM-Class LPD (landing platform dock);	2 KDC-10 (tpt/tkr);
Portugal	no capability	no capability	no capability	**Air Lift:** 2 squadrons (total amount of equippment): 6 C-130H HERCULES; 22 C-212 AVIOCAR;	no capability ;

	Deployable Theatre Air Defence	CSAR	Extended Air Defence	Sea/ Air lift	Air-to-air-refuelling
Spain	2 battalions: 24 HAWK missile launchers;	no capability	no capability	**Air Lift:** 11 squadrons (total amount of equipment): 3 Boeing 707 (tpt/tkr); 7 C-130H HERCULES; 31 C-212 AVIOCAR; 18 CN-235; **Sea Lift:** 2 GALICIA-Class LPD (landing platform dock); 2 HERNAN-CORTES-Class LST (landing ship tank);	3 Boeing 707 (tpt/tkr); 5 KC-130H HERCULES;
Sweden	4 battalions: HAWK missile system;	no capability	no capability	**Air Lift:** 6 squadrons (total amount of equipment): 7 C-130E HERCULES;	1 C-130H HERCULES;
United Kingdom	no capability	no capability	no capability	**Air Lift:** 1 squadron: 4 Boeing C-17A GLOBEMASTER; 4 squadrons (total amount of equipment): 26 C-130KC1/C3 HERCULES; 25 C-130JC4/C5 HERCULES; 1 squadron: 1 TRISTAR K-1 (tpt/tkr); 4 TRISTAR KC-1 (tpt/tkr); 3 TRISTAR C-2; 2 squadrons (total amount of equipment): 10 VC-10 C1K; **Sea Lift:** 1 OCEAN-Class LPH (landing platform helicopter); 4 SIR-BEDIVERE-Class LSL (landing ship large);	10 VC-10 C1K (tpt/tkr); 4 VC-10K-3; 5 VC-10K-4; 1 TRISTAR K-1 (tpt/tkr); 4 TRISTAR KC-1 (tpt/tkr);

CS – CSS (+ 10)

	Deployable Theatre Air Defence	CSAR	Extended Air Defence	Sea/ Air lift	Air-to-air-refuelling
Cyprus	no capability	no capability	no capability	no capability	no capability
Czech Republic	no capability	no capability	no capability	**Air Lift:** 2 squadrons (total amount of equipment): 14 L-410; 8 Antonov AN-24/26/30; 2 Tupolew TU-154;	no capability
Estonia	no capability	no capability	no capability	no capability	no capability
Hungary	no capability	no capability	no capability	**Air Lift:** 1 mixed transport wing: 8 Antonov AN-26;	no capability
Latvia	no capability	no capability	no capability	no capability	no capability
Lithuania	no capability	no capability	no capability	no capability	no capability
Malta	no capability	no capability	no capability	no capability	no capability
Poland	no capability	no capability	no capability	**Air Lift:** 3 squadrons (total amount of euipment): 10 Antonv AN-26; 2 Antonov AN-28; 2 Tupolew TU-154; **Navy:** 5 LUBLIN-Class LSM (landing ship medium);	no capability
Slovakia	no capability	no capability	no capability	**Air Lift:** 1 transport wing: 2 Antontov AN-24; 2 Antonov AN-26;	no capability
Slovenia	no capability	no capability	no capability	no capability	no capability

MANOUVRE (EU-15)

	Special Forces (covert operations)	Specialised Forces (overt operations)	General purpose land forces	Air Support	Sea basing (without amphibious forces)
Austria	Jagdkommandotruppe (special commando);	**Army:** 3 battalions mountaintroops; 1 battalion airborne troops;	**MBT:** 114 LEOPARD 2A4; **LT TKs:** 137 KUERASSIER Jagdpanzer; **APC:** 425 SAURER 4K4E/F; 68 PANDUR APC; **TOWED ARTY:** 84 IFH (105mm); 20 M-2A1 (155mm); **SP ARTY:** 162 M-109A2/-A3/-ASÖE (155mm); **MOR (mortar):** 497 (81 mm); 133 (107mm); 241 M-43 (120mm); **ATGW:** 378 RBS-56 BILL ; 87 RJPz-JAGUAR 1 (with HOT); **RCL:** 2.088 CARL GUSTAV (84mm); **ANTI-TANK GUNS:** 227 L7A1 CENTURION (static 105mm); **AD GUNS:** 145 (20mm);	**1 wing:** 23 Saab J-35Oe DRAKEN (strike fighter);	no capability
Belgium	**Army:** 2 units in Para-Commando regiment (ESR = Equips Speciales de Reconnaisance Compagnie) ;	**Army:** 1 Para-Commando brigade;	**MBT:** 143 LEOPARD 1A5 ; **RECCE:** 119 SCIMITAR; **AIFV:** 236 YPR-765; **APC:** 202 M-113 (plus 284 look-a-likes); 76 SPARTAN (plus 7 look-a-likes); 4 YPR-765 (plus 56 look-a-likes); 50 PANDUR; **TOWED ARTY:** 13 LG Mk II (105mm); **SP ARTY:** 108 M-109A2 (155mm); **MOR:** 60 (120mm); 118 (81mm); **ATGW:** 420 MILAN; **RL:** LAW (66mm); **AD GUNS:** 51 GEPARD SP (35mm); **SAM:** 118 MISTRAL; **UAV:** 3 B-HUNTER systems (18 air vehicles);	**3 squadrons:** 36 F-16 MLU FALCON (ground attack); **1 squadron:** 12 F-16A(R)/B (ground attack/reconnaissance); **2 squadrons:** 24 F-16A/B ADI (fighter); **2 anti-tank battalions:** 28 A-109BA (assault helicopter);	3 WIELINGEN-Class frigates (SSM: EXOCET; SAM: SEA SPARROW); 7 ASTER mine-countermeasure vessels; 2 logistical support/command ship;
Denmark	**Army:** 1 Special forces unit (Jaegerkorpset);	no capability	**MBT:** 220 LEOPARD 1A5; 18 LEOPARD 2A4; **RECCE:** 36 Mowag EAGLE; **APC:** 288 M-113 (plus 369 look-a-likes incl. 55 self-propelled mortar systems); 22 PIRANHA III; **TOWED ARTY:** 60 M-101 (105mm); 97 M-114/39 (155mm); **SP ARTY:** 76 M-109 (155mm); **MRL:** 12 MLRS (227mm); **MOR:** 160 BRANDT (120mm); 455 (incl. 53 SP) (81mm); **ATGW:** 140 TOW (incl. 56 SP); **RL:** 10.600 AT-4 (84mm); **RCL:** 1.131 CARL GUSTAV (84mm); **SAM:** STINGER;	**3 squadrons:** 68 F-16A/B FALCON (ground attack; fighter); 1 attack helicopter company: 12 AS-550C2;	2 TUMLEREN-Class SSK submarines; 1 NARHVALEN-Class SSK submarine; 1 KRONBERG-Class SSK submarine; 3 NIELS-JUEL-Class corvettes (SSM: HARPOON; SAM: SEA SPARROW); 4 missile-crafts (SSM: HARPOON; SAM: SEA SPARROW); 3 torpedo-crafts; 20 patrol-crafts (4 offshore; 16 coastal); 4 minelayers; 3 mine-countermeasure vessels;

	Special Forces (covert operations)	Specialised Forces (overt operations)	General purpose land forces	Air Support	Sea basing (without amphibious forces)
France	**Army:** 1 Parachute Regiment (2,700); **Navy:** 5 Commando Groups (500);	**Army:** Foreign Legion (7,700); Marines (14,000); 1 mountain infantry brigade; 1 airborne brigade; **Navy:** Marines (1,700);	**MBT:** 244 AMX-30B2; 370 LECLERC; **RECCE:** 317 AMX-10RC; 187 ERC-90F4 SAGAIE; 1,442 VBL M-11; **AIFV:** 384 AMX-10PPC; **APC:** 3,700 VAB; **TOWED ARTY:** 97 TR-F-1 (155mm); **SP ARTY:** 273 AU-F-1 (155mm); **MRL:** 61 MLRS (227mm); **MOR:** 363 RT-F1 (120mm); **ATGW:** 700 ERYX; 1,348 MILAN; HOT (incl. VAB SP); **RL:** AT-4 (84mm); 9,850 (89mm); 9,690 APILAS (112mm); **AD GUNS:** 328 53T2 (20mm); **SAM:** 98 ROLAND I/II; 331 MISTRAL; **UAV:** 8 CL-289; 2 CRECERELLE;	5 squadrons; 115 MIRAGE-2000B/C/5F (fighter); 5 squadrons; 67 MIRAGE 2000D (ground attack); 1 squadron; 20 JAGUAR (ground attack); 2 squadrons; 43 MIRAGE F1-CT (ground attack); 3 combat helicopter regiments; 109 SA-341F; 156 SA-342M; 27 SA-342 AATCP; 1 support helicopter regiment ; 21 AS-532 (support helicopter) ; 101 SA-330 (support helicopter);	6 RUBIS-Class tactical SSN submarines; 1 CHARLES-DE-GAULLE aircraft carrier (with 20 SUPER ETENDARD strike fighter and 12 RAFALE M); 1 JEAN D'ARC helicopter carrier (SSM: EXOCET); 2 CASSARD-Class destroyer (SSM: EXOCET; SAM: SM-1); 1 SUFFREN-Class destroyer (SSM: EXOCET; SAM: MASURCA); 7 GEORGES-LEYGUES-Class destroyer (SSM: EXOCET; SAM: CROTALE); 2 TOURVILLE-Class destroyer (SSM: EXOCET; SAM: CROTALE); 6 FLOREAL-Class frigates (SSM: EXOCET); 9 D'ESTIENNE-D'ORVES-Class frigates (SSM: EXOCET; SAM: CROTALE); 5 LA-FAYETTE-Class frigates (SSM: EXOCET; SAM: CROTALE); 35 patrol vessels (1 offshore; 11 inshore; 23 coastal); 4 DURANCE under-way-support vessels; 1 JULES VERNE maintenance-and-logistic vessel;
Finland	no capability	no capability	**MBT:** 74 T-55M; 161 T-72; **AIFV:** 164 BMP-1/PS; 110 BMP-2; **APC:** 112 BTR-60PB; 73 BTR-50PK; 655 XA-180/185/200 SISU; 261 MT-LBV; **TOWED ARTY:** 510 H63 (122mm); 127 K54 (130mm); 234 H55/H88-40/H88-37/H38 (152mm); 28 K98 (155mm); 136 K83 (155mm); **SP ARTY:** 72 PsH 74 (122mm); 18 TELAK-91 (152mm); **MRL:** 24 Rak H76 (122mm); 36 Rak H89 (122mm); **MOR:** 1,416 (81mm); 900 (120mm); **ATGW:** PST-OHB82 (AT-5 SPANDREL); PST-OHB3M (TOW 2); **RL:** APILAS (112mm); **RCL:** 66 KES-75 (66mm); 66 KES-88 (66mm); 700 SM-58-61 (66mm); **AD GUNS:** 1,100 ZU-23 (23mm); 16 GDF-005 (30mm); 47 S-60 towed (57mm); 12 ZSU-57-2 SP (57mm); **SAM:** SA-18; SA-16; CROTALE NG; SA-11;	3 wings; 56 F/A-18C HORNET (ground attack); 7 F/A18D HORNET (ground attack);	4 HELSINKI-Class missile-crafts (SSM: RBS-15); 4 RAUMA-Class missile-crafts (SSM: RBS-15; SAM: MISTRAL); 1 HAMINA-Class missile-craft (SSM: RBS-15; SAM: MISTRAL); 6 minelayers; 13 mine-countermeasure vessels; 1 command ship;
Germany	**Army:** KSK = Kommando Spezialkräfte; Fernspäher; **Navy:** Waffentaucher;	**Army:** 1 division special operations with 2 airborne brigades (8,500); 1 mountain brigade;	**MBT:** 670 LEOPARD 1A1/A3/A4/A5; 1,728 LEOPARD 2A5; **RECCE:** 409 SP2-2 LUCHS; 114 TPz-1 FUCHS (NBC reconnaissance); **AIFV:** 2,122 MARDER A2/A3; 133 WIESEL (with 20mm gun); **APC:** 909 TPz-1 FUCHS; 2,067 M-113; 147 DINGO APCV-2; **TOWED ARTY:** 118 M-101 (105 mm); 155 FH-70 (155mm); **SP ARTY:** 499 M-109A3G (155mm); 165 PzH2000 (155mm); **MRL:** 50 LARS (110mm); 150 MLRS (227mm); **MOR:** 504 TAMPELLA (120mm); **ATGW:** 1,519 MILAN; 186 RJP2-JAGUAR 1(with HOT); 210 WIESEL (with TOW); **RL:** PANZERFAUST 3 **AD GUNS:** 1,155 Rh 202 (20mm); 354 GEPARD SP (35mm); **SAM:** 143 ROLAND; STINGER (including OZELOT); **UAV:** CL-289;	6 squadrons; 186 TORNADO IDS (ground attack); 2 squadrons; 35 TORNADO ECR (ground attack for suppression of enemy air defence); 7 squadrons; 152 F-4F PHANTOM (fighter); Division for airmobile operations; 199 PAH-1 (anti-tank); 118 UH-1D (support helicopter); 107 CH-53G (support helicopter);	6 Type 206-Class SSK submarines; 1 Type 205-Class SSC submarines; 2 LÜTJENS-Class destroyers (SSM: HARPOON; SAM: SM-1); 8 BREMEN-Class frigates (SSM: HARPOON; SAM: SEA SPARROW); 4 BRANDENBURG-Class frigates (SSM: EXOCET; SAM: SEA SPARROW); 10 ALBATROS-Class missile-crafts (SSM: EXOCET; SAM: SEA SPARROW); 10 GEPARD-Class missile-crafts (SSM: EXOCET); 23 mine-countermeasure vessels; 2 SPESSART-Class under-way-support vessels; 2 BERLIN –Class support vessels; 6 ELBE-Class support vessels; 1 LÜNEBURG-Class logistical support vessel;

	Special Forces (covert operations)	Specialised Forces (overt operations)	General purpose land forces	Air Support	Sea basing (without amphibious forces)
Greece	Army: 1 special ops commando; 1 commando brigade;	Army: 1 marine brigade;	MBT: 683 M-48; 628 M-60; 412 LEOPARD 1; RECCE: 130 M-8; 37 VBL; 8 HMMWV; AIFV: 501 BMP-1; APC: 131 LEONIDAS Mk1/Mk2; 1.509 M-113A1/A2; M-114 (155mm); TOWED ARTY: 18 M-56 (105mm); 445 M-101 (105mm); 266 SP ARTY: 195 M-109A1B/A2/A3GEA1/A5 (155mm); 12 ZUZANA (155mm); 12 M-107 (175mm); 181 M-110A2 (175mm); some PzH2000; MRL: 115 RM-70 (122mm); 36 MLRS (227mm); MOR: 620 M-30 (incl. 231 SP) (107mm); 2.800 (81mm); ATGW: 290 MILAN (incl. 42 HMMWV); 336 TOW (incl. 320 M-901); 262 AT-4 SPIGOT; RCL: 2.000 CARL GUSTAV (84mm); 1.314 EM-67 (90mm); RL: 18.520 RPG-18 (64mm); 10.700 M-72 (66mm); 1.291 M-40A1 (106mm); AD GUNS: 506 ZU-23-2 (23mm); SAM: STINGER; 21 SA-15; 20 SA-8B;	14 squadrons; 96 A-7H (ground attack); 74 F-16CG FALCON (ground attack); 60 F-4E PHANTOM (ground attack); 86 F-5A/B (ground attack); 25 MIRAGE F-1 CG (fighter); 34 MIRAGE 2000EG/BG (fighter/training); 1 squadron; 13 AB-205A (SAR helicopter); 4 AB-212 (transport helicopter); 4 AS-332 (support helicopter); 5 army aviation battalions; 20 AH-64A APACHE (attack helicopter); 9 CH-47D CHINOOK (support helicopter); 76 UH-1H (support helicopter); 31 AB-205A (support helicopter); 14 AB-206 (support helicopter);	4 GLAVKOS-Class SSK submarines; 4 POSEIDON-Class SSK submarines; 2 KIMON-Class destroyers (SSM: HARPOON; SAM: SM-1); 4 HYDRA-Class frigates (SSM: HARPOON); 3 ELLI-Class frigates (SSM: HARPOON; SAM: SEA SPARROW); 4 AEGEAN-Class frigates (SSM: HARPOON; SAM: SEA SPARROW); 1 MAKEDONIA-Class frigate (SSM: HARPOON); 5 NIKI-Class corvettes; 11 LASKOS-Class missile-crafts (SSM: EXOCET, PENGUIN); 4 VOTSIS-Class missile-crafts (SSM: EXOCET, HARPOON); 2 STAMOU-Class missile-crafts (SSM: SS-12); 8 torpedo-crafts; 10 patrol-crafts (4 offshore; 6 coastal/inshore); 1 minelayer; 12 mine-countermeasure vessels; 1 AXIOS logistical support vessel;
Ireland	Army: Cciathan Fhiannoghlaigh an Airm (Army Ranger Wing);	no capability	LT TK: 14 SCORPION; RECCE: 15 AML-90; 18 AML-20; APC: 2 A-180 SISU; 40 PIRANHA III; TOWED ARTY: 42 25-pdr (88mm); 24 L-118 (105mm); MOR: 400 (81mm); 71 (120mm); ATGW: 21 MILAN; some JAVELIN; RL: AT-4 (84mm); RCL: 444 CARL GUSTAV (84mm); AD GUNS: 30 L-70 (40mm); SAM: 7 RBS-70;	7 SA-316B ALOUETTE III (Army support helicopter);	8 patrol vessels offshore;
Italy	Army: 9th Para-Assault Regiment; Navy: COMSUBIN special forces command with 4 groups;	Army: 3 mountain brigades; 1 alpine airborne battalion; 1 airborne brigade; 1 NBC reconnaissance regiment; Navy: SAN MARCO group marines (1.300);	MBT: 619 LEOPARD 1; 378 CENTAURO B-1; 186 ARIETE; AIFV: 27 DARDO; APC: 912 M-113; 545 VCC-1; 1.224 VCC-2; 157 FIAT 6614; 91 BV-206; AAV: 14 LVTP-7; TOWED ARTY: 157 Model 56 pack (105mm); 162 FH-70 (155mm); 4 M-114 (155mm); SP ARTY: 260 M-109G/L (155mm); 1 M-110 (203mm); MRL: 22 MLRS (227mm); MOR: 774 BRANDT (120mm); 59 RT-F1 (120mm); 1.200 (81mm); ATGW: 426 TOW 2B; 432 I-TOW; 752 MILAN; RL: 1.860 PANZERFAUST 3; RCL: 434 FOLGORE (80mm); AD GUNS: 120 SIDAM SP (25mm); SAM: STINGER; 46 SKYGUARD/ ASPIDE; UAV: 5 MIRACH 20;	4 ground attack squadrons; 78 TORNADO IDS; 4 ground attack squadrons; 52 AMX (50% of 1 sqn devoted to reconnaissance); 4 fighter squadrons; 44 F-104 ASA; 1 fighter squadron; 23 TORNADO ADV; army aviation units; 45 A-129 (attack helicopter); 27 A-109 (assault helicopter); 61 AB-206 (assault helicopter); 88 AB-205A (support helicopter); 14 AB-212 (support helicopter); 22 AB-412 (support helicopter); 36 CH-47C CHINOOK (support helicopter);	4 PELOSI-Class SSK submarines; 2 SAURO-Class SSK submarines; 1 GIUSEPPE-GARIBALDI aircraft carrier (with 6 AV-8B HARRIER); 1 VITTORIO-VENETO-Class cruiser (SSM: TESEO; SAM: SM-1); 2 LUIGI-DURAND-DE-LA-PENNE-Class destroyer (SSM: TESEO; SAM: SM-1); 2 AUDACE-Class destroyers (SSM: TESEO; SAM: SM-1); 8 MAESTRALE-Class frigates (SSM: TESEO; SAM: ASPIDE); 4 ARTIGLIERE-Class frigates (SSM: TESEO; SAM: ASPIDE); 8 MINERVA-Class corvettes (SAM: ASPIDE); 11 patrol vessels (8 offshore; 3 coastal); 13 mine-countermeasure vessels;
Luxembourg	no capability	no capability	MOR: 6 (81mm); ATGW: 6 TOW; RL: 1 LAW;	no capability	no capability

	Special Forces (covert operations)	Specialised Forces (overt operations)	General purpose land forces	Air Support	Sea basing (without amphibious forces)
Netherlands	**Army:** 1 SF battalion; **Navy:** 7NL SBS (special boat section); 108th S.O.C.; BBE (Bizondere Bijstands Eenheid or Special Backup unit);	**Army:** 3 air-mobile infantry battalions; **Navy:** marines (3,100);	**MBT:** 25 LEOPARD 1; 258 LEOPARD 2; **APC:** 224 YPR-765; 72 XA-188 SISU; 22 TPz-1 FUCHS; 80 M-114/39 (155mm); **SP ARTY:** 120 M-109A3 (155mm); **MRL:** 22 MLRS (227mm); **MOR:** 40 (81mm); 112 BRANDT (120mm); **ATGW:** 427 DRAGON; 326 TOW (incl. 96 YPR-765); **RL:** AT-4 (84mm); **RCL:** CARL GUSTAV (84mm); **AD GUNS:** 60 GEPARD SP (35mm); **SAM:** 312 STINGER; **UAV:** SPERWER;	6 squadrons (swing-role); 108 F-16M FALCON (ground attack; fighter; reconnaissance); 2 attack helicopter squadrons; 30 AH-64D APACHE; 1 flight; 5 BO-105; 3 support helicopter squadrons; 4 SA-316; 13 CH-47D CHINOOK; 17 AS-532U2 COUGAR; 1 AB-412 (SAR);	4 WALRUS-Class SSK submarines; 2 VAN-HEEMSKERCK-Class destroyers (SSM: HARPOON; SAM: SM-1); 8 KAREL-DOORMAN- Class frigates (SSM: HARPOON; SAM: SEA SPARROW); 1 KORTENAER-Class frigate (SSM: HARPOON; SAM: SEA SPARROW); 12 mine-countermeasure vessels; 1 PELIKAAN-Class support vessel;
Portugal	**Army:** Long Range Recon Patrol (LRRP); **Navy:** Destacamento do Acoes Especiais (Combat diver unit);	**Army:** 2 parachute battalions; **Navy:** marines (1,580);	**MBT:** 86 M-48A5; 101 M-60; **RECCE:** 15 V-150 CHAIMITE; 25 ULTRAV M-11; **APC:** 240 M-113; 40 M-557; 73 V-200 CHAIMITE; **TOWED ARTY:** 52 M-101 (105mm); 24 M-56 (105mm); 21 L-119 (105mm); 38 M-114A1 (155mm); **SP ARTY:** 6 M-109A2 (155mm); 14 M-109A5 (155mm); **MOR:** 76 M-30 (incl. 14 SP) (107mm); 98 TAMPELLA (120mm); 21 SP (81mm); **RCL:** 162 CARL GUSTAV (84mm); 112 (90mm); 128 M-40 (106mm); **ATGW:** 50 TOW (incl. 18 M-113; 4 M-901; 68 MILAN (incl. 6 ULTRAV-11); **AD GUNS:** 31 Rh202 (20mm); 62 L-60 (40mm); **SAM:** 15 STINGER; 37 CHAPARRAL;	2 ground attack squadrons; 25 ALPHA JET (+ training); 16 F-16A FALCON; 3 F-16B FALCON; 2 SAR helicopter squadrons; 10 SA-330;	2 ALBACORA-Class SSK submarines; 3 VASCO-DA-GAMA-Class frigates (SSM: HARPOON; SAM: SEA SPARROW); 3 COMMANDANTE-Class frigates (no guided missiles); 28 patrol crafts (10 offshore; 8 coastal; 9 inshore);
Spain	**Army:** 3 special operations battalions; **Air Force:** Escadrilla de Zapadores Paracaidistas;	**Army:** 2-Spanish Legion regiments; 1 mountain brigade; 1 airborne brigade; 1 airmobile brigade; **Navy:** marines (5,600);	**MBT:** 150 AMX-30 EM2; 88 M-48A5E; 184 M-60A3TTS; 108 LEOPARD 2A4; 22 CENTAURO B-1; **RECCE:** 339 BMR-VEC; **APC:** 122 PIZARRO; 1,337 M-113; 686 BMR-600; **TOWED ARTY:** 170 M-56 pack (105mm); 56 L-118 (105mm); 84 M-114 (105mm); **SP ARTY:** 34 M-108 (105mm); 96 M-109A1/A5 (155mm); 64 M-110A2 (203mm); **MRL:** 18 TERUEL (140mm); **MOR:** 409 (incl. 106 SP) (120mm); 665 (incl. 102 SP) (81mm); **ATGW:** 404 MILAN (incl. 106 SP); 28 SP; 200 TOW (incl. 68 SP); **RCL:** 507 (106mm); **AD GUNS:** 460 GAI-BO1 (20mm); 92 GDF-002 twin (35mm); 183 L-70 (40mm); **SAM:** 18 ROLAND; 13 SKYGUARD/ASPIDE; 108 MISTRAL;	7 squadrons; 91 EF/A-18A/B HORNET (fighter; 1 sqn ground attack); 2 fighter squadrons; 52 MIRAGE F-1 CE/BE (fighter); 2 SAR squadrons; 5 SA-330 (SAR helicopter); 12 AS-332 (6 SAR, 6 transport helicopter); 1 attack helicopter battalion; 28 HA/HR-15 (assault/attack helicopter); 5 medical and tactical transport helicopter battalions; 27 AS-532UL; 17 HA/HR-15; 6 HU-18; 10 HR-12B; 17 HT-17D; 48 HU-10B;	4 GALERNA-Class SSK submarines; 2 DELFIN-Class SSK submarines; 1 PRINCIPE-DE-ASTURIAS aircraft carrier (with 10 AV-8/AV-8B HARRIER); 2 ALVARO-DE-BAZAN-F100-Class frigates (SSM: HARPOON; SAM: SM-1); 6 SANTA-MARIA frigates (SSM: HARPOON; SAM: SM-1); 4 BALEARES-Class frigates (SSM: HARPOON; SAM: SM-1); 4 DESCUBIERTA-Class frigates (SSM: HARPOON; SAM: SM-1); 37 patrol crafts (8 offshore; 10 coastal; 19 inshore); 7 mine-countermeasure vessels;

	Special Forces (covert operations)	Specialised Forces (overt operations)	General purpose land forces	Air Support	Sea basing (without amphibious forces)
Sweden	**Navy:** BASSAK (Swedish Naval Counter-SOF Unit); Swedish Navy's Attack Divers; Kustjagare (Coastal Rangers); Rojdykaredivision (Mine Clearance Diver Division); **Air Force:** Flygbasjagara (Air Force Rangers); **Army:** Fallskarmsjagare (Airborne Rangers);	no capability	**MBT:** 160 Strv-121 (LEOPRAD 2); 120 Strv-122 (LEOPARD 2(S)); **AIFV:** 501 Pbv-302; 355 Strf-9040; 350 Pbv-501 (BMP-1); 122 XA-180/203 (plus 295 look-a-likes); **APC:** 433 Pbv-401A (MT-LB) (plus 170 look-a-likes); **TOWED ARTY:** 105 FH-77A (155mm); 50 FH-77B (155mm); **SP ARTY:** 26 BK-1C (155mm); **MOR:** 160 (81mm); 479 (120mm); **ATGW:** RB-55; RB-56 BILL; **RL:** AT-4 (84mm); **RCL:** CARL GUSTAV (84mm); PV-1110 (90mm); **AD GUNS:** 200 (incl. 30 Strv 90LV) (40mm); **SAM:** RBS-70; RBS-90; **UAV:** 3 SPERWER systems;	1 ground attack squadron: 16 Saab AJSH-37 / AJSF-37 VIGGEN (+reconnaissance); 5 multi-role squadrons: 135 swing-role Saab JAS-39 GRIPEN; 2 fighter squadrons: 47 Saab JA-37 VIGGEN (inclusive training); 2 battalions: 14 Hkp-4 (Vertol 107) (support helicopter); 29 Hkp-6 (Bell-206) (utility helicopter); 20 Hkp-9a (BO-105) (anti tank helicopter); 11 Hkp-10 (SAR); 5 Hkp-11 (SAR);	3 GOTLAND-Class SSK submarines; 4 VÄSTERGÖTLAND-Class SSK submarines; 4 GÖTEBORG-Class missile-crafts (SSM: RBS-15); 2 STOCKHOLM-Class missile-crafts (SSM: RBS-15); 8 KAPAREN-Class missile-crafts (SSM: PENGUIN); 18 patrol crafts; 1 minelayers; 20 mine-countermeasure vessels;
United Kingdom	**Army:** SAS (= Special Air Service); The 5th Airborne Brigade's Pathfinder Platoon; 148th Commando Forward Observation Battery; **Navy:** Special boat squadron;	**Army:** 3 airborne battalions (1 parachute); 1 joint NBC regiment; **Navy:** marines (7,000);	**MBT:** 386 CHALLENGER 2; 156 CHALLENGER; 1 CHIEFTAIN; **RECCE:** 327 SCIMITAR; 137 SABRE; 11 FUCHS; **AIFV:** 575 WARRIOR; 10 AFV 423 RARDEN; **APC:** 1,121 AFV 432; 597 FV 103 SPARTAN; 649 SAXON; 1 SARACEN; 135 STORMER; (plus 1,675 AIFV and APC look-a-likes); **TOWED ARTY:** 166 L-118/-119 (105mm); 48 FH-70 (155mm); **SP ARTY:** 178 AS-90 (155mm); **MRL:** 63 MLRS (227mm); **MOR:** 470 (incl. 110 SP) (81mm); **ATGW:** 740 MILAN; 60 SWINGFIRE (FV 102 STRIKER SP); TOW; **RL:** LAW-80; **SAM:** 135 HVM; 147 STARSTREAK; 57 RAPIER; **UAV:** 8 PHOENIX	5 ground attack squadrons: 88 TORNADO GRI/4; 2 ground attack squadrons: 39 JAGUAR GR-3/3A; 3 ground attack squadrons: 51 HARRIER GR-7; 4 fighter squadrons: 93 TORNADO F-3; 9 tactical and SAR helicopter squadrons: 38 CH-47 CHINOOK (support helicopter); 39 SA-330 PUMA (support helicopter); 23 SEA KING (SAR and support helicopter); 3 AS-355 (support helicopter); 4 Bell-412EP (support helicopter); 22 MERLIN HC3 (support helicopter); 5 army aviation regiments: 17 WAH-64-Mk-1 APACHE (attack helicopter); 133 SA-341 (support helicopter); 109 LYNX AH-1/-7/-9 (attack helicopter);	5 SWIFTSURE-Class SSN submarines (SSM: Sub-HARPOON, 2 with TOMAHAWK LAM); 6 TRAFALGAR-Class SSN submarines (SSM: Sub-HARPOON; 4 with TOMAHAWK LAM); 3 INVINCIBLE-Class aircraft carrier (with 32 HARRIER); 7 Type 42 Batch 1/2 destroyers (SAM: SEA DART); 4 Type 42 Batch 3 destroyers (SAM: SEA DART); 4 CORNWALL- Class frigates (SSM: HARPOON; SAM: SEAWOLF); 16 NORFOLK-Class frigates (SSM: HARPOON; SAM: SEAWOLF); 23 patrol vessels (5 offshore; 18 inshore); 22 mine-countermeasure vessels; 2 FORT VICTORIA-Class under way support vessels;

MANOUVRE (+ 10)

	Special Forces (covert operations)	Specialised Forces (overt operations)	General purpose land forces	Air Support	Sea basing (without amphibious forces)
Cyprus	**Army:** 1 special forces command with 3 battalions; **TURKISH REPUBLIC OF NORTHERN CYPRUS:** **Army:** 1 special forces regiment;	no capability	**MBT:** 104 AMX-30 (incl. 52-B2); 41 T-80U; **RECCE:** 124 EE-9 CASCAVEL ; 15 EE-3 JARARACA; **AIFV:** 43 BMP-3; **APC:** 168 LEONIDAS; 128 VAB; 16 AMX-VCI; **TOWED ARTY:** 36 25-pdr (88mm); 20 M-1944 (100mm); 72 M-56 (105mm); 12 TR-F1 (155mm); **SP ARTY:** 12 F3 (155mm); 12 ZUZANA (155mm); **MRL:** 18 FRY M-63 (128mm); 4 BM-21 (122mm); **MOR:** 170 E-44 (81mm); 70 M1/M29 (81mm); 20 M-30/M-2 (107mm); 116 RT61 (120mm); **ATGW:** 45 MILAN (15 on EE-3 JARARACA); 22 HOT (18 on VAB); **RL:** M-72 LAW (66mm); 850 RPG-7 (73mm); 1,000 APILAS (112mm); **RCL:** 40 EM-67 (90mm); 144 M-40A1 (106mm); **AD GUNS:** 36 M-55 (20mm); 24 GDF-003 with SKYGUARD; 20 M-1 (40mm); **SAM:** 60 MISTRAL; 24 ASPIDE; 6 SA-15; **TURKISH REPUBLIC OF NORTHERN CYPRUS (defined as Foreign Turkish Forces):** **MBT:** 441 M-48A5 T1/T2; **APC:** 361 AAPC; 266 M-113; **TOWED ARTY:** 72 M-101A1 (105mm); 18 M-114A2 (155mm); **SP ARTY:** 90 M-44T (155mm); **MRL:** 6 T-122 (122mm); **MOR:** 175 (81mm); 148 M-30 (107mm); 54 HY-12 (120mm); **ATGW:** 66 MILAN; 48 TOW; **RL:** M-72 LAW (66mm); **RCL:** M-67 (90mm); 192 M-40A1 (106mm); **AD GUNS:** Rh 202 (20mm); 16 GDF-003 (235mm); 48 M-1 (40mm); **SAM:** STINGER;	12 Mi-35P (attack helicopter); 2 Bell UH-1H (support helicopter); 2 Bell 206C (support helicopter); 4 SA-342 GAZELLE with HOT (anti tank helicopter); **TURKISH REPUBLIC OF NORTHERN CYPRUS (defined as Foreign Turkish Forces):** 3 UH-1H (support helicopter); 1 AS-532UL (support helicopter);	no capability

	Special Forces (covert operations)	Specialised Forces (overt operations)	General purpose land forces	Air Support	Sea basing (without amphibious forces)
Czech Republic	Army: 1 special forces group;	Army: 1 airborne battalion;	MBT: 541 T-72M; RECCE: 182 BRDM; OT-65; AIFV: 550 BMP-1; 186 BMP-2; 15 BRM-1K; 129 BPzV; APC: 345 OT-90; 10 OT-64; (plus 562 AIFV and APC look-a-likes); TOWED ARTY: 79 D-30 (122mm); SP ARTY: 2 2S1 (122mm); 273 DANA (M-77) (152mm); MRL: 81 RM-70 (122mm); MOR: 85 M-1982 (120mm); 8 SPM-85 (120mm); SSM: FROG-7; SS-21; ATGW: 721 AT-3 SAGGER (incl. 550 on BMP-1, 94 on BRDM-2); 21 AT-5 SPANDREL; AT-4 SPIGOT; AD GUNS: M-53-59 (30mm); SAM: SA-7; 140 SA-9/-13;	2 ground attack squadrons; 50 L-159; 1 fighter squadron; 8 MiG-21; 3 helicopter squadrons; 34 Mi-24 HIND (attack helicopter); 9 Mi-8/20 (support helicopter); 31 Mi-2; 13 Mi-17; 10 PZL W-3 (SAR);	no capability
Estonia	no capability	no capability	RECCE: 7 BRDM-2; APC: 25 BTR-60/-70/-80; TOWED ARTY: 19 M 61-37 (105mm); MOR: 44 (81mm); 14 2S11 (120mm); ATGW: 10 MAPATS; 3 RB-56 BILL; RL: 200 B-300 (82mm); RCL: 109 CARL GUSTAV (84mm); 100 PV-1110 (90mm); 30 M-40A-1 (106mm); AD GUNS: 100 ZU-23-2;	no capability	1 ADMIRAL-PITKA-Class corvette; 2 coastal patrol crafts; 4 mine-countermeasure vessels;
Hungary	no capability	no capability	MBT: 505 T-55; 238 T-72; RECCE: 104 FUG D-442; AIFV: 490 BMP-1; 12 BRM-1K; 178 BTR-80A; APC: 459 BTR-80; 335 PSZH D-944; 4 MT-LB; (plus 310 APC and AIFV look-a-likes); TOWED ARTY: 227 M-1938 (M-30) (122mm); 301 D-20 (152mm); SP ARTY: 151 2S1 (122mm); MRL: 56 BM-21 (122mm); MOR: 99 M-120 (120mm); ATGW: 110 AT-3 SAGGER; 30 AT-4 SPIGOT (incl. BRDM-2 SP); 224 AT-5 SPANDREL; ATK GUNS: 162 D-44 (85mm); 106 MT-12 (100mm); AD GUNS: 186 S-60 (57mm); SAM: 243 SA-7; 60 SA-14; 45 MISTRAL;	1 tactical fighter wing; 27 MiG-29 A/UB FULCRUM (strike-fighter); 8 MiG-21; 1 MiG-23; 1 Sukhoi Su-22; 1 combat helicopter wing; 49 Mi-24 HIND (attack helicopter); support helicopter; 23 Mi8/17 (transport and assault helicopter);	no capability
Latvia	Army: 1 special forces team;	no capability	RECCE: 2 BRDM-2; APC: 13 PSKBIL; TOWED ARTY: 26 K-53 (100mm); MOR: 5 (82mm); 32 (120mm); RL: 82 AT-4 (84mm); AD GUNS: 12 ZPU-4 (14,5mm); 18 L-70 (40mm);	no capability	1 coastal patrol crafts; 3 mine-countermeasure vessels;
Lithuania	no capability	no capability	RECCE: 10 BRDM-2; APC: 22 BTR-60; 11 PSKBIL; 10 MT-LB; 94 M-113A1; TOWED ARTY: 72 M-101 (105mm); MOR: 61 M-43 (120mm); RL: 403 RPG-7 (73mm); 210 RPG-2 (82mm); AT-4 SPIGOT (84mm); RCL: 273 CARL GUSTAV (84mm); 420 PV-1110 (90mm);	10 Mi-8 (transport and SAR helicopter); 2 Mi-2 (support helicopter);	2 GRISHA-Class corvettes; 3 coastal patrol crafts; 2 mine-countermeasure vessels;

	Special Forces (covert operations)	Specialised Forces (overt operations)	General purpose land forces	Air Support	Sea basing (without amphibious forces)
Malta	no capability	no capability	no capability	no capability	no capability
Poland	**Army:** 1 special operation unit;	**Army:** 1 mountain infantry brigade;	**MBT:** 586 T-72; 233 PT-91; 128 LEOPARD 2A4; **RECCE:** 435 BRDM-2; **AIFV:** 1,248 BMP-1; 33 BRM-1; **APC:** 33 OT-64 (plus 693 look-a-likes); **TOWED ARTY:** 227 M-1938 (M-30) (122mm); 135 M-1938 (ML-20) (152mm); **SP ARTY:** 533 2S1 (122mm); 111 DANA (M-77) (152mm); 8 2S7 (203mm); **MRL:** 219 BM-21 (122mm); 30 RM-70 (122mm); **MOR:** 204 M-120 (120mm); 15 B11/2S12 (120mm); **SSM:** 4 SS-21 launchers; **ATGW:** 129 AT-3 SAGGER; 104 AT-4 SPIGOT; 18 AT-5 SPANDREL; 7 AT-7 SAXHORN; **AD GUNS:** 376 ZU-23-2 (23mm); 44 ZSU-23-4SP (23mm); 224 S-60 (57mm); **SAM:** 80 SA-6; 576 SA-7; 64 SA-8; 232 SA-9;	1 fighter squadron; 45 MiG-29; 9 ground attack/ reconnaissance squadrons; 98 Sukhoi Su-22 FITTER ; 81 MiG-21 FISHBED. **SAM:** SA-N-1 GOA; helicopters (transport and support); 67 Mi-2; 12 Mi-8/17; 18 W-3 SOKOL.	1 SOKOL-Class SSK submarine; 1 ORZEL-Class SSK submarine; 2 WILK-Class SSK submarine; 1 WARSZAWA-Class destroyer (SSM: SS-N-2C STYX; SAM: SA-N-1 GOA); 2 PULAWSKI-Class frigates (SSM: HARPOON; SAM: SM-1); 1 KASZUB-Class frigate (SAM: SA-N-5 GRAIL); 4 GORNIK-Class corvettes (SSM: SS-N-2C STYX; SAM: SA-N-5 GRAIL); 5 missile-crafts (SSM: SS-N-2A); 14 patrol crafts (3 coastal; 11 inshore); 22 mine-countermeasure vessels;
Slovakia	no capability	no capability	**MBT:** 271 T-72M; **RECCE:** 129 BRDM; 90 OT-65; 72 BPVZ; **AIFV:** 311 BMP-1; 93 BMP-2; **APC:** 113 OT-90; 7 OT-64; **TOWED ARTY:** 76 D-30; **SP ARTY:** 49 2S1 (122mm); 134 DANA (M-77) (152mm); 16 M200 (155mm); **MRL:** 87 RM-70 (122mm); **ATGW:** 466 (incl. BMP-1/-2 and BRDM mounted) AT-3 SAGGER and AT-5 SPANDREL; **AD GUNS:** 200 M-53/-59 (30mm) and S-60 (57mm); **SAM:** SA-7; 48 SA-13; SA-16;	1 fighter wing; 22 MiG-29/UB; 29 MiG-21MF/UB; 1 ground attack/ reconnaissance wing; 8 Sukhoi Su-22M4/UM3K FITTER; 12 Sukhoi Su-25K/UBK FROGFOOT; 1 helicopter wing; 19 Mi-24V/D HIND (attack helicopter); 14 Mi-17 (assault helicopter); 2 Mi-2 (support helicopter); 6 Mi-8 (support helicopter)	no capability
Slovenia	**Army:** 1 special forces brigade (personnel believed to be way below brigade status);	no capability	**MBT:** 40 M-84; 30 T-55S1; **RECCE:** 8 BRDM-2; **AIFV:** 26 M-80; **APC:** 34 VALUK (PANDUR); 28 BOV-1; 2 BTR-50PU; **TOWED ARTY:** 6 M-2A1 (105mm); 18 TN-90 (155mm); **MOR:** 60 (82mm); 8 M-52 (120mm); 16 M-74 (120mm); 32 MN-9 (120mm); **ATGW:** AT-3 SAGGER (incl. 12 BOV-3SP); AT-4 SPIGOT (incl. 12 BOV-3SP)	8 B-412 armed helicopter; 2 AS-532 (support helicopter);	no capability

STRIKE (EU-15)

	Deep Strike – Stand Off	Precision Guided Munitions (PGM)	Offensive electronic warfare
Austria	no capability	no capability	no capability
Belgium	no capability	AGM-65G MAVERICK guided missile;	no capability
Denmark	no capability	AGM-65 MAVERICK guided missile; GBU-12 PAVEWAY II LGB (laser-guided bomb); GBU-24 PAVEWAY III LGB (laser-guided bomb); JDAM (delivery till 2004)	no capability
France	ASMP supersonic missile; SCALP (in delivery)	AS-30/30L laser guided missile;	no capability
Finland	no capability	no capability	no capability
Germany	TAURUS KEPD-350 (delivery starting November 2004)	AGM-88 HARM (high-speed anti-radiation missile);	no capability
Greece	SCALP (on order);	AGM-65G MAVERICK guided missile; AGM-88 HARM (high-speed anti-radiation missile);	no capability
Ireland	no capability	no capability	no capability
Italy	no capability	AGM-88 HARM (high-speed anti-radiation missile);	no capability
Luxembourg	no capability	no capability	no capability
Netherlands	no capability	AGM-65G MAVERICK guided missile; GBU-12 PAVEWAY II LGB (in delivery); GBU-24 PAVEWAY III LGB (in delivery);	no capability
Portugal	no capability	AGM-65B/G MAVERICK guided missile; AGM-84D HARPOON;	no capability
Spain	no capability	AGM-65B/G MAVERICK guided missile; AGM-88 HARM (high-speed anti-radiation missile); AGM-84D HARPOON;	no capability
Sweden	TAURUS KEPD-350 (delivery starting November 2004);	RB-75 (= AGM-65) MAVERICK guided missile;	no capability
United Kingdom	TOMAHAWK Block IIIC LAM (land attack missile) on 6 submarines SSN (nuclear-fuelled submarine); STORMSHADOW;	AGM-65G2 MAVERICK; AGM-84D-1 HARPOON; GBU-12 PAVEWAY II LGB (laser guided bomb); GBU-24 PAVEWAY III LGB (laser guided bomb); ALARM (air-launched anti-radiation missile);	no capability

STRIKE (+ 10)

	Deep Strike – Stand Off	Deep Strike – Precision	Offensive electronic warfare
Cyprus	no capability	no capability	no capability
Czech Republic	no capability	no capability	no capability
Estonia	no capability	no capability	no capability
Hungary	no capability	no capability	no capability
Latvia	no capability	no capability	no capability
Lithuania	no capability	no capability	no capability
Malta	no capability	no capability	no capability
Poland	no capability	no capability	no capability
Slovakia	no capability	no capability	no capability
Slovenia	no capability	no capability	no capability

DETERRENCE (EU-15)

	Nuclear deterrence
Austria	no capability
Belgium	no capability
Denmark	no capability
France	<u>Navy (64 SLBM in 4 SSBN plus Naval Aviation)</u>: 1 L´INFLEXIBLE SSBN with 16 M-4/TN-71 SLBM; 1 L´INFLEXIBLE SSBN with 16 M-45/TN-75 SLBM; 2 LE TRIOMPHANT SSBN with 16 M-45/TN-75 SLBM; 28 SUPER ETENDARD strike-fighter; **Air Force:** 3 squadrons with 60 MIRAGE 2000-N equipped with ASMP supersonic missile; **TOTAL OF 338 OPERATIONAL STRATEGIC WARHEADS**
Finland	no capability
Germany	no capability
Greece	no capability
Ireland	no capability
Italy	no capability
Luxembourg	no capability
Netherlands	no capability
Portugal	no capability
Spain	no capability
Sweden	no capability
United Kingdom	<u>Navy (58 SLBM in 4 SSBN)</u>: 4 VANGUARD SSBN, each with 16 TRIDENT II-D5 SLBM; **TOTAL OF 185 OPERATIONAL STRATEGIC WARHEADS**

DETERRENCE (+ 10)

	Nuclear deterrence
Cyprus	no capability
Czech Republic	no capability
Estonia	no capability
Hungary	no capability
Latvia	no capability
Lithuania	no capability
Malta	no capability
Poland	no capability
Slovakia	no capability
Slovenia	no capability

Appendix 6: Chronology

Day	Month	Year	Event
3–4	*December*	*1998*	The UK and France issue the St. Malo Declaration which states: "…the Union (EU) must be given appropriate structures and a capacity for analysis of situations, sources of intelligence, and a capability for relevant strategic planning, without unnecessary duplication, taking account of the existing assets of the WEU and the evolution of its relations with the EU. In this regard, the European Union will also need to have recourse to suitable military means (European capabilities pre-designated within NATO's European pillar or national or multinational European means outside the NATO framework)".
11–12	*December*	*1998*	European Council in Vienna. The first European Council after St. Malo "welcomes the new impetus given to the debate on a common European policy on security and defence." The need to establish the necessary capabilities to conduct a Common Foreign and Security Policy is for the first time specifically mentioned. "The European Council considers that in order for the European Union to be in a position to play its full role on the international stage, the CFSP must be backed by credible operational capabilities".
24	*March*	*1999*	NATO begins Operation Allied Force on the Balkans.
23–25	*April*	*1999*	50th anniversary summit of NATO leaders is held in Washington DC. The final communiqué of the Summit, inspired by events in Kosovo, shows a much greater acceptance of ESDP than the previously prepared new Strategic Concept that heads of State and Government adopted at the Summit. The Summit also sees the launching of the Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI).
3-4	*June*	*1999*	At the Cologne European Council it is decided to put in place decision-making procedures for a European Security and Defence Policy within the context of CFSP and to develop capacities to undertake operations. The Heads of State and Government confirm the St. Malo Declaration and recognise that to pursue the Common Foreign and Security Policy, "the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed

up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO."

13	*September*	*1999*	Javier Solana of Spain is appointed EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy
15	*November*	*1999*	For the first time ever, EU Defence Ministers meet with EU Foreign Ministers in the context of the General Affairs Council in Brussels. Javier Solana, High Representative for CFSP is allowed to accept an expected appointment as Secretary General of the WEU.
10–11	*December*	*1999*	European Council in Helsinki sets the objective of having a capacity by 2003 to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least one year 50,000 to 60,000 military personnel capable of the full range of Petersburg tasks. The decision is also taken to establish new political and military bodies and structures within the Council to enable the EU to guarantee the necessary political guidance and strategic direction of such operations.
19–20	*June*	*2000*	Feira European Council. "Principles and modalities for arrangements have been identified to allow non-EU European NATO members and other EU accession candidates to contribute to EU military crisis management. Principles for consultation with NATO on military issues and modalities for developing EU-NATO relations have also been identified in four areas covering security issues, capability goals, the modalities for EU access to NATO assets, and the definition of permanent consultation arrangements".
13	*November*	*2000*	WEU Council of Ministers in Marseille decides that WEU will cease most activities. The Petersberg Tasks are assigned to the EU, along with the WEU Satellite Interpretation Centre and the WEU Institute for Security Studies.
14–15	*November*	*2000*	NATO Defence Ministers agree on EU proposals concerning EU-NATO permanent arrangements for consultation and cooperation.
20–21	*November*	*2000*	Capabilities Commitment Conference in Brussels. EU defence ministers pledge their initial commitments to the European

Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF). This conference constitutes the first stage of the process of reinforcing military capabilities for crisis management by the Union with the purpose of achieve the Headline Goal.

7–9	*December*	*2000*	European Council in Nice. Three new permanent bodies are set up, the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the Military Committee of the European Union (EUMC) and the Military Staff of the European Union (EUMS). The Presidency Report on ESDP also includes paragraphs on permanent arrangements for EU-NATO consultation and cooperation, incorporation of certain WEU functions into the EU (Satellite Centre and Institute for Security Studies, police technical cooperation mission in Albania), the achievement of the Headline Goal and civilian crisis management. The Treaty of Nice adopted at this European Council states that "The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions relating to the security of the Union, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy, which might lead to a common defence, should the European Council so decide."
5	*February*	*2001*	First meeting of the North Atlantic Council and the EU Political and Security Committee at Ambassadorial level under the new permanent NATO-EU consultation arrangements takes place at the EU in Brussels.
26	*February*	*2001*	EU Foreign Ministers sign the Treaty of Nice, amending the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the European Community (TEC). They also create the Rapid Reaction Mechanism.
30	*May*	*2001*	First formal NATO-EU Ministerial meeting is held.
12	*June*	*2001*	NATO Military Committee and the EU Military Committee (EUMC) meet for the first time at NATO headquarters.
11	*September*	*2001*	Attacks against the United States in New York and Washington DC.
12	*September*	*2001*	NATO invokes Article 5, under which an attack on one member state is considered an attack on all 19 members.

19–20	*November*	*2001*	EU Foreign and Defence Ministers meet in Brussels to discuss capabilities improvements and agree on the European Capability Action Plan (ECAP).
14–15	*December*	*2001*	EU Heads of Government meet in Laeken, Belgium. The main topic under discussion is a plan to draft an EU Constitution.
1	*January*	*2002*	The WEU subsidiary bodies, the Torrejon Satellite Centre and the Institute for Security Studies, become EU agencies.
15–16	*March*	*2002*	The Barcelona European Council declares the EU's "availability" to take over NATO's operation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, "on the understanding that the permanent arrangements on EU-NATO cooperation ("Berlin plus") would be in place by then".
18	*July*	*2002*	In order to respond to the European public's view that the EU should assume greater responsibility in the field of security and defence policy and to the loss of momentum since St. Malo, the Belgian Prime Minister Verhofstadt proposes in a letter to Tony Blair and Jacques Chirac the creation of an EU planning cap, the setting up of an EU armaments agency, the introduction of a collective security guarantee among the 15 and an EU operation in Macedonia, despite the unresolved problem of EU use of NATO capacities and infrastructure.
21	*November*	*2002*	The French and German Foreign Ministers issue a joint proposal to the European Convention in which they call for a section on "common security and solidarity" in the Treaty. They also argue for "enhanced cooperation" in ESDP, i.e. flexibility within the EU which allows groups of Member-States to engage in deeper cooperation than other members. Their proposal further includes sections on military capacities and a European Armament Policy.
21-22	*November*	*2002*	NATO Prague Summit. Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia are invited to join. Ministers also approve new, more specific commitments on operational capabilities, replacing the Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI), considered too ambitious and overtaken by the September 11th events. The DCI thus becomes the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC).

12–13	*December*	*2002*	European Council in Copenhagen. First, it marks the conclusion of accession negotiations with Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia. Second, the "Berlin-plus" dilemma is finally overcome after three years of difficult negotiations as agreement is reached with NATO on access to the latter's planning, logistics and intelligence for operations in which NATO is not involved. The EU's determination to act in the field of security and defence thus becomes an operational reality.
1	*January*	*2003*	An EU Police Mission is launched in Bosnia and Herzegovina, taking over from the International Police Task Force (IPTF).
20	*March*	*2003*	The US and UK start the military operation against Iraq.
21-22	*March*	*2003*	The Brussels European Council "recognises the role that defence and security related R&D could play in promoting leading-edge technologies and thereby stimulate innovation and competitiveness" and welcomes the Commission's Communication "Towards an EU Defence Equipment Policy".
31	*March*	*2003*	An EU mission is launched in Macedonia with NATO support, the so-called Operation Concordia.
29	*April*	*2003*	The leaders of Belgium, France, Germany and Luxembourg meet in Brussels suburb of Tervuren to discuss increasing EU defence co-operation. They call for a "European Security and Defence Union" (ESDU) and for new rapid reaction force, built around the Franco-German brigade and supplemented by Belgian commandos and units from Luxembourg.
5	*June*	*2003*	EU agrees to send 1400 troops to Bunia, Congo as an Interim Emergency Multinational Force (Operation Artemis). The first EU military operation without recourse to NATO.
29	*November*	*2003*	France Germany and the UK present a joint paper that "sets out how the collective capability of the EU can be strengthened, including the ability to plan and run certain operations, and describes how consideration of the options involved would take place between UN Partners and NATO Allies". The three countries, "in order to improve the preparation of EU operations having recourse to NATO assets and capabilities under the

Berlin plus arrangements, (…) propose that a small EU cell should be established at SHAPE and to invite NATO to establish liaison arrangements at the EUMS. This will also ensure full transparency between EU and NATO embodying their strategic partnership in crisis management".

12	*December*	*2003*	The European Council approves a report drafted under the responsibility of the EU High Representative Javier Solana entitled "A Secure Europe In A Better World" – "European Security Strategy".
12	*December*	*2003*	A summit in Brussels is convened to finalise the European Constitution.
12	*December*	*2003*	The Brussels European Council approves the document that was introduced as a joint paper by the UK, France and Germany on 29 November 2003.
1	*May*	*2004*	Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Poland, Hungary, Malta and Cyprus join the EU.

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The Venusberg Group Reports

The Venusberg Group is a high-level network of security and defence experts from across Europe brought together by the Bertelsmann Foundation in Guetersloh and the Bertelsmann Group for Policy Research at the Center for Applied Policy Research (CAP), University of Munich, to examine the future of EU security policy. The Group was formed in early 1999 following a meeting that took place at a hotel on the Venusberg near Bonn, close to the Petersberg where in 1992 European leaders established the basis for EU defence.

Entitled Enhancing the European Union as an International Security Actor the first Venusberg Group Report was published in June 2000. It called on the EU to establish a New Strategic Security Goal (NSSG) that became the European Security Strategy (ESS). Looking beyond the Helsinki Headline Goal, the strategy called for the development of an autonomous political and military capability that by 2015 could carry out a full Kosovo-type operation without recourse to US assets.

Two years later the Bertelsmann Foundation again invited some members of the Venusberg Group to form a small advisory team to up-date the first Venusberg Report and to reinforce its core message: successful security and defence integration is an essential part of the strategic European project and the security and defence of Europeans. The members of the 2004 core group are Franco Algieri, Thomas Bauer and Janis Emmanouilidis, all Center for Applied Policy Research, Munich; Yves Boyer, Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, Paris; Tuomas Forsberg, George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, Garmisch-Partenkirchen; Julian Lindley-French, Geneva Centre for Security Studies, Geneva; Stefani Weiss, Bertelsmann Foundation, Guetersloh; Rob de Wijk, Clingendael Centre for Strategic Studies, The Hague. In preparation of the new report several meetings of the group took place between July 2002 and December 2003.

The second Venusberg Report was completed in the wake of the Madrid bombing and in the midst of renewed violence in the Balkans. At a time of considerable uncertainty over European security and defence integration the authors are concerned that the loss of political momentum will adversely affect the strategic European project and thus the security of Europeans in the twenty-first century.