Dealing with Neighbors: Fighting a Ring of Fire or Building a Ring of Friends?

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Background Paper

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Overview

This background paper addresses the question of how states should rethink and reform their policies toward neighboring countries: “Fighting a ring of fire” or “building a ring of friends” are two different strategies, among others, a nation (and its politicians) can use to design and manage foreign relationships with neighboring countries or deal with interests in nearby regions. More broadly, a “ring of fire” or a “ring of friends” can describe the geopolitical status quo, a phenomenon that states need to react to accordingly. Besides the external political relations aspect, economic relations and cross-border cultural activities play an important role in fostering regional cooperation.

A number of factors – changing political and economic realities, instability, armed conflicts – have prompted countries worldwide to reassess their approach toward their neighboring states. Against this background, this publication looks beyond the challenges neighborhood policy was and is confronted with in order to examine what can be learned from various views on shaping neighborhood relations. It includes five original pieces of research on dealing with neighbors that were commissioned in preparation for the 2016 Trilogue Salzburg. The authors examine this year’s topic **“Dealing with Neighbors: Fighting a Ring of Fire or Building a Ring of Friends?”** from a number of perspectives.

The first article, **Fighting a Ring of Fire or Creating a Ring of Friends,** focuses on neighborhood policy and region-building as an increasingly important part of foreign relations. It addresses some of the major problems the European Union, the United States and China face in their neighborhoods today and explores options that have been used to deal with their “ring.” The article also distills recommendations on how Europe could address current challenges.

The research paper **The European Neighbourhood Policy: Catalyst for Transformation or Paper Tiger?** analyzes the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The author discusses the challenge Europe is faced with and the ENP’s shortcomings and concludes with recommendations for renewing European foreign policy.

The author of **Identity Politics, Sectarian Conflict and Regional Political Rivalry in the Middle East** argues that most – although not all – instances of sectarian violence in the Middle East relate to conflicts between Sunnis and Shias. He shows which factors have played out in different ways in four major sectarian conflicts in Iraq, Syria, Yemen and Bahrain. The author describes how a successful neighborhood policy could be shaped to respond to conflicts today.

Learning from an Asian Neighborhood Policy: Living with a Dragon Next Door looks at the conclusions that can be drawn from Asian foreign policy. The closer countries are to China the more they are impacted by its newfound influence and power. Looking at the relevant core regions, the author shows how different countries deal with this dilemma. The article also gives an idea of how the region can help identify China’s role for the world. Based on this, the paper draws conclusions for the European Union.

The fifth article focuses on lessons that can be learned from U.S. foreign policy as well as the reaction of neighborhood countries for a successful regional policy. **Relating to One’s Neighborhood: A View from the United States** analyzes the United States’ neighborhood policy towards the region and the consequences for migration. The author concludes with policy recommendations derived from the approach the U.S. has been using to engage with key countries in its region.

The author of **Structures of European Neighborhood at a Time of Change** gives an historical analysis of the immediate future and enlarges the concept of neighborhood. The article stresses transformative factors and challenges, especially those the European neighborhood is faced with. The author argues that historians are expected to provide lessons to be learned from the past, but humanity learns little if anything from its own history. Nevertheless, the paper discusses key elements taught by history that can provide economic and cultural growth.

This background paper is designed to provide in-depth analyses on various aspects of the two issues that will be addressed during the conference sessions, namely **Lessons from Around the World: Living With Difference Next Door**, which will focus on political, economic, cultural, and social consequences of changing neighborhood relations, and **Toward a New Neighborhood Policy: Rethinking Strategy and Enlarging the Toolbox**, which will explore possible strategic and tactical approaches for an effective neighborhood policy.

Fighting a Ring of Fire or Creating a Ring of Friends

Verena Nowotny | Jörg Habich

I Introduction

As with family members, you cannot choose your neighbors. But you have to live with them anyway. Etymology suggests that originally there was a rather positive connotation to the word "neighborhood," which first appeared in the 15th century, in the sense of "neighborly conduct, friendliness." The modern meaning – "a community of people who live close together" – was first recorded in the 1620s. Nowadays, neighborhood is generally defined spatially as a specific geographic area and functionally as a set of social networks, which means it is no longer necessarily limited by geographic boundaries. Neighborhood in this sense provides a context, a common understanding of identity, a set of interaction patterns and a sense of belonging.[1]

Neighborhood is not a static concept; neighborhoods can shift and develop, deteriorate and decline, or completely change their character – gradually over time or suddenly due to massive intervention or other events.

Changing political and economic realities as well as instability and armed conflicts have prompted countries worldwide to reassess their approach toward their neighboring states. Due to their geographic proximity, neighborhoods are a special sphere of international relations in which the resolution of disputes and conflicts is a pressing concern and the diverging interests of a variety of stakeholders need to be taken into account.

"Fighting a ring of fire" and "building a ring of friends" are just two ways states can rethink and reform their policies toward neighboring countries. On the one hand, both terms can describe a country's own strategic outlook of its neighborhood, defining its policies and actions. On the other hand, both terms can describe a geopolitical status quo, a phenomenon that states need to react to accordingly. Clearly, neighborhoods form a challenging environment all over the world.

This article aims to explore the basic nature of "neighborhood" and its underlying potential and challenges. It will further address some of the regional problems the European Union, the United States and China face in their neighborhoods today and explore various options that have been used to deal with the resulting issues. The article concludes with several recommendations for neighborhood policies from a European perspective.

II Neighborhood: Shifting over Time

In recent years, the world has not necessarily become a better place. According to the 2016 Bertelsmann Transformation Index, there is an increasingly negative trend among the 129 transformation countries compared by the index in terms of their quality of governance. The core area of deterioration is centered in the Middle East, Northern Africa and Asia, whereas the

[1] Amie M. Schuck and Dennis P. Rosenbaum: "Promoting Safe and Healthy Neighborhoods: What Research Tells Us about Intervention," in Karen Fulbright-Anderson and Patricia Auspos*: Community Change: Theories.* The Aspen Institute 2006; pp. 61-140.

Americas have remained comparatively stable and in consolidation, with the major exception of Venezuela. Yet many governments, even those in relatively stable countries, are faced with political and social conflicts.

The 2016 Bertelsmann Transformation Index also shows that democracy and models of social market economy are being challenged worldwide and many governments have placed tighter restrictions on political and civil rights as a means of consolidating their own power. Therefore, many regions in the world must rethink and reform their policies toward neighboring countries.



Source: Bertelsmann Transformation Index 2016. Gütersloh 2016.

Especially for Europe, the situation has changed dramatically during the last ten years: 12 out of 16 countries in the European Union's neighborhood are currently exposed to frozen conflicts, civil wars, territorial occupation and interstate war.

The then president of the European Commission, Romano Prodi, saw a common European neighborhood policy as a key to stability in 2002, when he concluded:

> "I want to see a '**ring of friends**' surrounding the Union and its closest European neighbours, from Morocco to Russia and the Black Sea. This encircling band of friendly countries will be diverse. The quality of our relations with them will largely depend on their performance and the political will on either side. Of course, geography will play a role, too. … We have to be prepared to offer more than partnership and less than membership, without precluding the latter."[2]

Access to the EU's single market and visa liberalization schemes enabling stronger intercultural exchange were regarded as the European Neighbourhood Policy's major selling points. However, the massive convulsions in Europe's southern neighborhood, the millions of migrants and refugees crossing into Europe, the coup in Turkey and the destabilization of Ukraine are confronting Europe with a completely new status quo.

What was supposed to become a ring of friends surrounding Europe has turned into a ring of fire – with dire consequences for the EU in terms of migration and terrorism, consequences that are carrying "sparks" of instability to the heart of the Union. As the figure "Risk Map" shows, the EU is currently surrounded by more or less risky countries (100 = most risky).

Risk Map

Current Rating Risk Overall Assessment



Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit. Risk Briefing. http://viewswire.eiu.com/index.asp?layout=RKcountryVW3&country_id=1440000144 (retrieved July 22, 2016).

[2] Romano Prodi: A Wider Europe - A Proximity Policy as the key to stability. Speech at: "Peace, Security And Stability International Dialogue and the Role of the EU" Sixth ECSA-World Conference. Jean Monnet Project. Brussels 2002.

The development of the countries along the EU's borders is only one example of the dynamics that are inherent to neighborly relations. These relations can substantially change according to developments in

- relative economic weight;
- relative political weight;
- political direction;
- relative military weight;
- security concerns and external interventions;
- the regional or supra-regional framework;
- the extent of bilateral interdependences;
- religious, ethnic or cultural identities in the respective neighboring countries;
- the welfare gap between the neighboring countries;
- historically disputed areas and territorial claims.

Examples of such developments are abundant and ubiquitous: We have witnessed the transformation of China's relations with its neighbors due to its increasing importance as a global player; we have experienced disillusion after the Arab Spring, which did not fulfill (European) hopes for more democracy in countries such as Egypt and Libya. Military weight and most notably Russia's willingness to employ it fundamentally changed the situation in Ukraine and Syria. Fear of war and the total lack of future prospects prompted hundreds of thousands of desperate refugees and migrants to set out for Europe. In July 2016, about 100,000 people from Venezuela used a short opening of the borders to Columbia in order to buy food and basic goods that have not been available in Venezuela for quite some time. Disputed claims in the South China Sea are triggering constant tensions between China and its neighbors; an international tribunal has recently issued a ruling against China in a first case brought by the Philippines – but to no avail with regard to solving this conflict.

III What's in the Toolbox?

All these developments have a profound impact on neighborly relations between countries and on how they manage relations with their neighboring countries. Quite naturally, neighborhood policy is part of a country's foreign policy; however, due to the immediate consequences of any change in neighborly relations, governments usually pay special attention to developments in their vicinity. The spectrum of relations between neighboring countries encompasses various approaches ranging from visa-free travel agreements, free-trade zones, regional business institutions and development programs, to border protection and border patrols, sanctions, appeals to international institutions to resolve disputes, and military intervention.

Thumbnail sketches of strategic approaches used by global players such as the EU, the United States and China – which will be described in more detail in the following studies – allow a first comparison of tactics and their respective effectiveness.

1. The European Approach: Money, Mobility and Market

Following the successful enlargement of the European Union in 2004, the EU launched its European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) as a means to support democratic development, the rule of law and a functioning market economy in these countries. Today the ENP includes Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco,

Palestine, Syria, Tunisia and Ukraine. Former High Representative Javier Solana envisioned the future neighborhood as a "ring of well-governed countries."

To achieve that goal, the EU's offer to ENP partner countries has been summed up as the "three Ms": money, mobility and markets. Financial support, easier travel conditions and enhanced access to EU markets are indeed still attractive to many (as one can easily recognize from Turkey's demands for visa-free travel conditions in the course of the migration crisis).

However, this approach does not allow the EU to respond adequately to rapidly changing circumstances, which could be seen not only in the south of Europe in the course of the revolutionary awaking in Tunisia, Libya and Egypt in 2011, but also in eastern Europe where the Russian military intervention in Ukraine led to a crisis that has still yet to be overcome.

This situation was further exacerbated by the outbreak of war in Syria against the government of Bashar-al Assad. The armed conflict triggered a massive wave of migration, causing approximately 4.6 million refugees to move either to neighboring countries such as Lebanon, Turkey, Jordan, Iraq and Egypt, or to try to reach European soil via Greece, the Balkan region or the Mediterranean.

In this environment and with rising hostility in EU member states toward migrants and foreigners in general, the carrots of money, mobility and markets make only limited sense, as they were originally designed for more stable transition countries. Moreover, conditionality turned out to be interpreted as a hostile act by Russia, and in some cases has not been applied consistently by the EU.

2. The American Approach: To Intervene or not to Intervene?

The almost 2,000-mile border region between the United States and Mexico has not only been quite contentious but also continues to be a major concern in terms of security and trade. Examining U.S.-Mexican relations over time, one can observe all kinds of changes in bilateral relations: from war to close alliance, and from expropriation to the establishment of a free-trade zone.

Early relations were dominated by territorial disputes. Texas in particular remained a focal point of U.S.-Mexican relations for decades beginning in the early 19th century. This finally led to the Mexican-American War (1846-1848), as a result of which Mexico was forced to sell all of its northernmost territory, including California and New Mexico. Additionally, Mexico relinquished its claims to Texas.

During the second half of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century, Mexico increasingly considered the U.S. a "colossus of the north." On the one hand, it welcomed American investment, but at the same time carefully eyed any potential attempt by the U.S. to interfere with its political sovereignty. The multi-billion dollar investments made by the U.S. caused then President William Taft to settle the territorial dispute over the Chamizal strip and agree to a historic first meeting between a U.S. and Mexican president.

The Mexican Revolution radically transformed Mexican culture and government; the new constitution of 1917 enabled land reform, but also economic nationalism and the restriction of ownership of enterprises by foreigners. Initially the U.S. government generally supported those who occupied the seats of power, whether they held that power legitimately or not; however, this policy of interference was abandoned when president Franklin Delano Roosevelt initiated the "Good Neighbor Policy" in 1933. The policy's main principle was that of non-intervention and non-

interference in the domestic affairs of Latin America. The Roosevelt administration expected that this new policy would create new economic opportunities in the form of reciprocal trade agreements and reassert the influence of the U.S. in Latin America.

In 1920 and 1921, the U.S. economy was hard hit by a short but deep depression. When the depression occurred, U.S. officials and employers immediately advised the U.S. government that "a massive deportation program was the only option for relieving local and national benevolence agencies of the burden of helping braceros [manual workers] and their families." Between 1929 and 1936 an estimated 500,000 to two million Mexicans were forcibly repatriated without due process and on the basis of rather arbitrary selection criteria.

It was a common enemy that finally helped to ameliorate bilateral relations: The alliance between Mexico and the U.S. during World War II brought about a far more harmonious relationship between the two countries. The focus then returned to economic issues, reaching a new high point with the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994.

The strong interconnectedness is not only reflected in significant economic ties, but also in the large number of immigrants in the U.S. who are of Mexican origin. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, as of July 2013, Mexican-Americans made up 10.9% of the U.S. population, as 34.6 million U.S. residents identified as being of full or partial Mexican ancestry. Mexican-Americans comprised 64.1% of all Hispanics and Latinos in the U.S. The United States is home to the second-largest Mexican community in the world, second only to Mexico itself, and it comprises more than 24% of the world's entire Mexican-origin population.

Increased security concerns, especially after the terrorist attacks of 9/11, led to further tightening of the legal framework for immigration. "Operation Streamline" was introduced in 2005, a set of zero-tolerance policies implemented at the U.S.-Mexican border that seek to remove undocumented immigrants through an expedited process if they have arrived with missing or fraudulent identification or have previously been convicted for an immigration crime. Additionally, the U.S. has built a barrier on its border with Mexico consisting of a grouping of short physical walls, secured in between with a "virtual fence" which includes a system of sensors and cameras. As a result of the barrier, illegal migrants have turned to other routes which take them through inhospitable terrain, leading to an increased number of deaths. Despite sharp political rhetoric from anti-illegal immigration campaigners in the U.S. Congress, the cooperation between Mexico and the U.S. has reached unprecedented depth and encompasses a rather broad-minded and preferential attitude with regard to Mexican immigrants.

3. The Chinese Approach: Carrot and Stick

The last three decades have turned out to be a complete game-changer for China, and thus to its neighborhood policy posture. China's current economic weight and, consequently, the huge diplomatic relevance the country has acquired also had an impact on China's approach towards its Asian neighbors. Nowadays, China conveys a sense of entitlement to have a strategic space around it, which is mainly directed against the United States whose alliances with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines and Taiwan are often contested by China.

China's assertiveness and the ongoing dispute over its claim to the area up to the nine dash line in the South China Sea, a claim rejected by an international tribunal, is causing quite a similar security-economic quandary for the surrounding Asian countries. This can be observed in most relations

between neighboring countries where one is rather dominant because of its size and economic weight. Interestingly enough, countries in the region show no unity in their response to this challenge and pursue different strategies to balance their economic and security interests. Whereas Japan has reduced its exposure in terms of trade and investments in China and deepened its security commitments with the U.S., South Korea strengthened its economic exchange with China by signing a free trade agreement in 2015 while still hosting 36,000 troops within the framework of a security alliance with the U.S.

On the other hand, China's own policy similarly ranges from military saber-rattling to spinning a web of win-win economic ties built from trade strength. China's efforts to even out domestic imbalances in terms of economic development and to guarantee security of the autonomous region of Xinjiang are taken further in its concrete steps to enhance cooperation with neighboring countries in the west.

Founded in 2001, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) serves as a main vehicle for China to engage with the countries of Central Asia. The SCO is portrayed as diplomacy's answer to the Swiss army knife: It does everything from counter-terrorism to trade, energy interconnectedness, and multilateral diplomacy. The six members (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Russia and China) meet annually on heads of government level and are currently pursuing 20 large-scale projects related to transportation, energy and telecommunications.

In 2014, President Xi Jinping announced his vision of "One Belt, One Road" (OBOR), and one of its first elements was put into place with the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), which has 57 founding members. It has been indicated that up to 60 countries may be included in OBOR, with members spread across three different continents. Led from the highest levels of government, the OBOR push is backed by substantial financial firepower, with the government having launched a US$50 billion Silk Road Fund that will directly support the OBOR mission.

IV The New Dilemma: Being Close but Not Dependent

The rise of global interconnectedness due to the internet and digitization during the last 20 years might have led to the perception that the world as a whole is a "global village" and that the concept of neighborhood has lost importance as boundaries can now easily be overcome and communication can instantly reach people around the globe. This interconnectedness, however, has also brought with it a much greater interdependence, in particular with regard to each country's immediate neighbors. Climate change, natural and man-made disasters (think: nuclear accidents), migration and terrorism all demand international alliances if they are to be tackled efficiently; they cannot be mastered on a nation-state level. Thus, geographic closeness is generally an indicator of the importance of a relationship.

The economic-security quandary observed in various relationships worldwide among neighboring countries also seems to be a crucial balance for nation-states when it comes to defining their approach to foreign and neighborhood policy. Two different narratives can evolve out of that, depending on which side gains the upper hand. The "liberal dream," inspired by the Enlightenment and its traditions, promotes freedom and openness – and, consequentially, globalization, free trade and (controlled) migration. The "authoritarian dream" restores a sense of place and identity. It manifests in evocations of national pride (and superiority) and "the good old days"; thus, it is a retreat from modernity. The strong focus on identity implies that migration cannot be beneficial as

it would alter the configuration of a society and bring about change in its culture and traditions. One could watch these two opposing camps in full swing in the run-up to the British referendum on leaving or remaining in the European Union. The disturbing dominance of the "authoritarian dream" has also been apparent following the failed coup in Turkey.

V Recommendations

An evaluation of the historical and present relationships that the three global players – the U.S., China and the European Union – entertain with their neighbors provides some valuable suggestions as to how a fruitful neighborhood policy could and should be developed:

- **Use an individual approach within a regional context**. Neighboring countries tend to be rather unique and have individual interests and needs. Therefore, a "one-size-fits-it-all" approach (as applied with the ENP, for example) will not work. The European Union and China both have a diverse and large neighborhood and thus need to address their neighboring countries on a more individual basis without neglecting the regional context.
- **Define strategic priorities first.** Depending on the current state of bilateral relations, there will be pressing issues that a neighborhood policy needs to focus on. Be it migration or be it rule of law to secure economic investments, any given priorities must be defined first in order to reconcile them if possible with the neighbor's priorities and to create programs and policies that are beneficial for both.
- **Improve and enlarge the toolbox.** Bilateral trade agreements and security measures have so far been the main tools used to shape neighborhood relations. Cultural exchange, cooperation in education, joint commissions convened to overcome historical disputes, exchanges of students/experts, joint development programs, etc., should be considered as means for broadening mutual understanding.
- **Follow developments closely, be prepared for change.** During recent years, many political observers were taken by surprise by certain developments, such as the Arab Spring, the massive influx of migrants and refugees into Europe, the vote for Brexit, and the terrorist attacks in European capitals. Obviously, there is a need to get more deeply involved in the developments taking place in neighboring countries in order to spot signs of fundamental change early on.

Neighbors share a border. However, that does not necessarily need to be a burden. On the contrary, as the Austrian philosopher Konrad Paul Liessmann observes: "Borders make our lives easier. They foster distance and respect, but also allow closeness. Even between good neighbors one finds a border." [3]

[3] Liessmann, Konrad Paul. Ohne Grenzen könnten wir nicht leben. In: BrandEins. 3/2013.

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The European Neighbourhood Policy: Catalyst for Transformation or Paper Tiger?

Stefani Weiss[1]

I Of Sweet Dreams and Rude Awakenings

Contrary to the prevailing view that Europe was old and ailing, the European Union got off to a bright and promising start in the new millennium. In 2004, the EU successfully concluded its biggest enlargement ever when Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia became new member states. Accession negotiations with Bulgaria and Romania were well under way. After years of war, even the situation in the Balkans had eased considerably, not least because the EU had firmly committed itself to the European perspective of the Western Balkan countries and their ultimate accession.

Given the amazing speed with which the eight former communist countries had transformed into democracies and market economies, the EU had every reason to feel irresistibly attractive. Accordingly, many people felt that the decades-long division of the continent was a thing of the past, while the future would see a peaceful, free and united Europe. The dreams did not stop there, since many nurtured the vision of a Europe surrounded by neighbors who all abided by, or were at least sympathetic to, the values of democracy, rule of law, respect for human rights, and social cohesion.

1. Departure in High Spirits

It was in this elated state that the EU launched its European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). Modeled on the enlargement policy, the ENP aimed at promoting structural economic changes through trade agreements, technical and financial support and visa liberalization, with the ultimate goal of removing all trade barriers and integrating the EU's neighboring countries into the single market. At the same time, the policy was meant to support these countries in becoming well-governed democratic states. Alas, membership in the EU was not on the ENP agenda.

Initially, only the four new eastern neighbors – Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine – were to become ENP partners. At the insistence of southern EU member states, Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Syria and Tunisia were also included, and eventually even Armenia and Azerbaijan were added. The result was to be nothing less than a "ring of friends" spanning from the shores of the Mediterranean to the Southern Caucasus to Eastern Europe.

The ENP got off to a dynamic start. Two years after its inception, action plans were concluded with almost all 16 ENP countries. These plans encapsulated the agreed-upon reform agendas and the timelines for their implementation. To track what had been achieved, progress reports for each ENP country were published every year. Successful reforms were to be honored with closer political association and economic integration in the form of Association Agreements (AAs) and Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). By 2005 such agreements were already in place with most of the southern neighbors.

[1] Valuable comments were received from the Bertelsmann Stiftung's Christian Hanelt and Dr. Hauke Hartmann.

In addition to the bilateral association and free trade agendas, two multilateral dialogue forums for closer regional cooperation were set up: the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM)[2] and the Eastern Partnership (EaP)[3]. They were intended not only to facilitate a better understanding of the differences between the eastern and southern neighborhoods, but also the strong differences in strategic interests and regional preferences of different EU member states.

Beginning in 2009, the ENP was enhanced by so-called Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (DCFTAs) which were to allow for virtually full access to the EU's market. Initially available only to countries in the eastern neighborhood, the agreements were introduced to lend new momentum to the ENP and were to be reserved for those partners who shared the EU's worldview and values.

2. Landing in Hangover

Only a decade later, not much is left of the optimism that guided the ENP in its first days.



[2] The UfM was founded as an enhanced continuation of the preceding Euro-Med/Barcelona process on the initiative of France in 2008 and encompassed 45 states. http://ufmsecretariat.org/history/.

[3] The EaP was introduced in 2009. http://www.eeas.europa.eu/eastern/index_en.htm.

Instead of economically prospering and democratically transformed countries, the neighborhood is literally on fire. Of 16 ENP countries, 12 are exposed to frozen conflicts, civil wars, territorial occupation and interstate war.

Bad governance and ineffective state institutions have made corruption endemic, human rights abuses prevalent and autocratic rule the daily fare.

For a moment only, the Arab Spring in 2011 instilled new hopes for a democratic transformation of the Middle East and North Africa. After years of silent or even open complicity with Arab authoritarian regimes, the EU and its member states were embarrassed by the region's revolutionary awakening. To restore credibility, a review of the ENP was ordered that put fresh emphasis on promoting democracy and working with civil society. Above all, the EU tried to revitalize the conditionality that it had attached to the ENP but mostly had let slide. In the future, the "more for more" principle was to apply, granting closer economic cooperation only if ENP countries delivered on democratic reforms. Unfortunately, the new policy effort did not turn the tide: The political developments in the EU's neighborhood were already too dynamic and crisis-driven.

To the south, the brief flirt with freedom and democracy was either crushed by new military dictatorships as in Egypt, or the ensuing civil wars allowed radical Islamist movements to advance into the power vacuum left by the ousting of autocrats like Muammar al-Gaddafi in Libya and Zine El-Abedine Ben Ali in Tunisia. The terrorist militia ISIS/ISIL was able to overrun and gain control of entire sections of Iraqi, Syrian and Libyan territory. Since then, the Caliphate state it established has been spreading jihadist terror throughout the Arab world and into Europe. Millions began fleeing the Syrian war, putting enormous pressure on neighboring Jordan and Lebanon which, together with Turkey, have taken in most of the refugees. The repercussions of the refugee crisis are now being felt in the heart of Europe. Over one million migrants arrived in 2015 alone. The only hope left for positive change in the region is Tunisia, while Morocco and Algeria, both firmly under autocratic rule, appear stable, but are only so on the surface.

The situation does not look any better to the east. There the EU's eastern neighborhood crisis erupted fully in 2013, when Armenia submitted its just-concluded Association Agreement for membership in the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). The crisis culminated with the Russian military intervention in Ukraine, which, unlike Armenia, had not been subdued by Moscow's bullying. Instead, the Ukrainian people ousted their government and chose instead a democratic restart and closer cooperation with the EU.

3. The Review of the Review

Against the backdrop of an ever-deteriorating security situation on the EU's border, one of the first steps of the new European Commission under President Jean-Claude Juncker was to call for a second overhaul of the neighborhood policy. The results were presented in November 2015 and marked a significant departure from the original. Rather than transforming its neighbors into functioning market economies and democracies, a much less idealistic policy was proposed. Stabilization of the neighboring countries was now identified as the key strategic priority. Accordingly, security cooperation in areas of conflict prevention, border protection, terrorism, organized crime and anti-radicalization efforts were put high on the new policy agenda, as was migration, mobility and economic development capable of creating jobs for youth.

Above all, the notion that a uniform set of instruments and standards could be applicable to all 16 ENP partners was dropped once and for all. Instead, more tailor-made approaches were to inform

the relations with the 16 ENP countries, approaches that were to reflect both the aspirations of the partners as much as the interests (and less the values) of the EU. The ENP's traditional enlargement-derived instruments will come to bear only with those states that have already signed advanced AAs and FTAs (Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia) or are moving in this direction (Tunisia, Morocco).

II Facing Up to the Challenges?

The major achievement of the second ENP review lies in its acknowledgment of the huge gap that existed between the ENP's ambitious goals and its rather poor performance.[4]



The EU's new modesty is certainly welcome, but it will not suffice on its own. What is still missing – and the ENP review did not have the mandate of addressing this crucial problem – is a sound foreign and security policy strategy that spells out what the long-term goals of the EU are in its neighborhood and, accordingly, what policies and instruments need to be introduced to achieve these goals. Quite clearly, the ENP – no matter how often and in what manner it might be improved and streamlined – cannot substitute for a wholesale foreign policy approach. It remains to be seen if the new EU Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy (EUGS) can close the gap. The new strategy was brought to the attention of heads of state and government during the European Council of June 28–29, 2016. The timing could not have been worse. With the summit dominated by the British decision to leave the EU, the strategy took back seat and was merely welcomed. Given the unwillingness, especially of the larger member states, to delegate to the EU

[4] Valuable input on the Bertelsmann Transformation Index was received from Dr. Hauke Hartmann and Sabine Donner. For further information: https://www.bti-project.org/en/home/.

responsibilities for issues touching on war and peace, the chances are rather dim that the new strategy proposal will become the basis for a true common foreign and security policy. Many experts are already calling the EUGS yet another "mission impossible."

1. Too Many Actors and No Strategy

The first problem is how ownership of the ENP policy is organized within the EU itself. Some have maliciously suggested that the ENP was created only to give further employment to the 1,000 or so Commission officials who had achieved the big-bang enlargement in 2004.[5] However the Commission managed it, it became responsible for the neighborhood dossier. This assignment is the source of many of the deficiencies the ENP has been associated with over the years. With the Commission having no immediate competences in the realm of foreign and security policy, the ENP could not be designed other than as enlargement policy "lite." As such, the policy was well suited to helping harmonize industrial norms and standards and negotiating comprehensive trade agreements with neighboring countries, but it was not suited to dealing with the growing security threats.

This applies to the MENA region in particular, with its longstanding inter-state conflicts[6] and the increasing intra-state cleavages or proxy wars that have occurred in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. The ENP's soft-power practices might be effective in a secure environment and might help to prevent conflicts, but they are toothless when conflicts are already in full swing, as there can be no sustainable development in a hostile and insecure environment.

Another drawback of such a narrow approach became obvious during the Ukrainian crisis, when Moscow opposed closer cooperation between Kiev and Brussels and intervened militarily to guard what it considered its sphere of influence. It is, of course, wrong to blame the Commission, as some have done, for causing the crisis by not taking into account Russia's growing objections to Ukraine signing an AA and DCFTA with the EU. Still, an aftertaste remains. Trade relations are hardly an apolitical issue and, accordingly, no free lunches can be expected when international affairs are still driven by the logic of zero-sum games.

Unfortunately, the EU missed the chance in 2010 to use the newly established European External Action Service (EEAS) as the foreign policy framework to politicize the ENP. In the negotiations on the distribution of tasks and instruments between the Commission and the new service, the Commission retained the upper hand and the Commissioner for Enlargement remained in charge of the ENP dossier and its budget. Even though Commission officials began to feel that, compared to the enlargement policy, they lacked authority in implementing the neighborhood policy, the turf battles only began to diminish when the Juncker Commission took office. Federica Mogherini, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign and Security Policy, clearly became primus inter pares among the Commissioners dealing with external affairs. Nevertheless, the master of the keys for the neighborhood is still the Commissioner for Enlargement.

Since then, Mogherini and her Commission colleagues have been working hard to join forces inside the Commission and the EEAS, as well as with member states, the other EU agencies involved

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5 The Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations (DG Near) currently has 1,650 staff members in Brussels and in the EU Delegations in partner countries. http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/about/directorate-general/index_en.htm.

6 Examples include the Israeli-Palestinian dispute and the conflict over Western Sahara between Algeria and Morocco.

and the relevant international organizations. However, the plethora of policy actors and programs active in the ENP makes it difficult to create a cohesive and uniform policy. On the contrary, over the years the abundance of contact points and policy instruments has made it easy for ENP countries to pick and choose or even to ignore the Commission and turn directly to those EU member states with which they have historically had closer economic or cultural ties.

The crucial role that member states play in any meaningful EU policy towards the neighborhood cannot be overstated. Unfortunately, the member states have not wholeheartedly endorsed the ENP, but mostly pursued their own policies instead – often in outright contradiction to the ENP objectives they subscribed to while in Brussels. The armament exports of Germany, France and other member states to Egypt are only the latest example. They are in outright violation of a ban on weapons deliveries that the EU imposed in 2013 with the support of the member states after Egyptian security forces killed hundreds of civilian protesters.

That the member states' support is lukewarm at best might be due to the fact that the ENP is a Commission-led policy in which the member states have little say. Whatever the reason, the deep division that exists between member states – which ranges from different threat assessments and strategic priorities to, not least, the question of further EU enlargement – is contributing to the gap between original intention and actual performance in the neighborhood.

2. Values Versus Interests

In the past as well, double standards prevailed and conditionality was applied rather selectively and inconsistently, especially when the economic interests of the EU or member states were involved. A prime example is Azerbaijan, which was treated as an important energy partner and was granted considerable leniency regarding its human rights accord. The Arab states are another case in point. In the aftermath of 9/11, the EU's foremost concern was combating international terrorism, regardless of whether the partners in this undertaking were authoritarian leaders like Libya's Gaddafi or Tunisia's Ben Ali. It also seemed questionable that a Ukrainian government as reform-averse and corrupt as Viktor Yanukovych's should be honored with an AA/DCFTA, which was only be granted as the capstone to a country's deep and sustainable democratic transformation.

Given the former inconsistencies, the new pragmatism that is to guide the ENP in the future is bound to be met with skepticism. The question is how often the EU can turn a blind eye to bad governance and human rights abuses without losing further credibility in the region – as well as at home. Human rights organizations in the EU are already alarmed. They fear that the prioritization of stability over democratic standards will again lead to cooperation with illiberal political leaders to the detriment of the nascent and widely repressed civil society organizations in the region and their fight for human and civil rights. On the other hand, questions exist as to whether the EU can stand for long a "realpolitik" that runs counter to its own founding principles and calls into question the very basis of the EU as a values-based project.

The EU has lost credibility not only because it has not always been the proclaimed steadfast advocate of its own values in the region, but also because it is not living up to its values at home. Growing populist and Islamophobic movements in the member states make the EU look neither enlightened nor liberal. Together with a burdensome colonial heritage, the political radicalization in the EU has cast doubt among the predominantly Islamic countries in the south as to whether Europe can be a trustworthy partner. Likewise, it is difficult to see how the EU can serve as a role model in its neighborhood when some of its member states' governments themselves feel inclined to limit press freedoms, weaken parliamentarian rights and interfere with judicial independence.

After being hit hard by the global financial crises, the EU today no longer looks as economically powerful as it did, making it harder to impress its neighborhood to the point that the countries there wish to follow the EU's lead. As it struggles to manage the euro crisis, much of the EU's former glamour is gone. Other states less affected by the crisis have caught up and are competing with the EU for power, influence and resources in the region.

3. Conditionality and Funding

The ENP is based on the assumption that the EU's neighbors are ready and willing to share its values, if not immediately then at least in the longer run. As it turned out, the governments in the neighborhood were keen to share in western living standards but less willing to adopt democratic values. In the meantime, with political Islam gaining ground to the south and a new nation-centered, partly xenophobic orthodoxy spreading in the east, the EU has to admit that beneficiaries of the ENP are increasingly turning to other non-western models and ideologies.

Even under the most favorable conditions, the carrot of gaining the closest possible political and economic association – but no membership – was not sufficient for achieving real change on the ground. Given the neighborhood's point of departure economically, politically and socially, the ENP's reform agenda was too demanding by far. Only true optimists would have expected quick fixes.

To the south, the dominant sources of income are tourism and agriculture. In terms of the latter, the EU, eager to protect its own farmers, was only prepared to open its market gradually and selectively. Moreover, the North African states were becoming less interested in deregulating the industries that form a convenient source of income for their governments, something that also does not provide much leverage for the EU.

On the one hand, the situation in the eastern neighborhood was in principle more favorable for applying conditionality, as Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova and, up to a certain point, Armenia did and still do see the AAs as a first step towards full EU membership, even though the EU has repeatedly signaled the opposite. On the other hand, transforming these centrally planned economies, which rely foremost on old Soviet-style heavy industries, into free market economies was likely to be much more difficult and protracted than reforming the paternalistic economies to the south, with their largely colonial past. Above all, the eastern economies are largely under the control of oligarchs who fear not only the loss of access to their traditional Russian market, but also the loss of power once a genuine free market economy is introduced. Even before Moscow's intervention made things worse, it was difficult to imagine what kind of new business models these countries could adopt – at least in the short and medium run – to compete in the European market and secure growth and jobs at home. Accordingly, even the most EU-friendly governments in the eastern neighborhood were following the EU more hesitantly and slowing their efforts to liberalize markets.

Against this backdrop, an important instrument for inducing reforms and keeping ENP partners in line is, certainly, money. In the period from 2007 to 2013[7], the financial assistance offered through the ENP to the 16 neighborhood countries was €11 billion, the same amount the EU has spent on the six pre-accession countries[8]. Many experts have therefore questioned if that is really sufficient

[7] http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/funding/european-neighbourhood-and-partnership-instrument-enpi_en.

[8] The beneficiaries of the EU's pre-accession assistance (IPA) are currently Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Kosovo, Montenegro, Serbia and Turkey. http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/instruments/overview/index_en.htm.

for the ENP cause, given that other actors like Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, which have interests that oppose those of the EU, have started investing heavily in the region.

Moreover, the financial assistance is being spread across a wide variety of programs, putting too many objectives on the agenda that address too many issues in too many geographical areas, making it too little money to be effective. If no additional financial resources can be found, an effective remedy would be to prioritize and to increase coherence among the diverse actors in the EU.

Unfortunately, the latest ENP review did not result in more financial assistance, although the deteriorating security situation would have more than justified a different outcome. With no more than €128 million[9] per country and year at hand until 2020, it was indeed only realistic to suspend conditionality. However, abandoning the "more for more" principle does not answer the question of how the EU can influence the ENP countries in a way that produces a stabilized neighborhood. Likewise, it is an open question as to how the EU will deal with those neighboring countries who turned away from the EU, as Armenia did, or all the countries burdened by conflicts and wars, whose deadly repercussions can now be felt in the heart of Europe.

III Special Problem: Refugee and Migrant Crisis

The refugee crisis is exacerbating the problems the EU faces in its neighborhood. Greece is unable to live up to international asylum standards and the preceding policies of closing borders has not improved its reputation but made the EU look weak and divided once again. Only after considerable time had passed did the EU start to support the neighbors in coping with the enormous additional burden that the millions of refugees have put on already weak countries like Jordan, Lebanon and the Western Balkan states. A recent evaluation by the European Court of Auditors[10] concluded that the ENP's migration policies leave room for improvement. This was mildly put.

In the first place, a peaceful, stable and prosperous neighborhood would give people less reason to flee their country and seek a better future in the EU. With these goals ever less attainable, the 2011 ENP review unavoidably shifted its focus to security issues, with the dominant features terrorism, human trafficking, smuggling and migration-related organized crime. Many critics saw in this move the threat that a "fortress Europe" could be consolidating, instead of efforts to improve the means for legal migration and visa-free travel from the region.

Yet the situation in the immediate neighborhood is only part of an even bigger problem that threatens Europe: The EU also needs a stable and capable neighborhood in order to manage migration flows that transit the ENP countries. Poor living and health conditions and various forms of violence and oppression are leading more people in Africa to leave their home country. According to recent estimates, more than 200,000 people crossed the Mediterranean in the first half of 2016. Many more are waiting on the shores of Egypt, Libya and other North African countries for their chance to come to Europe. Currently, more than 1,000 migrants are rescued from decrepit vessels every day, and thousands have drowned since the beginning of the year.

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[9] Since 2013, the new financial instrument for the ENP has been the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI), budgeted at €15.4 billion for 2014-2020. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2014:077:0027:0043:EN:PDF.

[10] European Court of Auditors, Special Report No. 9/2016, EU external migration spending in Southern Mediterranean and Eastern Neighbourhood countries until 2014. http://www.eca.europa.eu/en/Pages/DocItem.aspx?did=35674.

Since the EU member states are not able to agree on a fair burden-sharing approach to dealing with the refugee and migration crises, the situation is now almost entirely in the hands of the EU's southern neighbors. Everything will depend on their willingness to cooperate and to help stop the flow of migrants to Europe.

It is too early to judge if the new Migration Partnership Framework[11] that is to reinforce cooperation with third countries can make a difference to this end. At least €8 billion will be on hand over the coming five years to support third countries, especially in Africa, to tackle the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement, and to forestall migration and improve reallocation and the readmission rate in these countries.[12] The Commission is also working on an External Investment Plan for Africa that, with the help of the European Investment Bank (EIB) and donations from member states, should trigger €61 billion to improve the business environment in African nations. The cooperation with African leaders who have problematic credentials will come at a price, as the EU-Turkey deal on the readmission of refugees made clear; it will make the EU look reckless, inhumane and highly unprincipled in light of its own values.

IV Neighbors of Neighbors

The shortcomings of the neighborhood policy became obvious during the Ukrainian crisis. Russia is trying to rewrite the rules of the European security order and expand its sphere of influence both by using military force to change borders and by intervening militarily, even "out of area" as in Syria. For a long time now, Russia's support for separatist and secessionist movements – encapsulated in the "frozen conflicts" between Georgia and both Ossetia and Abkhazia, between Moldova and Transnistria and between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh – have been confronting and undermining the EU's eastern neighborhood policy. Wherever possible, Moscow is supporting "spoilers" in these regions by promoting anti-western or populist narratives that exacerbate latent tensions in order to slow democratization processes.

The Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008 suggested old-style power politics had returned to Europe and it created a security environment in the east which the ENP had never been designed to cope with. In consequence, the EU's eastern neighbors find themselves squeezed between an ever more hegemonic Russia that uses force to revive its idea of a "near abroad," on the one hand, and the vague idea of a "wider Europe" that does not yet offer EU membership, on the other.

Under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkey has turned into an ever more self-assertive and nationalistic foreign policy actor. Driven by the Kurdish question, it has enmeshed itself deeply in the ensuing power conflicts of the region. Turkey's role in the war in Syria must be seen very critically. It is supporting the ISIS insurgency in Syria whilst fighting the Kurdish militias that are part of the US-led global coalition combating ISIS. Furthermore, Erdogan is investing considerable funds to promote Sunni Islam in the Middle East, Central Asia and the Balkans. Building on the sympathies of local Muslim communities, support for Erdogan is especially strong in Kosovo, where people took to the streets to celebrate his party's victory.

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11 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-2072_en.htm.

12 EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa; http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-1616_en.htm. And EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian crisis; http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-2262_en.htm.

Today it seems that Erdgan, in reaction to the military coup of July 15, is destroying the very democracy his people defended in the streets that day. By arresting thousands of soldiers, prosecutors, judges, policemen, academics, teachers, civil servants and journalists, he is staging his own coup against a democratic and pluralist Turkish society, one that will ultimately lead to more conflict within Turkey but also in its already war-torn and destabilized neighborhood. Political Islam combined with highly centralized rule and no regard for human rights and the freedom of the press is the opposite of what the EU wishes to see spreading in the Western Balkans or taken up as a model in the other Muslim countries in the southern neighborhood.

The politics practiced in the EU's southern neighborhood have long been held victim to the Middle East conflict and the impossibility, thus far, of brokering peace between Israelis and Palestinians. Today, a second and even more acute power struggle over regional supremacy is shaking up the region, namely the one between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Both countries are trying to take advantage of each other by fuelling conflict and civil war in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Yemen and Libya, thereby antagonizing any attempts by the EU and the wider international community to stabilize these countries.

With the US taking the side of Israel, and Saudi Arabia and Russia supporting Iran and Syria, we seem to be heading backwards to the days of the Cold War, with its nuclear standoff and proxy wars. Currently, however, there seems to be one decisive difference: Neither the US nor Russia appears to be capable of controlling its allies in a way that would open up the path for political solutions and stop further political radicalization and Islamic terrorism from spreading globally.

V Key Lessons Learned – Recommendations

What the ENP has achieved has fallen well below Europe's initial expectations. The ENP has not been the catalyst for true democratic and economic reforms and, accordingly, the neighborhood has not been turned into a ring of friends – quite the opposite. Nonetheless, it would be unfair to call the ENP a paper tiger. It would be more appropriate to call it a proxy policy that – contrary to all rhetoric – was overburdened from the beginning and merely concealed the unwillingness of the EU member states to forge a meaningful foreign and security policy.

To that extent, the EU should not give up on the ENP's underlying convictions. There are still strong arguments in favor of a policy in support of free trade and closer political and economic relations, one that can foster relations and begin encouraging Arab rulers, among others, to enact reform. Yet if the ENP is not embedded in a broader policy concept and if other instruments are not added to the toolbox for addressing the mounting regional power struggles and security challenges that permeate the neighborhood, it will become even harder to make and keep friends.

In sum:

- Neighborhood policy is and will remain foreign policy, one that has to deal with the prevailing pitfalls of an international system which, unlike the EU, is not rule-based.
- It is therefore questionable if the European Commission, which shares competences for foreign affairs with the EU member states only to a limited degree, can successfully handle the neighborhood dossier.
- A first step for giving the ENP more impact would be to hand over the task fully to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and to the Vice-President of the European Commission.

- Equally important will be aligning EU member states behind the ENP and securing their ownership by assigning special responsibilities to member-state groupings for certain neighborhood countries.
- The aforementioned steps are only complementary. They are not a substitute for the EU developing a common foreign and security policy that is worthy of its name.
- The EU will only be successful in influencing its neighbors if it lives up to its own values at home and runs a principled but realistic foreign policy, one that might be deemed “pragmatic idealism.”
- To achieve such a policy approach, the EU must not discard its values but must become less Euro-centric and pay more attention to the interests, constraints and opportunities of its partners.
- Regional cooperation can only be productive if the parties involved have enough in common, otherwise the EU should build on bilateral relations.
- In an environment marked by accelerating change, setting short-term goals is a more promising approach than embarking on a transformational agenda.
- Financial aid (in whatever form), economic cooperation and foreign direct investment are important tools for making friends and gaining influence, but they can only take effect when they are strategically focused and serve both sides, and when aid is not thinly spread over a multitude of programs and projects.

Identity Politics, Sectarian Conflict, and Regional Political Rivalry in the Middle East

Seán Cleary

I An Introduction to Sectarian Identities

Although conflicts between Sunni and Shia Muslims are not the only sectarian violence in the Middle East, with an increase in violence against members of the Coptic community in Egypt before and after the overthrow of President Mubarak exciting domestic and international concern[1], most references to sectarian violence in the Middle East relate to conflicts between Sunnis and Shias.



Sunnis are a majority in most Muslim communities in Southeast Asia, China, South Asia, Africa, and most of the Arab World.[2] Shias are in the majority of the Muslim population in Iran[3], Azerbaijan[4];

1 See for example: http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/Fact_Sheet-Egypt-Sectarian-Violence.pdf; https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/07/16/egypt-end-mubarak-era-impunity-sectarian-violence; https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/04/10/egypt-address-recurring-sectarian-violence [all retrieved July 15, 2016].

2 http://www.pewforum.org/2009/10/07/mapping-the-global-muslim-population [retrieved May 6, 2016].

3 Around 95%.

4 Around 90%.

Iraq[5], and Bahrain[6]. Minority communities are also found in Yemen[7], Turkey[8], Kuwait[9], Lebanon[10], Saudi Arabia[11], Syria[12], Pakistan[13], Afghanistan[14], Nigeria[15], and Tajikistan[16].

The distinction between the two branches lies in deep disagreement about the succession of authority after the death of the Prophet Mohammed. Sunnis believe that Abu Bakr, the father of Muhammad's wife Aisha, who was selected to succeed him by the Muslim *umma* on Muhammed's death, was the Prophet's rightful successor.[17] Sunnis follow the four Rashidun "rightly guided Caliphs," selected by the *umma* after the Prophet's death: Abu Bakr (632–634 CE), Umar ibn al-Khattab (634–644 CE), Uthman ibn Affan (644–656 CE), and Ali Ibn Abi Talib (656–661 CE).

Shias believe that Muhammad, acting on the command of Allah, declared his cousin and son-in-law Ali Ibn Abi Talib[18] the next Caliph, thus making him and his descendants the Prophet's successors[19]. Shias deny the legitimacy of the first three "rightly guided Caliphs" (Abu Bakr, Umar and Uthman) and believe that Ali is the Prophet's successor. Ali and his descendants by Fatimah – the Twelve Imams – are thus, in the Shia "Twelver" tradition, the legitimate Muslim leaders.[20]

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5 About 55–60%.

6 About 65%.

7 Some 40% are Shia, mostly Zaidi.

8 About 15–20% are from the Alevi sect.

9 30–40%.

10 50% of the Muslim population.

11 Some 25%.

12 About 12% are Alawi.

13 20–25%.

14 15–20%.

15 Less than 6% of Nigeria's Muslims.

16 Around 5%.

17 Sunnis believe that the Quran determines that leaders are to be chosen through the consensus of the umma.

18 Ali was the father of Muhammad's grandsons Hasan ibn Ali and Hussein ibn Ali, by Fatimah, Muhammad's daughter by his wife Khadijah bint Khuwaylid.

19 Shias believe that Muhammad made this appointment clear in the Hadith of Ghadir Khumm (Arabic: غدير خم), an account of a speech by Muhammad on 18 Dhu al-Hijjah, 10 AH (March 15, 632 CE) at Ghadir Khumm, near al-Juhfah. The hadith is interpreted differently by Shias and Sunnis: The Shias maintain that in this hadith the prophet Muhammad appointed Ali as his heir and successor. The Sunnis recognize Muhammad's declaration about Ali at Ghadir Khumm, but argue that he was simply urging the audience to hold his cousin and son-in-law in high esteem and affection. (Veccia Vaglieri, Laura, Ghadīr Khumm, Encyclopedia of Islam, 2012, Brill Online).

The Imamate of the Shias encompasses a prophetic function, unlike the Caliphate of the Sunnis, which was focused on political stability. Unlike the Sunnis, the Shias believe special spiritual qualities were granted to Muhammad and to Ali Ibn Abi Talib and the Imams that succeeded them. Shias believe the Imams are immaculate from sin and human error (ma'sūm) and can understand and interpret the meaning of the teachings of Islam. They are thus trustees (wasi) who bear the light of Muhammad (Nūr Muhammadin).

20 Some 85% of Shias are "Twelvers." Twelver (Arabic: اثنا عشرية, Ithnā'ashariyyah; Persian: دوازده امام عه‌ی‌ش) Shia Islam or Imamiyyah (Arabic: إمامية) is the largest branch of Shia Islam. The term Twelver refers to adherents' belief in the Twelve Imams, and their belief that the last Imam, Muhammad al-Mahdi, lives in occultation and will reappear as the promised Mahdi. Twelvers constitute majorities in Iran, Azerbaijan, Iraq, and Bahrain; a plurality in Lebanon; and significant minorities in Kuwait, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Qatar, UAE and Saudi Arabia. Smaller minorities also exist in Oman, Yemen, Egypt and Uzbekistan.

Vali Nasr[21] contextualizes this:[22]

> "The Shia view became crystallized at the siege and battle of Karbala in 680 C.E., when soldiers of the second Umayyad caliph, Yazid I, massacred Ali's son Husayn along with seventy-two of his companions and family members.[23] Husayn's refusal to admit the legitimacy of the Umayyad caliphate … [was] shared with many of the people of Kufa, Ali's capital. Many Kufans were liberated slaves and prisoners of war who had risen in revolt against the distinctly Arab character of Umayyad rule. Since that time, this town near Najaf [Kufa] has had a special emotional resonance for Shias. In 2004, when the firebrand Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr symbolically moved from Baghdad to Kufa to deliver his sermons dressed in a white funeral shroud, he was signalling his resolve to sponsor an armed challenge to the U.S. coalition, and Iraqi government authority."[24]

The Sunni and Shia traditions were embedded in political structures: Sunni Islam in the Umayyad and Abbasid Caliphates in Damascus and Baghdad, respectively, and Twelver Shia Islam, much later, in the Safavid dynasty[25] which ruled from 1501 to 1722, and 1729 to 1736, over modern Iran, Azerbaijan, Bahrain and Armenia, most of Georgia, the North Caucasus, Iraq, Kuwait and Afghanistan, and parts of Turkey, Syria, Pakistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.[26]

After the fall of the Abbasids in Baghdad, the Caliphate was claimed by the Ottomans. In 1453, after Mehmed's conquest, the Ottoman seat moved to Constantinople. In 1517, Sultan Selim I incorporated the Mamluk Sultanate of Cairo, becoming defender of the Holy Cities of Mecca and Medina. Although the Ottomans were viewed as the representatives of the Sunni world, Ottoman Sultans did not use the title "Caliph" in state documents until the Empire declined. Then, and until the formal abolition of the Caliphate in 1924 after Turkey's defeat in World War I, the Sultans used the title to give them prestige among Sunni Muslims.

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21 Nasr, Seyyed Val Rezai, *The Shia Revival, How Conflicts within Islam will Shape the Future,* WW Norton, 2006.

22 Dr. Nasr also served as senior advisor to the U.S. special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, between 2009 and 2011.

23 This event is commemorated by Shias each year on the 10th day of Muharram in the Islamic lunar calendar, an occasion of collective lamentation and self-flagellation known as Ashoura. Processions of believers follow a tall staff with a black flag, topped by a carved hand symbolizing the five holy person held in highest regard – the Prophet Muhammed, his daughter Fatima al-Zahra, his son-in-law and cousin Ali, and his grandsons Hasan and Husayn. It excites Sunni disquiet and condemnation as Shias use the day to define their identity, often in extreme ways, leading Sunnis to condemn Shia practices.

24 Nasr op. cit. p. 40.

25 Persian: سلسلهٔ صفویان. The Safavids arose from the Safaviyya Sufi order in Ardabil in Azerbaijan.

26 When the dynasty fell in 1736, the Safavids had revived Persia as a major economic power with an efficient state, and spread Shia Islam throughout Iran and large parts of the Caucasus, Anatolia, and Mesopotamia.

Nasr describes the interplay between clashing sectarian identities and the political context in the 20th century:

> "Debates between Sunnis and Shias … have their own internal dynamics, but events … imposed a certain logic on them. The end of [WWI] brought important changes…. The Ottoman Empire collapsed, and within … Asia-Minor arose the modern, secular-nationalist Republic of Turkey under its ... first President, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. Kemalism's anti-Islamic program would … become the model for emerging Muslim states…. Nationalism and secularism replaced Islam as the credo of state leaders[27], and muftis (Sunni religious leaders) and ayatollahs [Shia religious teachers] alike found themselves relegated to the margins…. In 1924, the Turkish Republic abolished the caliphate, ending the last vestige of Muslim unity…. In the turmoil…, Shias and Sunnis found pressing reasons to join forces. Intra-Muslim polemics began to appear trivial in the harsh light [of] … colonialism and secularism. …That Shia religious authorities should come to the caliphate's defense … was a … rare coming together of the two millennium-old rivals, rising above the legacy of their conflicts … and bloody history, to stand united as Muslims in the face of … a grave threat to Islam."[28]

Faced with Westernization and secular modernization over the next 50 years, Sunnis and Shias collaborated in Egypt, the Maghreb, and the Levant. In 1959, the Al Azhar University in Cairo included courses on Shia jurisprudence in its curriculum by way of a fatwa[29] declaring Shia law the fifth school of Islamic law (*fiqh*).[30] But two factors later frustrated this collaboration: The birth of Wahabism in the Nejd in what became the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), and the Iranian revolution and the birth of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979.

Nasr relates the rise of Islamist fundamentalism and the present intensity of Sunni-Shia hostility to the Wahabi and Salafi[31] traditions originating from Ibn Taymiya (d. 1328 CE), who "saw the Shia as the enemy within, guilty of polluting Islam and facilitating the fall of the Caliphate during the Mongol invasion."[32] Ibn Taymiya "dismissed Shiism as heresy and sanctioned violence against its

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27 This was also the path followed in Iran. Reza Shah Pahlavi (Persian: رضا شاه پهلوی) (15 March 1878 – 26 July 1944) was Shah from December 15, 1925 until forced to abdicate by the British and Soviet governments on September 16, 1941. As chief of the Iranian General Staff in 1921, Reza Pahlavi executed a coup against the pro-British government; in 1923, he was selected as Iran's prime minister by the National Assembly. In 1925, he was appointed as the legal monarch (Shah) of Iran by Iran's Constituent Assembly, which amended the 1906 Constitution to depose Ahmad Shah Qajar, the last Shah of the Qajar dynasty. Reza Shah established the Pahlavi dynasty as a secular, quasi-constitutional monarchy that lasted until 1979 when it was overthrown in the Iranian Revolution. He introduced social, economic, and political reforms, laying the foundations of the Iranian state, and requiring government ministers and Assembly members to wear secular clothes and not to invoke the Quran in debates on public policy.

28 Nasr op. cit. pp. 105–106.

29 A fatwā (Arabic: فتوى;) is a legal opinion or learned interpretation that the Sheikhul Islam, a qualified jurist or mufti, can give on issues pertaining to Islamic law. This fatwa was issued by the Rector of al Azhar, Sheikh Mahmoud Shaltut.

30 The four Sunni schools are: Hanafi (Turkey, the Balkans, Central Asia, Indian subcontinent, China and Egypt); Maliki (North Africa, West Africa and several Arab states in the Gulf); Shafi'i (Kurdistan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Egypt, East Africa, Yemen, Somalia and southern parts of India); and Hanbali (Saudi Arabia).

31 The Salafist movement is an ultra-conservative movement within Sunni Islam that takes a fundamentalist approach to Islam, emulating the Prophet Muhammad and his earliest followers – al-salaf al-salih, the "pious forefathers" – and rejecting any form of religious innovation, or bid'ah, while requiring the implementation of sharia (Islamic law). A hadith of the Prophet Muhammad has him saying, "The people of my own generation are the best, then those who come after them, and then those of the next generation." This is seen as a call to Muslims to follow the example of those first three generations, known collectively as the salaf or "pious Predecessors" (السلف الصالح as-Salaf as-Ṣāliḥ), including Muhammad, the "Companions" (Sahabah), the "Followers" (Tabi'un) and the "Followers of the Followers" (Tabi' al-Tabi'in). The hadith is narrated in the Sahih al-Bukhari of 'Abd Allah ibn 'Umar.

32 The Mongols, led by Genghis Khan, were a confederation of nomadic tribes which had conquered China. In 1220 they took Samarkand and Bukhara. By mid-century they had taken Russia, Central Europe, northern Iran,

followers. More important, he put forth a formal Sunni refutation of Shiism that set the tone for … sectarian conflict even to this day."

Wahabism, Nasr notes, "emerged in the Arabian peninsula as a … reform movement in the 19th century. … Abdul Wahab was a purist. His creed reflected the simple ways of the desert tribesmen of the Nejd…. He sought to cleanse Islam of … cultural practices … it had … incorporated over the centuries. They had corrupted and weakened Islam, he said, and must be purged. Following the example of Ibn Taymiya, he rejected anything other than a literal reading of the Quran and the prophetic traditions."[33]

The conflict was exacerbated in religious terms by the Islamic revolution in Iran. While Mohammed Reza Pahlavi was both Iranian and Shia, and had covert relations with Israel, he was by the 1970s a known quantity in the Arab world, having developed close relations with Anwar Sadat of Egypt, Sultan Qaboos bin Said al Said of Oman, and other Gulf leaders. The Shah had abandoned Iran's territorial claims to Bahrain[34] in March 1970, and signed a treaty normalizing relations with Iraq in 1975. Iran had worked with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), Iraq, Abu Dhabi, Kuwait, and Qatar in raising oil prices and cutting production on October 16, 1973 in the aftermath of the war between Israel and Arab states. The Empress Farah had made a pilgrimage to Shia shrines in Iraq in 1977, and been received by Saddam Hussein.

The emergence of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in Iran after the Islamic Revolution effected a radical change: Khomeini attacked "the concept of monarchy," causing concern in all the Gulf monarchies. Khomeini's call for support for the oppressed and abandonment of the oppressors caused further tensions, as Iranian Shia jurists judged Arab regimes to be oppressors. Khomeini sought to spread his Islamic revolution in the Muslim world, leading Shias to demand their rights. The KSA countered by exporting Wahabi doctrine and establishing *madrassahs*[35] in Pakistan, in which many Afghan Taliban were educated. Iran's diplomatic isolation from its neighbors, and

and the Caucuses, and in 1258, under Hulagu Khan, they invaded Baghdad and ended the once-glorious 'Abbasid Empire.

[33] Among the consequences were the desecration of the shrine of the Shia Imam Husayn by Wahabi armies in 1802 CE; the destruction of the Prophet Muhammed's tombstone in Medina in 1804, to prevent it being "worshiped"; and, over a century later, an attempt by the Ikhwan (Brotherhood) army of Abdul-Aziz ibn Saud (later the first king of Saudi Arabia), to impose Wahabism on the Shia population of Al-Hasa in 1913 CE; and the destruction of the cemetery of Jannat al-Baghi in Medina in 1925 – where the daughter of the Prophet, and the second, fourth, fifth, and sixth Shia Imams were buried. The Ikhwan sought Abdul-Aziz ibn Saud's permission to convert or kill the Shias of Al-Hasa, and although he did not grant it, they killed a large number in 1926. Although the King did not permit the eradication of the Shia, they were systematically marginalized and stripped of public roles.

[34] Iran periodically made claims to Bahrain, maintaining that the island was improperly removed from Iranian sovereignty by Britain in the 19th century. Tehran advanced these claims in 1906 and in 1927, but abandoned them in 1970. They were temporarily reactivated after the Islamic Revolution of 1979, but the Islamic Republic of Iran subsequently dropped its official claim, allowing for the restoration of relations. Iran also claims sovereignty over three islands near the Strait of Hormuz, Abu Musa, and the Greater and Lesser Tumbs. The Tumbs islands are essentially uninhabited and Abu Musa has about 2,000 inhabitants, but given their position in a waterway linking Gulf oilfields to the Indian Ocean, they are strategically important. While the British Royal Navy controlled the area, the islands were attached to Sharjah (and later Ras al-Khaimah) part of the "Trucial States" of the time, and today part of the United Arab Emirates (UAE). As the British were withdrawing its naval forces after 1970, Iran landed troops on the islands. Britain dropped its objections when Iran relinquished its claims to Bahrain, but the UAE still claims sovereignty over the archipelago, although Iran secured control before the UAE emerged as a sovereign state. In September 2011, the UAE took its case to the United Nations. Iran blamed the dispute on foreign powers seeking to destabilize the region and rejected the UAE's claim. As Iran has made appreciable military investments on Abu Musa, it is unlikely to cede control. Source: http://www.geocurrents.info/cultural-geography/iran%e2%80%99s-territorial-disputes-with-bahrain-and-the-united-arab-emirates#ixzz47lImS3Yc [retrieved May 5, 2016].

[35] Islamic schools.

internationally, intensified during the Iran–Iraq War from 1980 to 1988. All neighboring Arab states, except Syria, provided logistic and economic support to Baghdad The eight years of war inflicted great costs and loss of life, with Iraqi forces using chemical weapons, and both sides deploying large resources of armor and artillery.

Inspired by the Islamic revolution, Shia activism spread in the Arab world. Bahrain saw a failed coup in 1981; Kuwait uncovered terrorist attempts in 1983 and 1984. Tehran supported Shia political movements – al-Wefaq (Bahrain), Amal (Lebanon), al-Da'wa (Iraq), Hizb-e Wahdat (Afghanistan), Tahrik-e Jafaria (Pakistan) and Saudi Hezbollah and Al-Haraka al-Islahiya al-Islamiya (KSA).

II Wider Dimensions

1. Context:

While sectarian identities define part of today's conflicts, their relevance was sharpened by the rise of anti-Americanism, religious conservatism, and extremism. As Nasr noted in 2006: "Sunni extremism feeds on anti-Shia bias…. The spasms of sectarian rivalries strengthen Sunni extremism and sanction the violence, which – at least in places where the Shia can fight back – leads to a vicious cycle of provocation and revenge." He argued that sectarian politics sharpened debates about democracy, individual rights, the rule of law, and government reforms, by focusing on the relative power of Shias and Sunnis in creating governments, and controlling state resources."[36] The displacement of Saddam Hussein in 2003 and the subsequent war in Iraq, moreover, changed the balance of regional power, leading to a struggle to shape a new equilibrium in a region of weak states and contending local factions. Saudi and Iranian patronage exacerbates sectarian politics, whether the principals intend this or not.

Neither the KSA nor Iran wishes to confront the other on the battlefield; each engages asymmetrically. Iran backs militant non-state – primarily Shia – actors and the KSA has deployed substantial financial resources, pan-Arab media, and U.S. political and intelligence support, balancing alignment with Washington with unilateral Arab diplomacy. Sectarian differences between the KSA and Iran are not the principal determinants of the policies of either regime. The sectarian schism between Sunni and Shia influences the calculus of both governments, and each manipulates sectarian concerns in its geopolitical positioning. Both governments also have key constituents that define themselves in sectarian terms, requiring both, especially the KSA, to factor these in, but sectarian priorities do not drive the geostrategic agenda of either state.[37]

The KSA monarchy faces pressure from the Salafi *ulema* to counter Shia advances, and public pressure to protect Sunnis. The Saudi rulers counter Iran's pan-Islamist populism, fearing efforts to weaken Saudi primacy. After Hezbollah's popularity rose on the Arab "street" after the 2006 war in Lebanon, the KSA sought to depict Iran's Shia, and Persian ambitions, as a threat to Sunnis and Arabs. The KSA's own Shia community in the Eastern Province bore the brunt. Iran downplays sectarianism in the bilateral relationship, criticizing anti-Shia rhetoric from the Kingdom, but recognizing that voices from the Wahabi *ulema* are not those of the monarchy. Both states have also cooperated, at times, to mitigate sectarian conflict in Lebanon and Iraq.

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[36] Nasr, op. cit. p. 27.

[37] For a deeper analysis see Wehrey, Frederic M.,*Sectarian Politics in the Gulf: From the Iraq War to the Arab Uprising,* Columbia University Press, 2013.

Other Gulf states, notably Oman, Qatar, and the UAE, engage bilaterally with Iran. The KSA has engaged Iran directly when it was concerned about ambiguity in U.S. policy, notably after the 2007 U.S. National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) suggested that Tehran had halted its nuclear weapons program. Iran's vacillating policy towards its Arab neighbors, reflects internal disagreements between factions in the Islamic Republic, some of which see the Gulf as a zone of shared economic opportunity, while others seek hegemony.

The Shia communities in Saudi Arabia's Eastern Province, Bahrain, and Kuwait are points of tension. These are not under Iran's control; spiritual ties are real, but none has encouraged adoption of Iran's unique theocratic-democratic construct, velāyat-e faqīh[38]. Radical elements may become empowered, however, if political inclusion, civil rights, and economic advancement are blocked.

The risk and consequences of sectarian schism are sharpened by the collapse of the state in much of the Middle East.[39] Ernst Gellner defined *nationalism* as "the striving to make culture and polity congruent, to endow a culture with its own political roof…."[40] He also offered a provisional definition of a *nation*, citing *shared culture and reciprocal recognition of a shared national identity*.[41] In the sense defined by Max Weber, the *state* is the agency that possesses the monopoly of legitimate violence in a society.[42] When the state lacks legitimacy, or cannot secure its borders, or provide protection to its citizens, people mobilize on the basis of other identities, especially those defined by ethnicity, culture, and religion.

Nor are all societies in the Middle East endowed with states. The Kurds[43], who regard themselves as a *nation,* have become highly relevant in the conflicts in Iraq and Syria, and in Turkey; they also have important agendas[44] and do not exercise state control over territory commensurate with their residence.

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38 "Guardianship of the Jurist": The proposition that a government under Islamic law (sharia) requires a leading Islamic jurist (faqih) to provide "guardianship" (velayat) over the people. It was advanced in 19 lectures on Islamic Government by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, between January 21 and February 8, 1970 while in exile in Najaf in Iraq. Notes of the lectures were published under the title "The Islamic Government, Authority of the Jurist," in 1970.The principle underpinned the 1979 Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in which Ayatollah Khomeini served as the first faqih. [See Dabashi, Hamid, *Theology of Discontent: The Ideological Foundations of the Islamic Revolution in Iran,* New York University Press, 1993].

39 The structural conditions for explosive intra-state conflicts of the sort we have seen in the region include weak state capacity and defective legitimacy; historical or current experience of grievance by one or more subservient or marginalized groups, and the politicization of sub-national identities. Common catalysts include the narrowing of channels for political expression, manipulation of social grievances, economic mismanagement, and the disruption of livelihoods. Familiar triggers include elections, economic shocks, the death or removal of a political leader, or a natural disaster causing social disruption.

40 Gellner, Ernest, *Nations and Nationalism,* Basil Blackwell, 1983, p. 43.

41 Gellner, op. cit. p. 7: "1. Two men are of the same nation if and only if they share the same culture, where culture in turn means a system of ideas and signs and associations, and ways of behaving and communicating. 2. Two men are of the same nation if and only if they *recognize* each other as belonging to the same nation. In other words, nations maketh man; nations are the artefacts of men's convictions and loyalties and solidarities."

42 Weber, Max, "Politik als Beruf," the second lecture in a series to the Free Students Union of Bavaria on January 28, 1919.The state is the "only human Gemeinschaft which lays claim to the monopoly on the legitimated use of physical force. However, this monopoly is limited to a certain geographical area, and in fact this limitation to a particular area is one of the things that defines a state." *Weber's Rationalism and Modern Society*. Trans. and ed. by Tony Waters and Dagmar Waters, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2015. See also Weber, Max. *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, 1921, p. 29.

43 The Kurds are dispersed across parts of Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran, with different relations with each state.

44 Who are the Kurds? Council on Foreign Relations, May 2016.
http://www.cfr.org/middle-east-and-north-africa/time-kurds/p36547#!/ [retrieved May 19, 2016].

The states in the Mashriq[45] (Lebanon, Palestine, Jordan, Syria, and Iraq) and the Arabian peninsula (the KSA and (north) Yemen) arose out of the Arab Revolt of 1916, leading to the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in 1918, and its dissolution thereafter. These circumstances did not predispose to stable state structures. The Sykes–Picot *Asia Minor Agreement*, signed on May 16, 1916 by the United Kingdom and the French Third Republic, with the assent of the Russian Empire, defined the respective spheres of influence and control of France and Britain in Asia Minor[46] if the Triple Entente were to defeat the Ottomans. Neither the Sykes–Picot Agreement[47], nor the Treaty of Sèvres that followed it, facilitated effective state formation.

A summary history of Iraq and Syria since 1920 makes their weakness evident.

Iraq's modern borders were demarcated in 1920 when the Ottoman Empire was divided in the Treaty of Sèvres. The United Kingdom exercised control under the *British Mandate[48] of Mesopotamia*. A Hashemite monarchy was established in 1921 and the Kingdom of Iraq became independent in 1932. In 1958, the monarchy was overthrown, and the Republic of Iraq was created. The Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party ruled from 1968 until 2003. After an invasion by the United States and its allies in 2003, Saddam Hussein's Ba'athists were removed and parliamentary elections leading to Shia dominance were held in 2005. The American presence in Iraq ended in 2011, and the Iraqi insurgency intensified, as fighters from the Syrian Civil War spilled into the country.

France was assigned the League of Nations mandate of **Syria,** which included the territory of present-day Lebanon and Alexandretta, in addition to Syria. French administration took the form of the *Syrian Federation* (1922–24), the *State of Syria* (1924–30) and the *Syrian Republic* (1930-1958), as well as the *State of Greater Lebanon*, the *Alawite State* and *Jabal Druze State*. The French mandate of Syria lasted until 1943, when Syria and Lebanon achieved independence, Hatay having been annexed by Turkey in 1939. French troops left Syria and Lebanon in April 1946, after Syria became independent as a parliamentary republic on October 24, 1945. The post-independence period saw military coups and coup attempts from 1949 to 1971. In 1958, Syria briefly united with Egypt in the *United Arab Republic*. This ended with the Syrian *coup d'état* in 1961, leading to *The Arab Republic of Syria* after a constitutional referendum. Its term ended with the Ba'athist *coup* in 1963, since which the Ba'ath Party has retained power despite an intra-party coup in 1966, and the emergence of the *Corrective Movement* in 1970, which brought Hafez al-Assad to power. Syria was governed under Emergency Law suspending most constitutional protections from 1963 to 2011. Bashar al-Assad succeeded his father in 2000. Since March 2011, Syria has seen an uprising against Assad and the Ba'athist government. A Syrian Interim Government was formed by the Syrian National Coalition in March 2013 and its representatives have taken up Syria's seat in the Arab League.

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45 The Arab world extending eastwards from Egypt – "place of sunrise," from the verb sharaqa (قرش "to shine, illuminate" and "to rise"), referring to the east, where the sun rises.

46 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sykes%E2%80%93Picot_Agreement [retrieved May 1, 2016].

47 The agreement deviated from the Reglement Organique on the governance and non-intervention in the affairs of the Maronite, Orthodox Christian, Druze, and Muslim communities, under the Beirut Vilayet of June 1861 and September 1864; clashed with the Balfour Declaration of 1917 which noted that "His Majesty's government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object"; and negated British promises made to Arabs through Colonel T. E. Lawrence for a national Arab homeland in the area of Greater Syria, in exchange for their joining with British forces against the Ottoman Empire.

48 Under tutelage of the League of Nation.

2. Weak states and national identities

Bassam Tibi noted in 1998[49] that all states in the Arab Middle East were governed by authoritarian regimes with a culture of "neo-patriarchy."[50] Tibi described them as "nation-states only in a formal sense…. From modernity they adopted the *technology* of rule, but not the *democratic* logic of government. Rhetorically, they claim to have the legitimacy of governments by the people, and … all Middle Eastern states … enjoy international legitimacy. Internally, however, these states lack – by all reasonable measures – the legitimacy they claim.[51] Under these conditions, the rise of Islamic fundamentalism contributes to de-legitimizing these states, and thus to their political destabilization."[52]

Tibi, like Gellner, argues that a nation-state presupposes a political community which shares norms and values. In the Arab states that he is critiquing, however, "citizenship has no substance" and is not related to "any awareness of belonging to a … political community and … the related polity." Instead, "in the Middle East, an awareness of being a member of a community connotes membership not in a civil society, but in an ethnic or sectarian sub-community and its subordinate identity."[53]

Linking this to the appeal of Islamic fundamentalism, he argues that "ideal and real patterns of collective identity" coexist in these countries. "The religious ideal of an all subsuming Islamic *umma/*community underlies the supposition that there is a superordinate Islamic identity given to the faithful by an overarching Islamic civilization. Similarly, the belief that there is an Arab *umma*/nation derived from a superordinate multinational pan-Arab identity. In Arabic, the term *umma* is employed indiscriminately for both meanings."[54]

Speaking to the situation in Iraq under Saddam Hussein, he suggests that there are also other identities imposed by the states. "We might … refer to the idea of '*al-Iraqiyya*/Iraqihood'… … imposed in Iraq by the *mukhabarat*[55] of the totalitarian regime. This constitutes a pattern of national superordinate identity, since the real identity patterns in Iraq are either ethnic … or sectarian … or both…. The real identities in the Middle East are related to communal, ethnic and/or sectarian subgroups, each within its own local culture. The real conflict is thus not a conflict between Islamic fundamentalism and pan-nationalist or local-nationalist regimes. In reality, fundamentalism is, despite its universalist rhetoric, imbued with ethnicity and sectarianism. Similarly, the crisis of the nation-state lies not in the threat of an Islamic system of government, but rather in the potential breakdown of existing nation-state regimes induced through mobilization on religious grounds."[56] Writing in 1998, Tibi did not anticipate the destruction of the Iraqi state as a result of the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, and the dismantlement of the Ba'athist state administration. Iraqi citizens'

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49 Tibi, Bassam, *The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder,* University of California Press, 1998 [updated edition 2002].

50 Sharabi, Hisham, *Neopatriarchy: A Theory of Distorted Change in Arab Society,* New York: Oxford University Press, 1988.

51 See Hudson, Michael, *Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy,* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977, pp. 1–30.

52 Tibi, op. cit. p. 121.

53 Tibi, op. cit p. 122.

54 Tibi, op. cit.

55 The Iraqi Intelligence Service (Jihaz Al-Mukhabarat Al-Amma), also known as the Mukhabarat or General Directorate of Intelligence, was the main state intelligence organization in Iraq under Saddam Hussein.

56 Tibi, op. cit.

assertion of their ethnic and sectarian identities in the aftermath of these events is, however, consistent with his and Nasr's analyses.

Neither Iraq nor Syria is a *nation-state* – "*a sovereign state of which most of the citizens … are united also by factors which define a nation, such as language or common descent*."[57] A more extensive definition makes the defect still clearer: "A nation state … conjoins the political entity of a state to the cultural entity of a nation, from which it aims to derive its political legitimacy to rule, and potentially its status as a sovereign state…. A state is a … political and geopolitical entity, whilst a nation is a cultural and ethnic one. The term 'nation state' implies that the two coincide…."[58] They do not in either Iraq or Syria.

III Conclusions

The conflicts in the region are driven by several factors, some related to weak state formation and the persistence of sub-national identities that supersede national loyalties; some that are the product of authoritarian (or totalitarian) state structures that provide no rights or voice to their citizens; some that are the result of Muslim revolutionary ambitions exemplified by the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the accession to power of the Taliban in Afghanistan, and the campaigns of al Qaeda and ISIL/Da'esh; and some that derive from sub-regional power politics founded on perceived national interests and security concerns, notably between the KSA and Iran, also influenced by Turkey and Egypt.

The impact of external interventions has also been significant, both on local realities and regional perceptions: the schism between Washington and Tehran after the Islamic Revolution and the occupation of the U.S. Embassy in 1979; Soviet, Chinese, French, and U.S.[59] support for Iraq in its war against Iran from 1980 to 1988[60]; the close alliance between the KSA and the U.S. in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990; the displacement of the Taliban in Afghanistan, followed by the invasion of Iraq, without UNSC authorization, by a U.S.-led coalition in 2003[61], the disbandment of the Ba'athist government and Iraqi military forces, the execution of Saddam Hussein, and revelations about interrogation of prisoners in Abu Ghraib; U.S. and other Western states' relations with the governments of Egypt and Syria, notably to bolster peace agreements with Israel; Western ambivalence and Russian strategic purpose in the Syrian civil war; and the conclusion of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of

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57 Oxford English Dictionary.

58 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nation_state [retrieved May 1, 2016].

59 Howard Teicher, National Security Council Director of Political-Military Affairs, accompanied Donald Rumsfeld to Baghdad in 1983. In an affidavit in 1995 he affirmed that the Central Intelligence Agency directed armaments and hi-tech components to Iraq through fronts and friendly third parties (Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Kuwait): "[T]he United States actively supported the Iraqi war effort by supplying the Iraqis with billions of dollars of credits, by providing U.S. military intelligence and advice to the Iraqis, and by closely monitoring third country arms sales to Iraq to make sure that Iraq had the military weaponry required. The United States also provided strategic operational advice to the Iraqis to better use their assets in combat.... The CIA, including both CIA Director Casey and Deputy Director Gates, knew of, approved of, and assisted in the sale of non-U.S. origin military weapons, ammunition and vehicles to Iraq. My notes, memoranda and other documents in my NSC files show or tend to show that the CIA knew of, approved of, and assisted in the sale of non-U.S. origin military weapons, munitions and vehicles to Iraq. [Statement by former NSC official Howard Teicher to the U.S. District Court, Southern District of Florida, 1/31/95].

60 http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/iran-iraq.htm; see also https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iran%E2%80%93Iraq_War#Iraq_2 [retrieved May 6, 2016].

61 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2003_invasion_of_Iraq [retrieved May 6, 2016].

Action on July 14, 2015 between the P5+1[62] and the Islamic Republic of Iran[63]. Behind all this, the unresolved, though perhaps frozen, Israel-Palestine conflict still festers, and serves as tinder for radicals competing for support on the street.

These factors have played out in different ways in the four major sectarian conflicts of the past decade[64] – Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Bahrain.

1. Iraq

Among some 32 million Iraqis, 25 percent are non-Arab minorities – Kurds number about 7 million, followed by Assyrians, Turkmen, Yazidis, Armenians, Circassians, and Iranians, with smaller communities of Palestinians and Chechens. A significant Jewish community, over 100,000 in 1948, dwindled due to emigration to Israel.

Some 55 percent of Iraqis are ithna-Ashari (Twelver) Shia; Hanafi Sunnis comprise about 30 percent, followed by Christians, Yazidis, Zoroastrians, and Baha'is. Many Iraqi Kurds are Sunnis of the Shafi'i school. Shia unity in Iraq was fractured after the Ba'athists came to power in 1968 and Saddam Hussein focused on stabilizing a country divided along social, ethnic, religious, and economic lines. To do so, Saddam engaged in widespread repression while investing in economic development.

He modernized the economy while building a strong security apparatus. Seeking to broaden support, he implemented welfare and development programs in the 1970s, leveraging rising oil revenues to diversify the economy into mining and industry and expand the road and electricity networks.

The Shias became less politically active, with some joining the Ba'ath Party, although a few supported leftist parties and attracted Ba'athist ire. Disaffection led a growing number to look to the Shia *ulema*[65]. In 1974, Shia religious processions turned into political protests, leading to clashes with the authorities. Several Da'wa[66] Party members were executed, and Ayatollah Abul Qasim al-Khoei visited Saddam to make a short-lived peace. More executions followed in 1977 after fresh

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62 The five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council – China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, and United States – plus Germany.

63 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joint_Comprehensive_Plan_of_Action [retrieved May 6, 2016].

64 I have not considered Libya, as the destruction of the state under Muhammar Gadhafi, who established a highly personal rule, unsupported by civil institutions, led to a unique circumstance. About 97% of the population (about 6.5 million, 27.7% of whom are under the age of 15) are Muslims, almost all Sunnis, although there are small numbers of Ibadi Muslims, Sufis, and Ahmadis as well as a very small Christian – mostly Coptic – community.

65 Muslim scholars with specialist knowledge of Islamic law (sharia) and theology.

66 Hizb Al-Da'wa was formed in 1957 by Mohammed Sadiq Al-Qamousee to promote Islamic values and ethics, combat secularism, and create an Islamic state in Iraq. Mohammad Baqr al-Sadr – a leading philosopher, theologian, and political theorist – emerged as the leader and laid the foundations of its political ideology, based on Wilayat Al-Umma (Governance of the People). A similar party, Hezbollah, was founded in Lebanon by clerics from Najaf in support of Al-Qamousee's vision. Hizb Al-Da'wa gained strength in the 1970s and waged an armed insurgency against the Iraqi government. The government closed down the Shia journal *Risalat al-Islam* and several religious educational institutions, and obliged Iraqi students of the Shia seminary in Najaf to perform national military service. The Ba'athists arrested and imprisoned Al-Da'wa members from 1972 onwards and the head of Al-Da'wa's Baghdad branch was killed in prison in 1973. In 1974, 75 Al-Da'wa members were arrested and sentenced to death by a revolutionary court. In 1975, the government cancelled the annual religious procession from Najaf to Karbala. Despite the government's ban, Al-Da'wa organized the procession in 1977 and was subsequently attacked by police. Al Da'wa interacted with Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini during his exile in Najaf. Widely viewed in the West as a terrorist organization, the Da'wa party was banned in 1980 and its members sentenced to death *in absentia* by the Iraqi Revolutionary Command Council.

riots, which escalated after the Islamic Revolution in Iran, when the al-Da'wa Party mobilized to create an Islamic state in Iraq. Saddam Hussein cracked down hard, killing al-Da'wa leaders and purging the Ba'ath party and the armed forces of senior Shia members.

In June 1979, Shia Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr[67] was apprehended for inciting violence and placed under house arrest. After an attempt was made to assassinate Saddam in 1980, Sadr was executed. In 1982, the *Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq* was formed by Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim to overthrow the government. Al-Hakim tried to join forces with al-Da'wa and the Jamaat al 'Ulama but ethnic divisions frustrated this. Iraq's war with Iran, meanwhile, led Saddam to woo support from Iraq's Shias by providing resources to the predominantly Shia southern provinces, and emphasizing Iraq's inclusive Arab identity.

After the First Gulf War in 1991, Iraq's Shias rose against Saddam in March and April 1991. The insurgency was largely uncoordinated, fuelled by the sense that foreign support would be forthcoming. Before the uprising, on February 15, 1991, U.S. President George H. W. Bush called for a coup to topple Saddam Hussein.[68] Bush made a similar appeal on March 1, two days after the liberation of Kuwait.[69] On February 24, shortly before the ceasefire, the Voice of Free Iraq called on the Iraqis to overthrow Saddam.[70]

Shias in southern Iraq, where the uprisings began, were either demoralized Shia conscripts from the Iraqi Army or members of the Da'wa Party and the *Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq*. They were joined by Kurdish nationalists[71] and far-left groups. In the first two weeks most cities fell to rebel forces, but the revolutionaries could not consolidate because of internal divisions.[72] The government retained control over Baghdad, regrouped, and crushed the rebels in a brutal campaign spearheaded by the Republican Guard.

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67 Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr (آية الله العظمى السيد محمد باقر الصدر) (March 1, 1935 – April 9, 1980) was an Iraqi Shia cleric, philosopher, and ideological founder of the Islamic Da'wa Party. He is the father-in-law of Muqtada al-Sadr and a cousin of Muqtada's father Muhammad Sadeq al-Sadr and Imam Musa as-Sadr. His Shia lineage goes back to the Prophet Muhammad, through the seventh Shia Imam, Musa al-Kazim.

68 On the VOA broadcast, President GHW Bush said: "There is another way for the bloodshed to stop: and that is, for the Iraqi military and the Iraqi people to take matters into their own hands and force Saddam Hussein, the dictator, to step aside and then comply with the United Nations' resolutions and rejoin the family of peace-loving nations."

69 On this occasion President Bush broadcast: "In my own view ... the Iraqi people should put [Saddam] aside, and that would facilitate the resolution of all these problems that exist and certainly would facilitate the acceptance of Iraq back into the family of peace-loving nations."

70 The speaker was Salah Omar al-Ali, a former member of the Ba'athist Revolutionary Command Council. Al-Ali urged the Iraqis to overthrow the "criminal tyrant of Iraq," asserting that Saddam "will flee the battlefield when he becomes certain that the catastrophe has engulfed every street, every house and every family in Iraq." He continued: "Rise to save the homeland from the clutches of dictatorship so that you can devote yourself to avoiding the dangers of the continuation of the war and destruction. Honorable Sons of the Tigris and Euphrates, at these decisive moments of your life, and while facing the danger of death at the hands of foreign forces, you have no option in order to survive and defend the homeland but put an end to the dictator and his criminal gang."

71 Another insurgency broke out in March in Kurdish areas of northern Iraq. Unlike the spontaneous rebellion in the south, the uprising in the north was organized by the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). The defection of the government-recruited Kurdish home guard militias boosted the rebellion.

72 Many exiled Iraqi dissidents, including Iran-based Badr Brigade militants of SCIRI, joined the rebellion. SCIRI concentrated their efforts on the holy cities of Najaf and Karbala, alienating many people who did not subscribe to their Shia Islamist agenda and pro-Iranian slogans, for which SCIRI was later criticized by the Da'wa Party. Rebel ranks were swelled by mutinous Sunni members of the military, leftists from the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP), anti-Saddam Arab nationalists, and disaffected Ba'athists. But the diverse revolutionary groups, militias, and parties were united only in their desire for regime change. They had no common political or military program or leadership, and little coordination.

In the month-long fighting, tens of thousands died and nearly two million were displaced.[73] The government forced the relocation of Marsh Arabs and the draining of the marshes in the Tigris–Euphrates system.[74] The Gulf War Coalition established no-fly zones over northern and southern Iraq, enabling the Kurdish opposition to establish the Kurdish Autonomous Republic[75] in what is now Iraqi Kurdistan.[76]

Shia and Kurdish actions in Iraq after Saddam Hussein was toppled in 2003, thus occasion no surprise, nor do efforts by Sunni members of Iraq's former armed forces to restore their erstwhile power. The circumstances of Nouri Kamil Mohammed Hasan al-Maliki, prime minister of Iraq from 2006–2014, secretary-general of the Islamic Da'wa Party and a vice president of Iraq after stepping down as prime minister[77], illustrate the continuum. Al-Maliki's first government succeeded the *Iraqi Transitional Government* installed by the U.S.-led coalition. His first Cabinet was sworn in on May 20, 2006; his second, in which he was also acting interior minister, defense minister, and national security minister, was approved on December 21, 2010.

Al-Maliki was a Shia dissident in the late 1970s and fled into exile for 24 years after being sentenced to death. He rose in the leadership of the Da'wa Party, coordinated anti-Saddam guerrillas, and built relationships with Iranian and Syrian officials in trying to overthrow Saddam.

He worked closely with the U.S. before and after the withdrawal of Coalition Forces from Iraq in 2011, but his use of Shia militias to supplement the Iraqi security forces led to opposition from non-Shia Iraqis, and opened the way for the entry into Iraq of ISIL/Da'esh. After Iraqi forces suffered

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73 In March and early April, nearly two million Iraqis, 1.5 million of them Kurds, escaped to the mountains in the north, the southern marshes, and into Turkey and Iran. By April 6, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees estimated that about 750,000 Iraqi Kurds had fled to Iran and 280,000 to Turkey, with 300,000 more gathered at the Turkish border. Many were gunned down by Republican Guard helicopters, which strafed columns of civilians in both the north and south.

74 In March 1993, a U.N. investigation reported hundreds of executions of Iraqis from the marshes in prior months, reporting that the Iraqi army's behavior in the south is the most "worrying development [in Iraq] in the past year" and added that following the formation of the no-fly zone, the army switched to long-range artillery attacks, followed by ground assaults resulting in "heavy casualties" and widespread destruction of property, along with allegations of mass executions. In November 1993, the U.N. reported that 40% of the marshlands were drained, and there were unconfirmed reports that the Iraq army had used poisonous gas against villages near the Iranian border. In December 1993, the U.S. Department of State accused Iraq of "indiscriminate military operations in the south, which include the burning of villages and forced relocation of non-combatants." On February 23, 1994, Iraq diverted waters from the Tigris River south and east of the marshes, to render farmlands useless and drive the rebels hiding there back to the drained marshes. In April 1994, the U.S. officials said Iraq was continuing a military campaign in Iraq's remote marshes. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1991_uprisings_in_Iraq [retrieved April 30, 2016].

75 Fighting continued until October 1991 when an agreement was made for Iraqi withdrawal from parts of the Kurdish region, and the establishment of the Kurdistan Regional Government and a Kurdish Autonomous Republic in three provinces of northern Iraq. Tens of thousands of Iraqi soldiers dug-in along the front, backed by tanks and heavy artillery, while the Iraqi government blockaded food, fuel, and other deliveries. The U.S. Air Force continued to enforce a no-fly zone over northern Iraq. The stalemate was broken in the 1994–1997 Iraqi Kurdish Civil War, when, due to the PUK's alliance with Iran, the KDP called in Iraqi military support leading to the capture of Arbil and Sulaymaniyah. Iraqi government forces retreated after the U.S. launched missile strikes on southern Iraq. On January 1, 1997, the U.S. and its allies launched Operation Northern Watch to continue the no-fly zone in the north after Operation Provide Comfort ended. The Kurds expanded their area of control after participating in the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, which led to the new Iraqi government's recognition of Kurdish autonomy in this region.

76 In March 1991, the U.S. and its allies established a no-fly zone over northern Iraq and provided humanitarian assistance to the Kurds. On April 17, U.S. forces began to take control of areas more than 100 km inside Iraq to build camps for Kurdish refugees. Many Shia refugees fled to Syria, where thousands settled in Sayyidah Zaynab.

77 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nouri_al-Maliki [retrieved May 5, 2016].

defeats by ISIL forces in the Northern Iraq Offensive[78], the U.S. determined that that al-Maliki should step down, and on August 14, 2014, he resigned as prime minister, but in September 2014, was elected as one of three vice presidents.

ISIL's success in the Northern Iraq Offensive transformed the security situation not only in Iraq, but also in Syria.[79]

ISIL Areas of Control, and Operational Space – as of April 26, 2016

Wider Dimensions: Iraq



IS control IS free to operate

Source: Institute for the Study of War (April 26, 2016).

[78] The Northern Iraq offensive began on June 5, 2014, when the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and its allies began an offensive in northern Iraq against the Iraqi government, building on earlier clashes in December 2013. ISIL captured several cities and related territory, securing Samarra on June 5, Mosul on June 10 and Tikrit on June 11. As Iraqi government forces fled south on June 13, the Kurdish forces took control of the oil hub of Kirkuk. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki sought to have parliament declare a national state of emergency on June 10, but many Sunni Arab and Kurdish legislators boycotted the session to block an expansion of the prime minister's powers. By late June, Iraq had lost control of its border with Jordan and Syria.

[79] http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27838034 [retrieved May 5, 2016].

Coalition Air-Strikes Targets – as of April 26, 2016

Air-Strikes in Iraq and Syria



Note: Approximate location of areas Russia has targeted, number of strikes unknown.

IS control IS free to operate Kurdistan Government-administered

Source: Institute for the Study of War, US Central Command, (April 26, 2016).

Financing Sources for ISIL: Oil



IS control IS free to operate Kurdistan Government-administered Oil fields Oil pipeline Major oil refineries

Source: World Energy Outlook, IEA, Petroleum Economist, ISW.

The Northern Iraq Offensive in 2014 was supported by many Sunni Arabs in the Gulf[80], despite their governments' concerns about the rise of ISIL/Da'esh.[81] Many saw Iraq's Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki as an Iranian stooge.[82] The ISIL advance fuelled sectarian passions, with the Iraqi government criticizing Gulf States for arming and backing Sunni fighters, and accusing KSA of promoting "genocide" in Iraq. Support is not limited to the Gulf, of course. Tunisia, Russia, Turkey, Jordan and France are all major sources of recruits.



2. Syria

In 2014, Lawrence Potter[83] called the Syrian civil war an "intensely sectarian conflict." By the end of 2012, the UN Human Rights Council had concluded that "the 21-month-old civil war in Syria is rapidly devolving into an 'overtly sectarian' and ethnic conflict."[84] An extensive collaboration on Wikipedia concluded:[85]

80 "Today's battle is waged in the Baghdad of Rasheed and Damascus of Waleed on behalf of the whole Islamic nation to restore anew its dignity. God, grant your victory," tweeted Hakem al-Mutairi, head of a Kuwaiti Salafi group, referring to the Umayyad caliph in Syria, and his Abbasid successor in Iraq.

81 http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-iraq-security-gulf-opinion-idUKKBN0EY1UF20140623 [retrieved April 30, 2016].

82 "Smile if you wish, the apostates (Shi'ites) in Kerbala are taking to the streets chanting 'We want the Messiah to appear' in order to save them from the holy warriors," tweeted Ibraheem al-Faris, a professor of religion at Saudi Arabia's King Saud University.

83 Potter, Lawrence G. *Sectarian Politics in the Persian Gulf.* New York: Oxford University Press, p. 83.

84 https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/syrian-conflicts-sectarian-ethnic-dimensions-growing-un-warns/2012/12/19/727183a2-4a2c-11e2-820e-17eefac2f939_story.html [retrieved July 15, 2016].

85 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sectarianism_and_minorities_in_the_Syrian_Civil_War#cite_ref-2 [retrieved April 28, 2016].

> "The focus of the conflict … [is] a ruling minority Alawite government … and allied Shia governments such as Iran, pitted against the country's Sunni Muslim majority who are aligned with the Syrian opposition and their Sunni Turkish and Persian Gulf State backers.[86] The conflict has drawn in other ethno-religious minorities, including Armenians, Assyrians, Druze, Palestinians, Kurds, Yazidi, Mhallami, Mandaeans, Arab Christians, Turkmens and Greeks.
>
> "In 2012 the first Christian Free Syrian Army (FSA) unit formed, yet … the Assad government still had the reluctant support of the majority of the country's Christians of various ethnicities and denominations. By 2013 an increasing number of Christians favored opposition. In 2014, the predominantly Christian Syriac Military Council formed an alliance with the FSA, and other Syrian Christian militias such as the Syriac Security Office (Sutoro)[87] had joined the Syrian opposition against the Assad regime."

In her paper in June 2013, Nicole Bibbins Sedaca[88] argued that the conflict began like other uprisings in the "Arab Spring," with citizens claiming freedoms from a dictator. She continued: "But it is unquestionably religious now, as we see from the definition of religious conflict put forward by noted scholar of religion Monica Duffy Toft [who] …defines … religious civil war as civil war in which combatants identify with different faith traditions or are of the same faith but contest the role of their religion vis-à-vis society and the state. Syria falls squarely [within] … [this] definition."[89]

Daniel Philpott, in an interview on July 2, 2013, on *The Role of Religion in Post-conflict Syria*[90], observed, "The Bashar al-Assad dictatorship follows a pattern of Arab dictatorship with respect to religion.... It can be seen as a protector of minorities … the Alawites and Christians, but it follows a pattern of authoritarian rule … based upon an Arab nationalist ideology that is all about modernization…. The view of religion is that Islam is something that … needs to be contained and managed."

He argued that many feared that if Assad was overthrown, Syria "will not become a … secular democracy, but Sunni Islamist … an ally of other Sunni Muslim forces around the region. … [T]he Arab nationalist project has been an economic disaster, often built on socialism, on statist-style economies. …The failure of nationalism creates a vacuum. People's religious identities haven't gone away; they've started to mobilize around them politically." The validity of these assertions of societal fracture, and divisions along ethnic, sectarian, and secularist-religious axes is reflected in the fragmentation of control in Syria today.

86 Potter, p. 36.

87 (Syriac: ܣܘܪܝܝܐ ܕܣܘܬܪܐ ܒܗ ܡܟܬܒܐ, Arabic: سوتورو), a Syriac (Assyrian) Christian militia in the Al-Hasakah Governorate of the Syrian Arab Republic. It is the armed wing of the Syriac Union Party (SUP).

88 Sedaca, Nicole Bibbins, "The Religious Component of the Syrian Conflict: More Than Perception," Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, June 21, 2013.

89 http://journal.georgetown.edu/the-religious-component-of-the-syrian-conflict-more-than-perception-by-nicole-bibbins-sedaca/ [retrieved July 15, 2016].

90 http://www.cfr.org/syria/role-religion-postconflict-syria/p31050 [retrieved July 15, 2016].

Areas of Control In Syria – as of March 2016



Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Syrian_civil_war.png [retrieved July 19, 2016].

Russian aerial bombardment of anti-regime forces since September 30, 2015 and its support of the Syrian military enabled Assad's forces to retake key cities. Russia supported the government from the beginning of the civil war, vetoing Western and Arab League draft resolutions in the U.N. Security Council that called for the removal of Assad and for U.N. sanctions against the government. After several statements critical of Assad in 2012, however, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov proposed on September 9, to avert a U.S. attack after reports that the government had used chemical weapons against its citizens, that Syria place its chemical weapons under international control prior to their destruction.

On September 11, 2013 in an op-ed in the New York Times,[91] Russian President Vladimir Putin argued for caution:

[91] http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/12/opinion/putin-plea-for-caution-from-russia-on-syria.html?_r=0 [retrieved May 5, 2016].

> "Syria is not witnessing a battle for democracy, but an armed conflict between government and opposition in a multi-religious country. There are few champions of democracy in Syria. But there are more than enough al Qaeda fighters and extremists of all stripes battling the government. The United States State Department has designated *al-Nusra Front* and the *Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant*, fighting with the opposition, as terrorist organizations. This internal conflict, fueled by foreign weapons supplied to the opposition, is one of the bloodiest in the world. Mercenaries from Arab countries fighting there, and hundreds of militants from Western countries and even Russia, are an issue of our deep concern. Might they not return to our countries with experience acquired in Syria? After all, after fighting in Libya, extremists moved on to Mali. This threatens us all."

Putin called for "peaceful dialogue enabling Syrians to develop a compromise plan for their own future," using the U.N. Security Council to "preserv[e] law and order in today's complex and turbulent world … to keep international relations from sliding into chaos." Warning against military intervention against Assad, he argued that "force has proved ineffective and pointless. Afghanistan is reeling, and no one can say what will happen after international forces withdraw. Libya is divided into tribes and clans. In Iraq the civil war continues, with dozens killed each day. In the United States, many draw an analogy between Iraq and Syria, and ask why their government would want to repeat recent mistakes." Citing an opportunity to avoid military action because of the pressure that Russia had brought to bear on Assad, he argued for the need to "take advantage of the Syrian government's willingness to place its chemical arsenal under international control for subsequent destruction."

After the U.N. action to destroy Syria's chemical weapon stocks, Washington and Moscow crafted a joint approach to a ceasefire, and arranged new peace talks between the government and parties not designated as "terrorist organizations." Addressing the UN General Assembly in September 2015[92], Putin spoke his mind:

> "Attempts to push for changes within other countries based on ideological preferences often led to tragic consequences and to degradation rather than progress. It seems however, that far from learning from others' mistakes, everyone just keeps repeating them. And so the export of revolutions, this time of so-called 'democratic' ones, continues. Suffice it to look at the situation in the Middle East and North Africa. ... Instead of the triumph of democracy and progress we got violence, poverty and a social disaster. ... It is now obvious that the power vacuum created in some countries of the Middle East and North Africa led to emergence of areas of anarchy. Those were filled with extremists and terrorists. Tens of thousands of militants are fighting under the banners of the so-called 'Islamic State'. ... And now the ranks of radicals are being joined by the members of the so-called "moderate" Syrian opposition supported by the Western countries. First, they are armed and trained, and then they defect to the Islamic State.
>
> "...Russia has always been … consistent in opposing terrorism…. Today, we provide military and technical assistance … to Iraq and Syria [in] fighting terrorist groups. We think it is an enormous mistake to refuse to cooperate with the Syrian government.... We should … acknowledge that no one but President Assad's Armed Forces and Kurd militia are truly fighting the Islamic State and other terrorist organizations in Syria."

Russia's upper house authorized the president to use its armed forces in Syria after the Syrian government requested military help. Moscow's intervention consisted chiefly of air strikes in north-western Syria against militant opposition and terrorist groups, including *ISIL, Jabhat al-Nusra* (al Qaeda in the Levant) and the *Army of Conquest*. In an interview on October 11, 2015 Putin defined

[92] Statement by Mr. Vladimir V. Putin, president of the Russian Federation, at the 70th session of the U.N. General Assembly, September 28, 2015.

Russia's goal as "stabilising the legitimate power in Syria and creating the conditions for political compromise."[93]

In December 2015, the UN Security Council endorsed a joint U.S. and Russian peace plan envisioning "credible, inclusive and non-sectarian governance" in Syria within six months, followed by "free and fair elections" within 18 months. In February, the Syrian government and some rebel groups (excluding *ISIL* and *Jabhat al-Nusra*, and other "terrorist organizations") agreed to end hostilities, and peace talks began in Geneva. While nothing emerged from the talks, the truce held in many areas despite violations. In mid-March, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry claimed that the level of violence "has been reduced by 80 to 90 percent." On March 14, 2016 Putin ordered the withdrawal of the "main part" of Russian forces from Syria.[94]

In late February, before withdrawing, Russia was executing 60 air strikes daily, while the U.S.-led coalition averaged seven. The Russian air strikes were effective against ISIL's oil trade and supply routes. Some 209 oil facilities were destroyed, along with 2,000 petroleum transport trucks. When Putin ordered the withdrawal, Russia had conducted over 9,000 airstrikes over five and a half months, and helped the Syrian army recapture 400 towns and 10,000 square kilometers of territory. Vincent R. Stewart, director of the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, said in February 2016 that the "Russian reinforcement has changed the calculus completely" and that Assad "is in a much stronger … position than he was just six months ago."[95]

Russian military operations in Syria have continued, albeit at lower intensity. Tensions rose as a result of apparently calculated attacks on civilian facilities, including a hospital, in Aleppo, but an agreement between Russia and the U.S. to extend the cease-fire to include Aleppo was reached on May 3.[96]

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93 "Путин назвал основную задачу российских военных в Сирии," Interfax, October 11, 2015.

94 http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/03/syria-geneva-peace-talks/476034/ [retrieved May 5, 2016].

95 "U.S. officials: Russian airstrikes have changed calculus completely in Syria," Washington Post, February 9, 2016.

96 http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/us-russia-agree-extend-ceasefire-aleppo-1558313 [retrieved July 15, 2016]

3. Yemen[97]

The Houthi[98] insurgency in Yemen is a sectarian military rebellion that began in June 2004 against the government of Ali Abdullah Saleh Al-Sanhani Al-Humairi, president of the Yemen Arab Republic from 1990, and formerly president of North Yemen from 1978 to Yemen's unification. It has since become a civil war pitting Zaidi Shia[99] Houthis against the Yemeni military.

In 2004, dissident cleric Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi, of the Zaidi sect, launched an uprising against the government, in which he later died. Initially, most fighting was in the Sa'dah Governorate in north-western Yemen, but later spread to Hajjah, 'Amran, al-Jawf and the Saudi province of Jizan. In 2009 and 2010, the KSA air force bombed key Houthi targets, and Arab Special Forces were deployed to support the Yemeni army and pro-government Sunni tribes. Iran's Revolutionary Guard was said by Arab media to be assisting the Houthis.

A presidential election was held on February 21, 2012 with a reported 65 percent turnout, in which Abd Rabbuh Mansur al-Hadi won 99.8 percent of the vote, and was sworn in on February 25, 2012 after President Saleh stepped aside. In 2014, however, the Houthis took over key government facilities, capturing the presidential palace on January 20, 2015.[100] The presidential guards surrendered after being assured that President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi could leave unharmed. The U.N. Security Council called an emergency meeting, calling for an end to hostilities. On January 22, President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi and Prime Minister Khaled Bahah tendered their resignations.[101]

A full-blown Civil War began in 2015 between two factions claiming to constitute the Yemeni government. Houthi forces controlling Sana'a, allied with forces loyal to former president Ali Abdullah Saleh, clashed with forces loyal to the government of President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi, in Aden. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the ISIL/Da'esh have also carried

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97 Yemen (Arabic: اليَمَن), officially the Republic of Yemen (Arabic: الجمهورية اليمنية), lies on the southwestern and southern end of the Arabian Peninsula, over an extent of 527,970 km2 with a coastline of about 2,000 km. Saudi Arabia lies to the north, the Red Sea to the west, the Gulf of Aden and Arabian Sea to the south, and Oman to the east. The territory includes more than 200 islands; the largest of which is Socotra. Officially the capital is Sana'a, which has been under rebel control since February 2015. As a result, the capital has been temporarily relocated to Aden, on the southern coast. Yemen was originally the home of the Sabaeans, a trading state that flourished for over a thousand years probably extending to include parts of Ethiopia and Eritrea. In 275 AD, the region came under the rule of the later Himyarite Kingdom. Christianity arrived in the 4th C CE after Judaism and local paganism were already entrenched. Islam was widely adopted in the 7th C CE and Yemenite troops were active in early Islamic conquests. Several dynasties emerged between the 9th- 16th centuries CE, the Rasulid being the strongest. Yemen was divided between the Ottoman and British empires in the early 20th C, and the Zaydi Mutawakkilite Kingdom of Yemen was established after World War I in North Yemen, which became the Yemen Arab Republic in 1962. South Yemen was a British protectorate until 1967. The two Yemeni states united to form the modern republic of Yemen in 1990.

See also https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yemen#The_Zaydis_and_Ottomans.

98 The Houthis (Arabic: الحوثيون al-Ḥūthiyyūn), officially called Ansar Allah (anṣār allāh أنصار الله "Supporters of God"), is a Zaidi Shia-led movement from Sa'dah, in northern Yemen, founded by Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi who started the rebellion in 2004 and was killed the same year. The group has been led since then by Abdul-Malik al-Houthi.

99 Iranian shias are "Twelver Shia" (Ithnā' ashariyyah) and constitute the largest branch of Shia Islam, perhaps 85 percent of Shias are "Twelvers", honoring twelve Shia Imams. The Houthi are Zaydi Shia, members of a sect that emerged in the 8th C CE, named after Zayd ibn 'Alī, the grandson of Husayn ibn 'Alī. Zaydi Shia make up about 35–40% of Muslims in Yemen.

100 http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/1/20/yemen-crisis-negotiations.html [retrieved May 2, 2016].

101 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-30936940 [retrieved May 2, 2016].

out attacks, as AQAP controlled swaths of territory in the interior, and along stretches of the coast.[102]

On March 21, after capturing Sana'a, the Houthi-led *Supreme Revolutionary Committee* mobilized to overthrow Hadi and drive into the southern provinces. By March 25, Lahij had fallen to the Houthis and they reached the outskirts of Aden, leading Hadi to flee Yemen. A coalition led by KSA launched military operations backed by airstrikes[103]. The U.S. provided intelligence and logistical support, aimed at persuading the KSA to limit their goals to halting rebel advances and reaching a battlefield stalemate, to lead all sides to the negotiating table.[104] According to the U.N., over 6,500 people were killed in Yemen from March 2015 to March 2016, including 3,218 civilians.

4. Bahrain[105]

Bahrain saw sustained civil and violent resistance from February to July 2011, in the wave of civic protests in the Middle East and North Africa, initially aimed at political freedom for the Shia majority, and then expanded to calls to end the Al Khalifa monarchy after protesters were killed in police action at the Pearl Roundabout on February 17.

On February 27, 2011 the 18 *Al-Wefaq* Shia opposition MP's resigned to protest regime violence against protestors. On March 14, 1,000 troops and armor from Saudi Arabia, and 500 troops from UAE, entered Bahrain to crush the uprising. King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa declared martial law and a three-month state of emergency. A number of other Shia officials, including two ministers, four MPs, and a dozen judges, also resigned. In April the government destroyed 35 Shia mosques, including the 400 year-old Amir Mohammed Braighi mosque in A'ali, claiming they had been illegally built.

On 14 April, the Ministry of Justice banned *Al Wefaq* and the *Islamic Action Society* (*Amal al-Islām*)[106] for damaging "social peace and national unity," but withdrew the banning orders after U.S.

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[102] http://www.cfr.org/yemen/yemen-crisis/p36488 [retrieved May 2, 2016].

[103] http://www.theatlantic.com/photo/2015/05/the-saudi-arabia-yemen-war-of-2015/392687/ [retrieved May 2, 2016]

[104] http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-widens-role-in-saudi-led-campaign-against-yemen-rebels-1428882967 [retrieved May 6, 2016].

[105] Bahrain (Arabic: البحرين) officially the Kingdom of Bahrain (Arabic: مملكة البحرين) is a small archipelago on the western side of the Gulf. Bahrain Island is 55 km long and 18 km wide. Saudi Arabia lies to the west, connected to Bahrain by the King Fahd Causeway; Iran is 200 km to the north across the Gulf. The population in 2010 was 1,234,571, including 666,172 non-nationals. The archipelago was originally part of the ancient Dilmun civilisation and the inhabitants converted to Islam in 628CE. After nine centuries of Muslim rule, Bahrain was occupied by the Portuguese in 1521, who were expelled by the Persian Safavid Shah Abbas I in 1602. In 1783, the Bani Utbah clan captured Bahrain from Nasr Al-Madhkur head of an Omani tribe controlling Bushehr province, including Bahrain, on the Persian Gulf littoral. Under Safavid suzerainty, the Al-Madhkurs, although Sunni Arabs of Omani extraction held allegiance to the governors in southern Persia. Since 1783, Bahrain been ruled by the Sunni Al Khalifa family, with the head of the family originally styled Hakim al-Bahrayn. In the late 1800s, following successive treaties with the British crown, Bahrain became a protectorate of the United Kingdom, acceding to independence in 1971 after the United Kingdom's decision to withdraw its forces from East of Suez. After his accession in 1999, after an earlier uprising against his father, Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa introduced wide ranging reforms in 2001, which were approved by 98.4 percent of Bahraini citizens in a referendum. Bahrain was declared a Kingdom in 2002. Since early 2011, the country has experienced sustained protests and unrest inspired by the Arab Spring, led by the Shia population who make up some 70 percent of Bahrain's citizens.

[106] The Islamic Action Society (Arabic: جمعية العمل الإسلامي Jamʿiyyat al-ʿAmal al-Islāmī), also referred to as Amal Party (Arabic: أمل), is a leading Islamist party that appeals to Shia followers of the late Islamic philosopher Mohammad Hussaini Shirazi. The party boycotted the 2002 general election along with other opposition groups, but contested the election in 2006, securing no seats. It arose from the militant Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain, whose members were pardoned after political reforms instituted by King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa in 2001, leading to the formation of the Islamic Action Society.

representations. After the state of emergency was lifted on June 1, *Al Wefaq* organized weekly protests which drew tens of thousands, and continued into 2012. The *Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry*[107], appointed by King Hamad bin Isa in June 2011, reported on November 23 that the government had abused detainees, and rejected claims that the protests had been instigated by Iran.

In February 2012, talks between the opposition and the government were announced, "to pave the way for a dialogue that would lead to a united Bahrain," supported by *Al Wefaq* and Crown Prince Salman bin Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa.[108] Seven points for democratic reform, announced by Crown Prince Salman in March 2011, served as the basis for discussion. On March 9, however, a hundred thousand Bahrainis protested in an anti-government rally led by Sheikh Isa Qassim, a leading Shia cleric, calling for the removal of the King and the release of political leaders. The protest ended peacefully, but when hundreds of youths marched to the Pearl roundabout, they were dispersed by security forces with tear gas.

In 2013, opposition activists called for protests on August 14, the 42nd anniversary of Bahrain Independence Day, and the 30-month anniversary of the uprising in 2011, despite warnings by the Ministry of Interior against "illegal demonstrations and activities that endanger security." Small protests continued through December, leading to arrests and home raids.

In 2014, a bomb blast during protests by Shias in Daih on March 3 killed three police officers (one from the UAE) and injured another. More than 20 suspects were arrested and the Cabinet designated certain protest groups as "terrorist organizations."

General elections were held on November 22,[109] with a second round on November 29 in constituencies where no candidate received 50 percent of the vote. The elections were boycotted by *Al Wefaq* which had 64 percent of the popular vote in 2010, but only eighteen seats due to manipulation of constituency boundaries. The government announced the voter turnout as 52.6 percent, although the opposition claimed it was only 30 percent. Independents won 37 of the 40 seats, with Sunni Islamists losing two of the five seats they had earlier held. The number of Shia MPs – all independents – fell to 14 due to *Al Wefaq's* boycott. Three women were elected, down from four in 2010.

IV Policy Recommendations

The absence of cultural homogeneity in a state is not necessarily debilitating. Belgium and Switzerland are not "nation-states," but both have effective consociational[110] structures. The U.S. is not a "nation-state": Waves of migrants from Europe and Latin America displaced indigenous peoples beginning in the 18th century before accommodating those who survived. Ten percent of the population derives from the slave trade, and slavery continued until the 13th Amendment to the Constitution in 1864. A conscious effort to promote "Americanization" through cultural assimilation

[107] http://www.lcil.cam.ac.uk/sites/default/files/LCIL/documents/arabspring/Bahrain_11_Report_ Bahrain_Independen_Commission_of_Inquiry.pdf.

[108] http://www.arabianbusiness.com/worried-bahrainis-seek-talks-as-clashes-worsen-443277.html [retrieved May 4, 2016].

[109] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bahraini_general_election,_2014#cite_note-:0-3 [retrieved May 4, 2016].

[110] Consociation is a political system formed by the cooperation of different, especially antagonistic, social groups on the basis of shared power. Oxford English Dictionary.

was pursued over the past century with success[111], although the assumed primacy of European post-Enlightenment values is now under stress in a more pluralistic society.

In the 20th and early 21st centuries, powerful authoritarian[112] or totalitarian[113] states like the USSR[114] between 1922 and 1991, Yugoslavia under Josip Broz Tito[115], Iraq under Saddam Hussein, or Syria under Hafez al-Assad, contained the centrifugal effects of cultural diversity[116] by using force and guile. The demise of each was followed by cultural fragmentation, with bloody wars in the Balkans between 1991 and 2001, as well as in parts of the former USSR[117], and continuing bloodshed in Iraq and Syria on an even larger scale. So, confronted with these conflicts today, how can we shape a successful neighborhood policy in the Middle East? This is easier said than done, but efforts to achieve it, must be informed by five principles:

1. Define each conflict – and its components – correctly

In his seminal text on *deep-seated* conflicts, John Burton noted:[118]

> "Conflicts which involve deep feelings, values and needs cannot be settled by an order from … outside authority.... These are conflicts which may seem endless, erupting into emotional displays and even violence from time to time, contained only by imprisonment or social, political and … military pressures. Containing serious conflicts, however, does not resolve them…. It tends to protract them."

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111 The achievements and the limits are well described in Glaser, Nathan and Moynihan, Daniel P., *Beyond the Melting Pot, 2nd Edition: The Negroes, Puerto Ricans, Jews, Italians, and Irish of New York City,* MIT and Harvard, 1970.

112 Authoritarianism is a form of government characterized by strong central power and limited political freedoms. Juan Linz's description of authoritarianism characterized authoritarian political systems by:

1. limited political pluralism; with constraints on political institutions;
2. legitimacy based on emotion, especially the identification of the regime as a necessary evil to combat dangerous societal problems;
3. minimal social mobilization because of constraints on political opposition and anti-regime activity, and
4. informally defined – and thus imprecise limits on – executive power.

[Linz, Juan J., "An Authoritarian Regime: The Case of Spain," in *Cleavages, Ideologies and Party Systems,* eds. Eric Allard & Yrjo Littunen, Helsinki: Academic, 1964].

113 Totalitarianism is characterized by the executive power in a state accepting no limits to its authority. Totalitarian regimes tend to be one-party systems, relying on propaganda disseminated through state-controlled mass media, political repression, control of the economy, regulation of speech, mass surveillance, and state repression. The concept was first developed by the Weimar German jurist, and later Nazi academic, Carl Schmitt, who used the term *Totalstaat* in his work on the legal basis of an all-powerful state, *Der Begriff des Politischen,* 1927.

114 The USSR was very ethnically diverse, with more than 100 distinct ethnic groups in a population estimated at 293 million in 1991; the majority Russians (50.78%), Ukrainians (15.45%), and Uzbeks (5.84%). All citizens of the USSR had an ethnic affiliation, chosen at the age of sixteen by the child's parents.

115 Tito was general secretary (later chairman of the Presidium) of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (1939–80) and led the Yugoslav Partisans (1941–45). After the war, he was prime minister (1944–63) and president (later president for life) (1953–80) of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

116 Culture comprises the characteristics and knowledge of a particular group, defined by language, religion, cuisine, social habits, music, and arts. It comprises shared patterns of behaviors and interactions, cognitive constructs and understanding learned by socialization, and enables a group identity fostered by social patterns unique to the group.

117 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Post-Soviet_conflicts [retrieved May 1, 2016]

118 John Burton, *Resolving Deep-Rooted Conflict: A Handbook, University Press of America,* 1987. Burton was Head of the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and later Head of the Center for the Analysis of Conflict at University College, London, and the Center for Conflict Resolution at George Mason University in Virginia.

These conflicts are driven by imperatives that defy rational analysis. Typically, they are enduring, lasting many generations[119] and, rarely, even centuries[120]. They are not initiated for reasons of state[121] by governments, but rather by family[122], ethnic, cultural or religious groups which perceive *threats to their identity or group security*. Analysis of group conflicts suggests four causes, in two broad categories: firstly, *exclusion from* (i) *political participation or* (ii) *economic access;* and secondly*, threat, whether intended by the aggressor or perceived by the group that sees itself as a victim, to that group's* (iii) *identity or* (iv) *security.*[123] The *enduring* group conflicts to which Burton referred are driven by threats to group identity and/or security.

Burton notes further:

> "…an incorrect definition of the cause of a serious conflict leads to the adoption of procedures of management ... inconsistent with the realities of that conflict …(and) … likely to be unsuccessful. If a conflict is caused by an unsuppressable need for identity and cultural security, but is defined as one stemming from aggressiveness, the likely outcome will be protracted ... conflict. Equally if a conflict stems from ... attempts to pursue ideological or leadership interests, but has been defined and treated as one based on legitimate aspirations, there could be outcomes that would threaten the societies involved, as well as global society."[124]

Burton argues that conflicts may be protracted "not necessarily because of their inherent complexities, but because of the ways in which they have been initially defined, and the means employed to manage them."[125]

Ethnic, racial, or religious diversity is not itself a cause of conflict. Claims by individuals and groups to political access or influence and economic opportunity are normally pursued through political institutions[126] and mediated through civil society[127], as in Switzerland or Belgium. But when there is acute social uncertainty because of sharp disparities, when the political system is exclusive or ineffective, and when civil society institutions have atrophied or been repressed, ethnic and

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[119] Examples would include conflicts in Cyprus, Angola, and between Israelis and Palestinians. Blood feuds in Sicily or KwaZulu illustrate the phenomenon at a local level and on a smaller scale.

[120] The Irish and Balkan conflicts would fall in this category.

[121] Cardinal Richelieu's famous phrase *raison d'Etat* indicated that an act undertaken by a state in pursuit of its legitimate interests was always appropriate. Such acts were not grounds for censure by other sovereigns.

[122] Typically family feuds involving revenge or "honor" killings continuing for generations.

[123] It is necessary to distinguish between disputes about interests (which can be negotiated), needs (which are ontological), and deeply held values (on which the parties will often not compromise). Such needs and values may include identity, group security, and recognition, and, in this context, political participation and distributive justice. Burton suggests that these are pursued "regardless of human costs and consequences."

[124] Burton op. cit., p. 21.

[125] Burton op. cit., p. 21.

[126] Political systems have six functions: (i) to allow for the expression of their needs and interests by all in the society, (ii) to aggregate similar needs and reconcile those which are divergent, (iii) to institutionalize a normative framework acceptable to all those participating in the system that facilitates such decisions; (iv) to formalize pre-eminent norms in the form of laws; (v) to execute and administer these laws; and (vi) to adjudicate disputes and transgressions when reconciliation is either impossible or inappropriate.

[127] Civil society refers to the civic and social organizations which form the voluntary basis of a functioning society, as opposed to the authority-backed structures of the state. The London School of Economics Centre for Civil Society defines it as follows: "Civil society refers to the arena of uncoerced collective action around shared interests, purposes and values. In theory, its institutional forms are distinct from those of the state, family and market, though in practice, the boundaries between state, civil society, family and market are often complex, blurred and negotiated. Civil society commonly embraces a diversity of spaces, actors and institutional forms, varying in their degree of formality, autonomy and power. Civil societies are often populated by organisations such as registered charities, development non-governmental organisations, community groups, women's organisations, faith-based organisations, professional associations, trade unions, self-help groups, social movements, business associations, coalitions and advocacy groups."

religious cleavages become a major societal fault-line, usually characterized by human rights abuses.

The Progression of Ethnic or Religious Conflicts

Define each Conflict – and its Components - Correctly



Source: Sean Cleary, Challenges and Dilemmas in respect of Dehumanization in Conflict, Diplomacy, Policymaking, and Conflict Resolution, Neuroscience and Social Conflict Initiative (meeting on Dehumanization in Conflict), 16-17 February 2013, Project on Justice in Times of Transition, SaxeLab Social Cognitive Science Laboratory, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge MA, 2013.

Ethnic[128] activists strengthen the preference of members of each group for ethnic activity, dividing societies to the point where groups may have little social contact with one another; political entrepreneurs and related, often unicultural[129] media mobilize their (ethnic) constituencies on the basis of political myths. These have some historical basis, though they are often distorted, perhaps deliberately, under the influence of nationalistic historians. Fear and resentment of the other defines each party. "Ethnic conflict is … fear of the future, lived in the past," observed Vesna Pesič[130], at the height of the war in the Balkans. These conflicts are sustained because of minimal inter-group communication, deep reciprocal mistrust and mutual incentives to pre-emptive violence.[131]

[128] The word "ethnic" is used in the remainder of this section as an inclusive concept pertaining to a population subgroup (within a larger or dominant national group) with a common national or cultural tradition. It thus expressly includes "sectarian" identities like Shia and Sunni.

[129] The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is interpreted for the two parties by Israeli media writing and broadcasting in Hebrew, and Palestinian and other Arab media doing the same in Arabic.

[130] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vesna_Pe%C5%A1i%C4%87 [retrieved May 6, 2016].

[131] More generally, see Gates, Nygård, Trappeniers, "Conflict Recurrence," *Conflict Trends* 2-2016, Peace Research Institute, Oslo: "Of the 259 armed conflicts identified by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), 159 recurred and 100 involved a new group or incompatibility. 135 different countries have experienced conflict

2. Use the appropriate instruments at the correct time

On February 26, 2016 the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 2268 (2016) to endorse the *Accord on the Cessation of Hostilities in Syria*.[132] The cessation did not apply to *Jabhat al-Nusrah*[133] and *ISIL*, or other terrorist organizations designated by the U.N. Security Council,[134] as the co-chairs intended military operations to continue against these organizations.

Diplomatic efforts to end the Syrian civil war are unlikely to succeed until the warring parties are exhausted by their violent efforts. It is usually "conflict weariness" – a sense that victory is not available at an acceptable cost – that brings armed conflicts to a close, rather than political solutions crafted by disinterested mediators.

William Zartman has long argued that conflicts must be "ripe" for resolution before substantive proposals will be accepted by the parties.[135] Referring to Kissinger (1974), who observed that "stalemate is the most propitious condition for settlement"[136], Zartman argues for three propositions:

- *Ripeness*[137] is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the initiation of negotiations, whether bilateral or mediated.
- Some, but not all parties, notably their military components, or their patrons, must perceive a *hurting stalemate*, and a *way out;* parties may then see an opportunity for victory in an alternative outcome prepared by negotiation, although some will be proven wrong.[138]

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recurrence, and the pattern is deepening. Recurring conflict is symptomatic of unaddressed grievances, and lasting peace will not be achieved until these issues are addressed."

132 The Accord is set out in the *Joint Statement by the United States and the Russian Federation*, co-chairs of the International Syria Support Group.

133 Jabhat al-Nusra, an al Qaeda affiliate, is reportedly laying the foundation of an Islamic emirate in northern Syria: http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/05/04/al-qaeda-is-about-to-establish-an-emirate-in-northern-syria/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=New%20Campaign&utm_term=Flashpoints [retrieved May 6, 2016].

134 http://www.rbs0.com/CF20160222.html [retrieved July 15, 2016]. Paragraph 3 of the *Joint Statement of the United States of America and the Russian Federation, as co-chairs of the International Syria Support Group*, provides: "Military actions, including airstrikes, of the Armed Forces of the Syrian Arab Republic, the Russian Armed Forces, and the U.S.-led Counter ISIL Coalition will continue against ISIL, 'Jabhat al-Nusra,' and other terrorist organizations designated by the U.N. Security Council. The Russian Federation and United States will also work together, and with other members of the Ceasefire Task Force, as appropriate and pursuant to the ISSG decision of February 11, 2016, to delineate the territory held by 'Da'esh,' 'Jabhat al-Nusra' and other terrorist organizations designated by the U.N. Security Council, which are excluded from the cessation of hostilities."

135 I. William Zartman, "Ripeness: The Hurting Stalemate and Beyond," in *International Conflict Resolution after the Cold War,* The National Academies Press, 2000. http://www.nap.edu/read/9897/chapter/7 [retrieved July 15, 2016].

136 See also: "In his parting report, Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations Marrack Goulding (1997:20) specifically cited the literature on ripeness in discussing the selection of conflicts to be handled by an overburdened U.N.: 'Not all conflicts are "ripe" for action by the United Nations (or any other third party)…. It therefore behooves the Secretary-General to be selective and to recommend action only in situations where he judges that the investment of scarce resources is likely to produce a good return (in terms of preventing, managing and resolving conflict).'", Zartman, op. cit., p. 234.

137 "The concept of a ripe moment centers on the parties' perception of a mutually hurting stalemate (MHS), optimally associated with an impending, past, or recently avoided catastrophe (Zartman and Berman, 1982; Zartman, 1983, 1985/ 1989; Touval and Zartman, 1985). The idea behind the concept is that, when the parties find themselves locked in a conflict from which they cannot escalate to victory and this deadlock is painful to both of them (although not necessarily in equal degrees or for the same reasons), they seek a way out. The catastrophe provides a deadline or a lesson indicating that pain can be sharply increased if something is not done about it now; catastrophe is a useful extension of the notion of an MHS but is not necessary to either its definition or its existence.", Zartman op. cit., p. 228.

138 Zartman, op. cit, p. 235, citing Stedman (1991).

- (At a second level), the presence of strong leadership of each party, able to deliver its compliance to an agreement, is a necessary (though insufficient) condition.[139]

The Progression of Ethnic and Religious Conflicts



Source: I. William Zartman, Ripeness: The Hurting Stalemate and Beyond, Ch. VII, fig. 6.1, International Conflict Resolution after the Cold War, The National Academies Press, 2000.

At present, no actor can enforce its preferred solution.[140] Saudi Arabia and Turkey sought to unseat President Assad but their weakness was exploited by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard and Hezbollah. Western aid to the (Sunni) anti-Assad rebels was ineffective. *ISIL/Da'esh* has been contained and weakened by Western, Arab and Russian air strikes and *Peshmerga* ground offensives. Russia's military strikes shifted the balance of power in favor of the Syrian government, but has not destroyed the opposition. The parties are not yet experiencing a "mutually hurting stalemate," and the government does not see a "way out," especially for Assad. President Assad and his military may now believe in a possible victory, and seem determined to seek it.

Outside forces have some leverage. Russia has shown its capability, having preserved its strategic assets at Tartus[141], built up its Mediterranean fleet, and used air operations to enable Syrian forces to retake Palmyra in March 2016. Putin's announcement of his withdrawal of forces underscored Moscow's ability to frustrate any outcome inconsistent with its interests. Turkey is in a difficult position, having supported rebel groups from the outset. Its porous border exposes it to terrorist attacks, and the flood of refugees from the fighting has a high economic cost. Turkey has confronted Iran in Syria, underscoring Sunni-Shia fault lines and Turkish-Iranian geopolitical rivalry. It can ill afford Iranian support for Kurdish militias, notably the PKK, which constitutes a security threat. Ankara's decision to down a Russian fighter aircraft in November 2015 was a miscalculation.

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139 Zartman, op. cit. pp. 235–236, citing Stedman (1991) and Lieberfeld (1999 a and b).

140 Inbar, Ephrahim, The Syrian Civil War: An Interim Balance Sheet, BESA Center Perspectives. April 6, 2016, http://www.meforum.org/5948/syria-civil-war-balance-sheet [retrieved May 6, 2016].

141 http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/syria/tartous.htm [retrieved May 6, 2016].

The direction of the country's evolution under Recep Tayyip Erdogan's presidency is likewise uncertain.

The situations in Iraq and Yemen also show few signs of "ripeness." Well-coordinated programs combining military and diplomatic instruments should, however, be directed to promoting this.[142] Bahrain is probably capable of resolution with the support of the KSA, and responsible undertakings from Iran.

3. Craft an appropriate policy for each conflict, and an integrating concept

Each conflict requires a specific approach to management and resolution, but two principles provide an *integrating concept* in each case: (a) The core interests of all relevant parties[143] – local, regional, and external – must be accommodated in an integrative, potentially sustainable solution; and (b) local interests must enjoy priority over those of outside powers, to enable sustainable solutions.

- In Iraq, the relevant local parties are (a) the government of Iraq; (b) the Shia communities who suffered under Ba'athist rule; (c) the Sunni communities which have felt threatened since the destruction of Ba'athist structures; and (d) the Kurdish communities that suffered under Ba'athist rule, and have played significant roles since 2003. The relevant outside powers are the U.S., Iran, and Turkey.
- In Syria, the relevant local parties are (a) the government of Syria; (b) organized Syrian communities of all ethnic and sectarian affiliations, and secular communities that suffered under Assad's brutal attempts to crush the rebellion; (c) the communities that have suffered under *ISIL/Da'esh* occupation; (d) the Kurdish communities that have played significant roles since 2012. The relevant outside powers are the U.S., Russia, Turkey, and Iran.
- In Yemen, the relevant local parties are (a) Yemenis loyal to President Abd Rabbuh Mansur al-Hadi who won 99.8 percent of the vote in 2012, and served as president from February 25, 2012 until he was deposed illegally on January 20, 2015 by Houthi insurgents; (b) Zaidi Shias who are part of the Houthi rebellion; (c) Yemenis loyal to former President Ali Abdullah Saleh Al-Sanhani Al-Humairi (1990–2012). The relevant outside powers are the KSA, the U.S., and Iran.
- In Bahrain, the relevant local parties are (a) the government of Bahrain; (b) the Shia political parties that have participated in governmental institutions and civic organizations since 2002, notably *Al Wefaq* and *Amal al-Islām*; and (c) those – Sunni and Shia alike – who gathered as "Independents" to support dialogue, and stand for representation in Parliament. The relevant outside powers are the KSA, the U.S., and Iran.

Where possible, the outside powers should agree on formulae with the potential to resolve the conflict, before convening the local parties. As several outside powers – the U.S., the KSA, and Iran – have a stake in each conflict, it is in their collective interests to establish formal but flexible channels of conversation to clarify their interests, and enable progress to resolution. In Syria, Russia and Turkey must be part of these talks. The co-chairmanship of the U.S. and Russia of the *International Syria Support Group* provides a working template.

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[142] Peace agreements guaranteed by peacekeepers are much more likely to prevent wars from recurring in the years immediately following war. In the long run, political reforms are necessary to ensure durable peace. Conflict Recurrence Peace Research Institute Oslo (op. cit).

[143] A "relevant" party is one with the capacity to prevent or destroy a program otherwise capable of resolving the conflict.

Additional resources are needed. The rapid increase in refugee flows in 2015 has strained the humanitarian regime and the reception systems of states, and called into question the protections afforded to refugees. Some 60 million people are displaced around the world, due primarily to violent conflicts, and displaced populations are more mobile because of new means of transportation and communication. Official development assistance (ODA) for conflict prevention and resolution, peace and security (CPS) is needed to prevent and resolve conflict, support the transition from conflict to peace, and lay the foundation for reconstruction. The resources are far too small. In 2014, CPS comprised US$3.2 billion, 1.9 percent of ODA.[144] While ODA spent on CPS-related activities may be a little larger[145], more resources are needed.

4. Prepare for integrated post-conflict reconstruction

Sustained, violent inter-group conflict causes death and economic destruction, delegitimizes political and legal institutions, fractures the bonds of trust that permit cooperative behavior, and induces social trauma. The challenge of *post-conflict reconstruction*, originally conceived as the restoration of economic activity in the aftermath of conflict[146], goes well beyond what development officials are equipped to address. Apart from restoring *economic activity*[147] and (re)constructing *political institutions* with society-wide legitimacy, means must be found to rebuild a *sense of community,* and *social and institutional legitimacy.*

The Challenge of Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Recreating Working Institutions



Source: Sean Cleary, Cognitive Distortions in the Appreciation of Risk and the Manifestation of Prejudice, Parmenides Foundation Faculty Meeting, Starnberg, Germany, October 24, 2005.

144 Development Initiatives, Aid spending on conflict prevention and resolution, peace and security, April 2016 http://devinit.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Aid-spending-on-conflict-peace-and-security_factsheet.pdf [retrieved July 15, 2016].

145 Some may be included in other categories in the OECD Development Assistance Committee's reporting system, from which these figures are drawn.

146 Although the World Bank, in its original incarnation as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, was created to address this challenge, especially in war-torn Europe, it introduced the term "post-conflict reconstruction" in 1997, in a seminal paper entitled "A Framework for World Bank Involvement in Post-Conflict Reconstruction", Washington DC, April 1997.

147 Typically rebuilding damaged infrastructure, rehabilitating the primary and secondary sectors, and restoring urban and rural markets and financial services.

Without success in this realm, neither the legislature, the executive authority, nor the courts will be trusted nor able to function effectively. In facilitating the reconstruction of *community*, one must recognize the personal trauma suffered by many directly affected by conflict. Post-traumatic stress disorders and neuroses are common, and psychoses not infrequent. Many combatants have indulged in behavior deemed psychopathic in more normal times. Reintegrating former combatants into civilian society, poses a far greater challenge than teaching them civilian skills.

Poor understanding of the need for an integrated approach vitiated success. As Western governments and multilateral institutions do not know how address the trauma caused by sustained, violent conflict[148], and as resources are scarce, they focus on political and economic reconstruction. The efforts of the occupation forces in Afghanistan and Iraq to restore basic infrastructure services and oil delivery, and to install, in conditions of civil war, democratically-elected governments, make the inadequacy of these efforts all too clear.

5. Facilitate the emergence of sub-regional economic and security institutions

A sustainable solution requires the states of the region to recognize overarching interests and agree to be bound by common rules. The challenge lies in clarifying these interests, and defining the rules for constructive inter-state behavior. This requires a *Regional Security Framework* to provide a collaborative space in which to clarify interests, define appropriate behavior, and allow states to share intelligence, resolve disputes and build confidence. Those who seek stability and progress must work on constructing such a framework.[149]

While this agenda is extensive, executing it is necessary if these conflicts, driven by weak states, divisive sub-national identities, and utopian myths, are not to spawn new waves of radicalism and fanaticism.

The first step should be a joint initiative by the U.S., the E.U. and Russia – after agreement on the parameters – to engage collaboratively with the KSA and Iran to contain, manage, and work to resolve these conflicts. Further confidence-building measures on Iran's nuclear intentions may be necessary. Progress would allow for Turkey's constructive engagement, and, over time, inclusion of Israel in a comprehensive peace between Israel and the Arab states, under the Arab Peace Plan, and enable Israel's recognition by Iran.

Painstaking work will be necessary to address each conflict, and to craft the reconstruction of state and community in each environment. The borders of states in the region established over the last century, may not survive.[150] Human history is a panorama of shifting identities and territories, often with unfortunate consequences for those caught in the melee. But one should not open Pandora's Box lightly, and the political geography of states is the proper construct for efforts to stabilize and rebuild the region today.

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148 This lack of comprehension is institutional, not personal. Many employees have deep insight into the issues, but are unable to influence organizational outcomes.

149 This is no new thought – see http://english.alarabiya.net/views/2011/07/12/157229.html; http://www.alarabiya.net/views/2011/07/05/156128.html, and http://english.alarabiya.net/views/2011/07/29/159872.html [retrieved May 6, 2016].

150 The circumstances of the Kurds will need to be addressed, which risks opening up the plight of the Armenians. These issues still undermine stability in the Caucasus, and engage the interests of Turkey and Russia, as well as Azerbaijan. Since the end of the Nagorno-Karabakh War in 1994, representatives of the governments of Armenia and Azerbaijan have engaged in perfunctory talks mediated by the OSCE Minsk Group on disputed status of territory in the region.

To allow the major regional states to engage constructively, a new paradigm is needed, one that abandons the institutional dependency of Arab states, and Israel, on foreign *big powers*, and avoids its replacement by sectarian geopolitics[151]. Regional stability is only possible if all states recognize and accept their individual and collective responsibility to craft and maintain peace, and create conditions for progress, in the Middle East.

A central pillar of the modern era was created when treaties embodying the Peace of Westphalia[152], were signed in 1648, building on the Peace of Augsburg[153] of 1555, to end a century of religious wars and establish the basis of the nation-state. Europe's reconstruction after the Napoleonic Wars was effected at the Congress of Vienna[154] in 1815, largely through Metternich's conservative vision and Castlereagh's prudence; its rebirth after the devastation of World War II was due to the vision of Jean Monnet and the political courage of French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman in proposing the creation of the *European Coal and Steel Community* in 1950, to unite France and Germany, so as to make another European war "not only unthinkable, but materially impossible."[155]

We need visionaries of that sort today, to create the future in the Middle East.[156]

[151] The term is used loosely here to denote the use of political power in relation to geographic space.

[152] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peace_of_Westphalia [retrieved May 6, 2016].

[153] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peace_of_Augsburg [retrieved May 6, 2016].

[154] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Congress_of_Vienna [retrieved May 6, 2016].

[155] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Economic_Community [retrieved May 6, 2016].

[156] http://english.alarabiya.net/views/2011/07/12/157229.html [retrieved May 6, 2016].

Learning from an Asian Neighborhood Policy: Living with a Dragon Next Door

Kerry Brown

I Introduction

Under X i Jinping, Chinese Communist Party chief and the country's president, China has gone even deeper since 2012 into what can be described as a highly activist, more confident, and sometimes more assertive foreign policy posture. The ways in which this stance has manifested itself have ranged from positive (China's mediating role in the negotiations with Iran over ending its nuclear weapons plans in 2014 and 2015) to troubling (its increasingly vocal and aggressive stand on the South and East China Seas issues). This stance has raised new questions in the region about what to do with a country which offers economic opportunities because of the vastness and potential of its domestic market and investment, but also huge security and political challenges. China, after all, remains a country where one Party has a monopoly on power, and one whose foreign policy outlook is often driven by resentment.

In this context, Xi has articulated large narratives for China's role in the world as it becomes a middle income, more prosperous, and developed economic and geopolitical actor. From "major power" relations with the United States, to "civilizational partners" with the European Union, to the vast One Belt, One Road initiative, Xi has attempted, in his own words, to tell the China story. That story, however, is not one that is wholly reassuring for many in the region and the wider world. And the closer countries are to China, the more this issue of their divided allegiances – deepening economic links to China, security and political ties elsewhere (usually with the US) – raises its head. It is clear that China's principle short to medium-term objective is to have greater say and autonomy in its region. This essay will look more closely at what conclusions Europe might draw from the ways in which those closest to China and most impacted by its newfound influence and power are reacting to this conundrum.

II China's Regional Role

It seems an anomaly: A country that has made peaceful co-existence and non-interference in the affairs of others the main mantras of its foreign policy since its establishment as the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949 has, since the late 2000s, been increasingly accused of assertiveness, aggression, and an overarching design to exercise dominance in the Asian region, which it sits at the heart of. Why is it that a China that says it stands against hegemony, wants win-win outcomes for itself with the rest of the world, and invites everyone to celebrate and work with its peaceful rise seems to act against these stated principles when it, for instance, asserts the nine-dash line in the South China Sea, claims territories that stretch into maritime territory thousands of miles from its southern coasts, and resists any attempts to negotiate or use international law to reach a compromise on its position?

First of all, some context needs to be given. As of 2016, China is the second largest economy in the world, and in most economic and developmental indicators stands at the head, or close to the top, of most tables. Globally the largest exporter, second largest importer, and largest holder of foreign reserves, it therefore has – since introducing reforms and opening up in 1978 – acquired a huge diplomatic relevance and force it never had before. Through this it has also acquired confidence and a sense of historic mission – something that Xi's predecessor Hu Jintao started referring to a decade before. Its moment of being able to reacquire its position as a country with

high status and commensurate political clout, one free forever from again being a victim of colonial bullying, is almost within reach. Xi has appealed to this nationalist mission far more explicitly than leaders before him, for instance with his talk, since 2013, of a China Dream. China's "renaissance" and rejuvenation, as it has been called by senior foreign policy advisors like Zheng Bijian, has become a major mobilizing theme for Xi and his fellow leaders in a country where the economic narrative of recent years has been less compelling as growth has started to slow down. With the various environmental, developmental, and social challenges likely to face China as it tries to achieve middle income status by 2021, this resort to nationalist appeal is unlikely to weaken. It provides the route to a new source of legitimacy for the Party-state.

Second, there is a clear sense – derived from this new economic prominence – of China thinking that it is not only able, but entitled, to have a strategic space around it. As the world's second largest economy, it feels that it should be allowed greater freedom, at least within its own region, to operate without the constant fear of containment, or interference, in particular by the US. The Chinese academic Wang Hui has talked of the way in which the borders of the United States "almost come up to the borders of China."[1] America's treaty-based alliances with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and others create something akin to a great "Pacific Wall," which dominates the space as China looks east. Xi was contesting this when he spoke of "the vast Pacific Ocean" which "has enough space for the two large countries of China and the United States" on visiting the US in mid-2013.[2] This Chinese sense of frustration at America's ubiquity is compounded by its dominance of the seaways. It has 15 aircraft carriers; China has only one. It has military installations and alliances that crisscross the area around China. There is a sense in which, since the mid-2000s, China has been carefully, but very deliberately, trying to question and contest this, but in ways which avoid any chance of direct military conflict, where America's power is still overwhelmingly superior to China's.

III Strategic Considerations

Does China have a specific Asian-region strategy from which the EU and others can learn? It would be logical to think that, because of geographical proximity, Asian countries would have the most vested interest in having a regional policy, even if they do not have a broader coherent specific international policy.

Some would say that China's regional approach is very easy to summarize: It is trying to build an alternative kind of arrangement against the US and its military dominance referred to above – an arrangement which on the surface is based on economic links and dependencies, but which is driven underneath by political aims supportive of Chinese influence and power. China is the principal trading partner of most countries in the region, and is the region's largest, fastest-growing market. This remains China's largest asset, and one that its leaders are increasingly aware of. Through entities like the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), which currently has 56 members, the key policy makers in Beijing have tried under Xi to give greater structure to this economic imperium, inviting neighboring states to think more about how they can engage with, and benefit from, China's economic dynamism and potential for growth.

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1 Wang Hui, *The End of the Revolution: China and the Limits of Modernity*, London: Verso Books, 2010.

2 Office of the Press Secretary, White House, "Remarks by President Obama and President Xi Jinping of the People's Republic of China Before Bilateral Meeting," June 7, 2013. Https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/07/remarks-president-obama-and-president-xi-jinping-peoples-republic-china-.

That there is also an underlying and less benign political narrative is clear enough. This could be seen, for instance, in the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) retracting its communiqué in June 2016, reportedly under Chinese pressure, since the original draft had language, later redacted, about the fears of militarization of the South China Sea area.[3] Similarly, any moves in the region to show support for Taiwan, or Tibet, or other issues on which Beijing is sensitive, are met with at best harsh language, and at worst attempts at diplomatic and economic reprisals. China's use of informal bans on exports of rare minerals after arguments with Japan in 2010 concerning the disputed Senakaku/Diaoyutai islands is one example of this. And while it is unclear just how much such sanctions achieve, they certainly create enough uncertainty and doubt to make regional countries cautious in their management of issues that matter to China.

What China's rising influence in the region does prove is that partners have to differentiate increasingly starkly between, on the one hand, preserving their economic, China-related interests and, on the other, trying to balance these with their security concerns. For Japan, there has been a radical and dramatic shift, namely from being a major partner for investment and technology transfer during the early years of Chinese reform in the 1980s, to a retrenchment beginning in the late 2000s as tensions have increased, deriving from arguments over maritime borders and the East China Sea, and management of the memories of World War II. Japanese investment in China has decreased, and its trade figures have leveled out. Part of this might solely be due to Japan's own longstanding economic issues. But according to one official speaking in 2016 to the author, there is increasing sentiment in the Japanese government and bureaucracy that strategic engagement with China in order to promote political change along with economic modernization has clearly proved erroneous. This echoes critiques in the US about the failure of this form of engagement.



[3] Chun Han Wong, "ASEAN Members Walk Back Statement on South China Sea," June 15, 2016, http://www.wsj.com/articles/asean-members-walk-back-statement-on-south-china-sea-1465924238.

One metaphor for explaining this constant need to balance security and economic interests is that of two dials. There is an economic dial, which has to constantly be calibrated and changed in order to respond to the security dial. Too much economic dependence or exposure to China could lead to outcomes that run contrary to security considerations. In this context, the South and East China Seas figure as a theater of Chinese aspiration – a place where the true image of Chinese ambitions can be seen and the real underlying drivers of its foreign policy divined. The right it claims to territories in the seas around it must be seen in a context dominated by the rectification of historic injustices and the sense of regeneration China now feels, rather than one in which international law or negotiation figures greatly. In some senses, the attitude of the Chinese government over the South and East China Seas is almost pre-modern, ignoring the attempt to create global rules-based means to resolve territorial issues and instead stressing the primacy of China's historic dominance (itself a highly contested concept).

Because of this stark difference in mindset between China and many of its neighbors, it is hard for democracies living around it, from South Korea, to Japan, to the Philippines, to truly relax into a posture where pursuing economic matters can be the sole objective. In the end, this posture would deny the fact that China's strategic objectives are different because of the way they function in this narrative of national rejuvenation and in the ultimate assertion of China's dominant regional role. Fully realizing these objectives would carry costs for those around China. The fact that China is a non-democratic political system only compounds this. It cuts against the aspirations for modernity that many Asian countries harbor.

IV The Issue of Taiwan and the Testing of Alliances

There is one final strategic issue that needs to be factored in here: the clear statement by Beijing that it is aiming, eventually, for reunification with the island of Taiwan. Of all the issues in the region, this is potentially the most incendiary. Cross-Strait relations remain subject to an uneasy political truce, with the Chinese clearly aiming to gain increased economic leverage over the island, and the island government trying to both enjoy gains from engaging economically with the mainland, while at the same time preserving its autonomy and international space. A form of détente under Hu Jintao with the Ma Ying-jeou administration in Taipei resulted in the restoration of direct air links, postal links, and huge increases in tourists visiting Taiwan. But under Xi, the tone has become more assertive, with his stating to one Taiwanese interlocutor in 2014 that the two sides in the dispute could not speak indefinitely and "hand those problems down from generation to generation."[4] This new sense of urgency may have supplied the impetus that led to the unprecedented summit between Xi and former president Ma in November 2015 in Singapore. This reinforces the sense of historic restoration and destiny that Xi has increasingly referred to.

Resolving the Taiwan issue is utterly central to the way Chinese leaders understand the historic mission of their country. The Taiwan issue is therefore at the very center of China's strategy for the South and East China Seas. Agitating over the islands defines a clear area of influence around Taiwan, and in that sense closes its space in even more dramatically. For some, like Australian analyst Hugo White, the whole tactic of China is to use actions of proxy agents like civilians, life guards, and fishing boats in order to test the real resolve of the US and its allies in standing by Taiwan.[5] Close economic links mean that countries that in the past would have unilaterally supported Taiwan are now in a more ambiguous position. The US itself has a commitment based

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4 Xinhua, "Xi Meets Taiwan Politician Ahead of APEC Gathering," October 6, 2013, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-10/06/c_132775470.htm.

5 See Hugh White, *The China Choice: Why We Should Share Power,* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.

on the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 to engage in some process to aid Taiwan should it be the subject of attack. Even so, China is well aware that the costs now of opposing its attempt to reunify with Taiwan, should it ever decide to pursue a more aggressive stance and demand action on reunification, are higher than ever for other players. China has therefore raised questions about the alliances in the region, and, where there was once a high level of certainty and cohesion regarding the alliances, created much more ambiguity and doubt. It knows that its soft power and charm offensives have not, and probably never will, make its neighbors love it and stand by it. But it simply wants their passivity regarding an issue like forcing discussion on reunification onto the negotiating table to a much greater degree.

V Dealing with Chinese Insecurity: The Need for Strategic Flexibility

Countries like South Korea and Japan, who were important partners in the early phase of China's economic development, have learned that the simple equation – economic change would lead to political change at some point – has so far proved, at best, very optimistic and, at worst, misguided. There are others too who are now questioning the basis of strategic engagement – working with a Communist China in the hope that it will eventually become a more liberal, more pluralistic polity, on its way to full democracy. For them, the arguments supporting Chinese entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 and its hosting of the 2008 Olympics – namely, that engagement in soft cultural or economic areas would lead to change in the political and security realm – have been disproved.[6]

The PRC under Xi has so far grown not less but more illiberal in the political realm. Extending the language from the late era of Hu Jintao, the main talk has been to oppose all forms of political reform. An internal communication leaked from the Party ideological management apparatus in April 2013, Document No. 9, told university teachers to not discuss western bicameral parliamentary systems, multi-party elections and notions of universalism, amongst other ills it regarded as pernicious ideas from the sullied outside world.[7] Rights lawyers were rounded up, with some tried and others threatened in 2015 and 2016. Five Hong Kong booksellers were abducted, inside and outside China, by state security agents in the same period. All the while, a tightening of the ideological space continued, with officials urged to adhere to the prevailing Party line and to observe greater vigilance against capitalism and thought contamination. The net result of this has been to exacerbate rather than reduce the security-economic dilemma for the outsiders referred to above. Now the task of calibrating and harmonizing the two dials has become even more challenging.

VI Looking at the Core Regional Relations

Across the region countries have taken widely different postures on how to deal with this dilemma. The one thing that they have not done, however, is to act in a more unified manner with each other, despite China's own conviction that a strategy of containment is happening. This can be evidenced in the case of the South China Sea where there is almost no unity between the different countries involved in disputes with China over how best to respond. Vietnam has engaged in its own incremental domination of sea space; the Philippines has taken its case to the International Court of Arbitration; Malaysia and Indonesia have simply been involved in sporadic sea clashes. Rarely

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6 An example of a highly optimistic statement of this can be found in Michael A. Santoro, *China 2020: How Western Business Can, and Should, Influence Social and Political Change in the Coming Decade,* Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2009.

7 See "Document 9: A ChinaFile Translation," https://www.chinafile.com/document-9-chinafile-translation.

have the various parties tried to create a unified position on which they can then push back at China.

1. Japan

Japan is the most difficult regional relationship. Japan is still the world's third largest economy. It figured as China's most generous donor of aid and technology over the early decade of the Reform and Opening Up era after 1978. Companies like Toyota, Sony, and Hitachi have major operations in China. Japan ranked as the largest foreign investor and one of China's largest trading partners. From 2001, however, under Prime Minister Junichiro Kozuimi, the two countries started to experience increasing political tensions. Part of this was the result of patriotic education campaigns undertaken in China from the early 1990s which placed awareness of the humiliations and sufferings Chinese suffered in World War II at the center of the secondary school curriculum. Chinese irritation was increased by the moves within Japan to deny or simply gloss over the war history. Kozuimi himself insisted on visiting the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo where war criminals are buried, an event that inflamed Chinese leaders to such an extent that a freeze was placed on top-level contact until the visit of Hu Jintao in 2008. By 2010, however, clashes over the Senkaku/Diaoyotai islands caused relations to deteriorate once more. Xi Jinping has yet to visit Tokyo since becoming Party leader in late 2012, and Shinzo Abe has yet to come to Beijing.

Japan's strategic response has been, as already stated, to reduce its exposure in terms of investment in and trade with China. Japanese investment in the US and the EU, as well as ASEAN, has risen. Japan did not join the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and has deepened its security commitments with the US, witnessing an American president's first ever visit to the Hiroshima nuclear bomb memorial in June 2016. This incremental, tactical disengagement with China has involved Japan diversifying its links with other partners in the region and globally. Despite this, it has seen a huge rise in tourists visiting from China.

2. India

For India, the complexity in its relations with China comes not from maritime disputes, but from its unresolved land border arguments. A war in 1962 which China won still figures painfully within Indian memory, along with the continuing role that India plays in hosting the exiled Tibetan religious leader, the Dalai Lama. But India's prime interest since Narendra Modi was elected in 2014 is to see greater economic linkages. The relationship at the moment is underwhelming for two such large and quickly growing markets. India imports three times more than it exports to China, with an economy that is only one-third of the size of its neighbor. Despite its dominance in the hi-tech sector, in most other areas it runs far behind China in terms of manufacturing and industry. It lacks the physical infrastructure and the capital investments in fixed assets which have made China a more attractive destination for foreign investment since the 1980s.

India since the mid 2000s has sporadically intensified its relations with the US, creating unease in Beijing. Levels of mutual distrust, despite the clear warmth between Modi and Xi, mean that it is hard for them to articulate a shared security vision. For India, too, China's deep involvement in Pakistan is a further issue. Both powers clearly understand the benefits of having better economic links, and a common economic area. But they also have longstanding causes of mistrust and division. And both are prone to strong public expressions of nationalism.

3. Pakistan

Pakistan is China's longest standing regional ally. The relationship has been described as one that is closer than "lips and teeth." But Pakistan's tensions with India mean that China has to constantly avoid being pulled into the middle of a fractious and unpredictable relationship. For this reason, Xi visited both countries on the same foreign trip in 2015. In Pakistan he announced US$ 46 billion in aid and trade deals. Pakistan figures heavily in the One Belt, One Road initiative (see below). Almost uniquely, it is a security ally of China through its role in cooperating over extremist Uyghur groups which China blames for separatism and terrorist attacks within China. But Pakistan is regarded as an often fickle and unstable partner, and one that also maintains close links with the US.

4. Vietnam

Vietnam last had a military conflict with China in 1979, the most recent combat experience for the Chinese military. In 2014, as a result of the use of a massive sea-exploration platform within contested waters in the South China Sea by China, there were riots within Vietnam and vandalism against companies and investments seen to be Chinese (some were, in fact, Taiwanese). The two countries have a long history of tensions. In the Vietnam War from 1965, the North Vietnamese received generous aid and assistance, and military help, from China in their struggle against the US and South Vietnamese. Despite this, since 1975 the two countries have had a number of clashes, with the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1978–1979 one of the worst examples of Vietnam, in China's opinion, acting against its interests.

5. ASEAN

With ASEAN (The Association of South East Asian Nations), the ambiguity of China's regional position is brought into the most intense focus. Of the ten members of this regional forum, Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Vietnam all are disputants with China over the South China Sea. Their relations with the People's Republic range from pragmatic (that of Singapore), to fraught (the Philippines, because of the case it has been pursuing since 2015 at the International Court of Arbitration in the Hague). China signed a free trade agreement with ASEAN in 2004. Despite this, its trade volumes vary across the region, constituting over a third of Laos' trade in 2014, to only 3 percent of Brunei's. As it proved with the rewritten ASEAN summit communiqué in 2016 referred to above, China is well able to pick apart internal divisions within the ASEAN bloc.

Trade Relations between ASEAN Members and China



*2013 data **2010 data

Source: Trademap, Market Analysis and Research, Geneva 2015. © Stratfor 2015. www.stratfor.com.

6. South Korea

The final major regional partner is South Korea. South Korea under President Park Geun-hye has enjoyed largely positive relations with China and, in contrast to previous practice, Xi made a visit to Seoul early in his tenure. He has yet to visit Pyongyang in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) as of June 2016, ostensibly a much closer partner. South Korea has strong trade relations with China, and good investment links. Both signed a free trade agreement in 2015, with China figuring as South Korea's largest trading partner, and South Korea ranked third in China's overseas markets. Despite this, South Korea, still hosting 36,000 US troops, has to constantly balance its clear security alliance with the US against its exposure to the Chinese economy.

VII One Belt, One Road

China's own framework within which it is trying to place itself in the region is the One Belt, One Road story, something that grew from talk of the New Silk Road which Xi referred to during a visit to Central Asia in 2014. That idea was very clearly about how to secure from China's western neighbors at least some common understanding of their economic linkages to the PRC. In a White Paper on the concept in 2015, the main thrust was on creating commonalities in terms of connectivity and infrastructure and ensuring that there were strong information and investment flows.[8]

[8] See "Full text: Action Plan on the Belt and Road Initiative," State Council of the Chinese Government, March 30, 2015, http://english.gov.cn/archive/publications/2015/03/30/content_281475080249035.htm.

Domestically, the initiative (this somewhat abstract descriptor is required because it is not actually a formal policy, and does not have any single implementing agency responsible for its fulfillment) has been linked to the attempt, from 2000, to open up the western regions of the country. For the 11 provinces and autonomous regions involved (including Tibet and Xinjiang), there were anxieties by the central government about the ways in which they had grown increasingly remote from the more economically successful coastal provinces, which were at the heart of the manufacturing boom being experienced then. Despite the fact that western China has over half of the country's landmass and contains a third of its population, its infrastructure was poor, state industries more dominant, and wealth levels lagging far behind those in the east.

The original idea was that coastal provinces would partner with western ones and funnel investment towards them. Zhejiang province therefore acted as the sister province to Tibet, sending business delegations and building factories and projects in the autonomous region. There were limits to this model, however, because the synergies between provinces could be very remote. The One Belt, One Road initiative looks at the economies closest to the western regions, in Central Asia and South Asia in particular. The idea now extends as far as Eastern Europe and embraces the Middle East, and runs, via the maritime road, down to Indonesia and Australia.

Critics have pointed out that apart from the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, there has been little practical action behind the grand rhetoric of the initiative. What is even clearer is that there have been traces of a more ancient Chinese view to the region associated with it, one in which Beijing views itself as the central partner and other countries almost as tributary or vassal states. This assertion of its return to an historic dominance is matched by the use of language about historic mission, and of China undergoing a renaissance and restoration of its core political role as referred to above. The most one can say is that the One Belt, One Road initiative shows ambition. But is the reality behind it benign, or more disruptive and domineering? It is too early to say.

One Belt, One Road Region



Source: Sander Denecker. China's 'One Belt One Road' Strategy. http://insight.amcham-shanghai.org/chinas-one-belt-one-road-strategy [retrieved July 19, 2016].

VIII The Region Working Out China's Role for the World

China impacts directly on the countries around it in ways which are far more immediate and visible than, for instance, in its role in Africa, Europe, or Latin America. There it is more remote and evidence for the tenor of its behavior weaker and less easy to interpret.

However, before leaping to an easy narrative in which China is exposing its desire for greater dominance in Asia, it has to be borne in mind that the country's geography is very difficult. It has 14 neighbors, of which four are nuclear powers. With one of them (India) it has contested land borders. Only with the DPRK does it have a treaty alliance. It lives in a region of uncertainty, where relations are best regarded as transactional, rather than based on common values and aspirations. Talk at the 2015 Boao Forum in Hainan of China being at the center of a regional vision of common destiny is clearly not shared by key partners like Japan, Indonesia, Vietnam, or even India.

China's pragmatism is both a strength and a weakness. In the claims over the South China Sea it resists acceptance of international law, asserting the primacy of historic claims underpinned by perceptions of its own rising military ability. "Perceptions" is an important word to stress here. For all the new technology China has spent on its hard power, it has not seen combat experience since 1979. It is therefore a highly inexperienced military player.

Contesting Claims for the South China Seas



Source: David Rosenberg. The South China Sea. http://www.southchinasea.org [retrieved July 19, 2016].

The other qualifier to throw into this mix is the simple fact that from 1949 to 1979, when China was economically weak and impoverished and largely diplomatically isolated, it engaged in a series of wars, from the Korean War from 1950 to 1953, to the wars with India in 1962, Russia in 1969, and

Vietnam in 1979. Since then, as it has grown stronger and more important, it has desisted from external fights. Its aggression, when it has been seen, has been in the realm of diplomacy, words, and skirmishes, not actual actions. A stronger China has therefore, at least historically, been a less bellicose one.

No country in the region has satisfactorily answered the question of how they balance the security-economic quandary with China. Instead, each offers a range of responses, from disengagement (Japan) to strategic ambiguity (Singapore) and prioritization of security over economics (Vietnam). China's attempts to articulate a region-wide vision for its role in the One Belt, One Road initiative have so far proved unconvincing.

IX Policy Conclusions for the EU

Looking at this, the EU can only draw the following simple conclusions

- The countries closest to China do not regard its rising role as something to be complacent about. They are wary of its ambitions and do not feel reassured about its long-term plans. Most are hedging, maintaining close security links with the US, and urging the US to continue to play a deep role in the region. The EU should adhere to this position. It should articulate its security vision in Asia in ways which demonstrate closeness to the US and its allies.

- The Asian consensus at the moment is to be pragmatic about economic engagement with China, but to also seek diversification. Therefore, while the EU seeks a free trade agreement with China, it should reflect upon the ways in which regional partners have constantly tried to balance any economic dependence they might have on China with the availability of other options, in case China places political pressure on them.

- The most promising regional initiative that China has been at the center of is the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. This shows a way in which China can share its knowledge of economic development with others and play a positive role in the region. One positive aspect is that several EU members, including the UK, Germany, and France, are part of this initiative.

- The EU must avoid working with ASEAN and other regional partners in such a way that it seems to be colluding with a process that looks to Beijing like containment. It does not want to be interpreted as being in any specific regional camp or faction. But it does have a legitimate right to build up a strong, viable series of relationships, at multi-lateral and bilateral level, throughout the region. In this way, it can have a clear role in promoting its own interests, and learn from its partners as they work out the China challenge in the years ahead. If anyone does this, it will most likely be in the region.

Relating to One's Neighborhood: A View from the United States

Demetrios G. Papademetriou

I Bilateral and Sub-Regional Relationships in the Newest Age of Instability

In a world in which deep internal divisions and the resultant instability have become defining features, states are looking for ways to manage one of the worst expressions of such instability – mass unwanted migration. In that regard, some states are likely to pursue more systematically security and economic partnerships with like-minded states in their immediate neighborhood in order to protect themselves from the many adverse consequences of the chaotic waves of illegal migration *and* advance other interests. And as instability threatens to, and often actually turns into chaos, the search for partners with whom they can pursue certain critically important shared goals and priorities will only intensify.

The humanitarian, security and domestic social and political consequences of the 2015/2016 migration crisis in Europe are on every politician's and policymaker's mind. The crisis saw approximately one-and-a-half million persons, primarily from the Middle East and South Asia, arrive in Europe through the Eastern Mediterranean in 2015 and the early months of 2016. And since the Spring of 2016, there have been resurgent attempts (which are likely to continue) by what may well turn out to be hundreds of thousands of primarily African migrants seeking to enter Europe through the Central Mediterranean. These continuously unfolding events have motivated key EU Member States, as well as the Union's Brussels institutions, to think more creatively about partnering with key transit countries to reduce both the number of potential migrants and, perhaps more importantly, to change the chaotic manner in which they have been arriving in recent years. The EU-Turkey deal (more accurately, the Germany-Turkey deal which was then "offered," pretty much as a *fait accompli,* to the other EU Member States) and a likely, if differently structured[1] EU deal (once more, and more accurately, an Italy and Germany deal) with Libya are prime examples of relying systematically on key regional players to address a major humanitarian, political, and security problem. But such deals stand a good chance to work in the longer term only if

(a) there is a political and economic commitment to widening and deepening engagement with key states in regions of particular interest;
(b) they correctly identify the most relevant (although typically highly idiosyncratic) root causes for flight and make a long-term commitment to addressing them – and fulfill that commitment; and
(c) they are backed by a commitment to resettle substantial numbers of refugees before they embark on their often deadly quest to reach Europe.

Such a coordinated response to the crisis broadly comports with the general outlines of the European Commission's most recent suggestions in a June 7, 2016 Communication that focused on the ongoing migration crisis. That Communication laid a road map for stemming what may in fact be a much larger crisis than the one in the recent Eastern Mediterranean: an African migration

[1] If indeed such a deal takes place, it will center an allowing "search and rescue" navy vessels from EU Member States that are willing to participate in the effort to operate jointly with the Libyan navy, *in Libyan territorial waters,* to prevent boats of migrants from setting sail across the Central Mediterranean for Italy (and Malta). Of course, for such an effort to be both successful and pass legal muster, it requires a Libyan Government that is in control of its territory, a way of vetting asylum claims in Libya (or off its coast, as Italian Interior Minister Alfani has suggested), *and* a formula for transferring and protecting bona fide refugees in the EU *and elsewhere*.

crisis which, if left unattended, will likely increase geometrically, if not exponentially, in the years ahead. Most relevant for this discussion are the Communication's provisions, collectively referred to as the European Agenda for Migration. The first of these elements, pursuing an end to the conflicts that lead to massive displacements (see Figure "Internally Displaced Refugee Populations, 2015"), is completely aspirational, at least until the Union actually develops a real foreign policy and is given the tools – political, economic, and military – to pursue it effectively, or until major EU Member States coordinate their activities with the aim of pursuing the same goals (the intergovernmental option).



The second element is even more aspirational, as well as *deeply obtuse,* in that it would rely on UN-centered multilateralism, based on the principle of "global responsibility-sharing," to address the issue. The third element, however, may in fact be rather promising and involves a set of initiatives that would fall under a "new" "Migration Partnership Framework." If adopted by the EU Council and Parliament, and funded at the appropriate (*think: massive*) levels, it *may* create a different dynamic by negotiating "tailored compacts" with key states that, once again, *may* help change habits and patterns of unwanted migration from Africa by addressing the social, political, and economic factors ("root causes") for flight.

The language of this component of the European Agenda for Migration reminds one of the many and mostly unsuccessful efforts to gain the cooperation of states in the European neighborhood on these matters that go back to the beginnings of this century. What is different this time is the sense that the various crises and their consequences for European political stability, and the European

Project itself, require bolder and far deeper engagement, as well as the commitment of appropriate political and financial resources. Only then would such efforts stand a chance to begin changing the calculus and the accompanying narratives about the "opportunities" available through uncontrolled – that is, illegal and chaotic – migration to Europe. Once more, however, for the concept to be properly tested, the gap between promise and performance must be narrowed dramatically. And for that to happen, Member States will have to appreciate the nature, scope, and magnitude of the challenge regardless of whether they are directly affected by the most recent crisis or not, and commit to implementing the strategy outlined in the June 7, 2016 Framework fully and in a coordinated way. Absent implementation that includes the testing of new ideas and the ability to adapt the approach to different "on-the-ground" circumstances, the Framework will just be another Commission document and the Member States will continue to do their own thing (mostly nothing) … until the crisis affects them directly and mightily. And by then, practically anything they might do may very well be for naught.

The broader question that arises from this crisis and the efforts to take control of it is whether there are other parts of the world that have dealt with comparable crises and may have developed and pursued similar or different approaches to addressing them. Specifically, the mandate of this brief paper is how the United States has related to its "neighborhood" in roughly analogous circumstances.

II The U.S. and Latin America: Is There a U.S. "Neighborhood Policy" Toward the Region?

The United States, a classic "immigration country," has a long history with all forms of migration. While migration, and the changes that it implies, are a core part of the American narrative – and as such welcomed by large majorities of Americans – one form of migration, *illegal migration* (see Figure "Unauthorized Population in the United States, 1990-2014"), has been a constant source of policy frustration and often enormous political arguments. (It is estimated that there are currently about 11 million unauthorized immigrants in the United States, a number that constitutes about 25 percent of the foreign-born persons residing in the country.)

Yet, despite these realities, there is little conversation within governmental circles, and certainly not within the U.S. Congress, about moving even slightly beyond the sovereignty-focused unilateralism that has long been the U.S. approach to migration matters. As a result, whereas in Europe, EU Member States pool, without surrendering, their sovereignty on most migration matters, the United States stands firmly on its sovereign prerogatives despite an increasing appreciation of the fact that many of its illegal immigration challenges can be addressed more effectively, and more cheaply,[2] through smarter and deeper cooperation with its immediate and proximate neighbors to its south.

[2] Immigration enforcement at U.S. borders and the U.S. interior cost nearly $19 billion annually. That compares to $15.2 billion (about 25 percent less) for all other principal federal law enforcement agencies *combined*. Source: Migration Policy Institute estimates for fiscal year 2015.



Such unilateralism goes well beyond immigration matters and shapes much of the U.S. relationship with several countries in the Hemisphere. In fact, one must note that if there is a vision about the country's relationship with Latin America writ large, and a strategy about how to pursue that vision, migration is likely to play a large part in it and, in many instances, a central part. In general terms, however, one would have a hard time identifying such a vision, outside certain narrowly-focused elites in Washington and possibly Florida (because of its central place in the long saga involving Cuba refugees and Haitian immigrants), and in the few states in the U.S. Southwest that have increasingly interdependent social and economic relationships with Mexico – unless, of course, one were to describe a policy of mostly benign neglect as a vision or as "strategy." Accordingly, one would be hard pressed to point to either a national discourse or, as a consequence, to investments of substantial political and diplomatic capital, which a proper national strategy would imply. And that is despite periodic summitry and evocative – but quickly and easily forgotten – declarations of interest in the welfare and progress of the region.

Indeed, in the last six decades, that is, since the creation of the Inter-American Development Bank in the 1950s under President Eisenhower, and President Kennedy's "Alliance for Progress," which set economic and social modernization, and social justice, as alternatives to communist ideology, U.S. engagement with Latin America has been episodic, at best, and inconsistent in its application. As a result, whatever forms of engagement there are, they are rather narrow in their geographic focus (with a strong emphasis on bilateral and sub-regional interactions), and are characterized by great variation in commitment and intensity, and they have quite different policy foci/targets.

In the most general terms, U.S. policy toward the region has been animated primarily by three main considerations: (a) ideology; (b) economic interests (often in the form of trade accords); and (c) security (border controls, drugs, and terrorism). A fourth consideration, migration and related social/human security issues, cuts across these considerations and will as a result be a major focus

of this analysis. Together, these considerations constitute the sum total of U.S. engagement with individual states or groups of states in the region, though the boundaries between issues are easily permeable (and thus spill over one into another rather routinely), and the significance of each priority area, and hence the attention the U.S. pays to each, has fluctuated both by state/sub-region and time period during the last 60 years.

Ideology, in the form of a committed opposition to communism and its corollary, sympathy for and at times outright support for right-wing governments (and even unsavory dictatorships), has defined certain U.S. policy responses. These include the policy toward Cuba since the Castro revolution in 1959 and U.S. engagement with certain Caribbean states before and after Cuba's "loss" to communism, interactions with much of Central America (especially in the 1970s and 1980s), and, intermittently and less resolutely, relations with countries primarily along the northern part of South America. With one exception, that of Cuba, the energy of such activism had dissipated by the end of the 1980s, although Venezuela's left-wing dictatorship has preoccupied Washington for most of this century. But remarkably, and as of about a year ago, President Obama's opening to Cuba, and the relatively muted U.S. domestic political reaction to it, are on the way to removing the one ideological constant of the last half century when it comes to US policy toward Latin America: the economic and political isolation of Cuba. And with this move, the explicitly ideological dimension of U.S. policy toward Latin America may be coming to an end.

As one might expect, economic interests and engagement in many ways shape all other relationships with the region. That is, in the absence of severe ideological or security differences, economic interests, in the form of access to markets and creating consistent and predictable legal and regulatory frameworks for commercial contacts and investments, underlie all U.S. relationships. But while these are constant policy priorities for the U.S. regardless of time or place, it was not until after the 1988 completion of the U.S./Canada Free Trade Agreement that the U.S. Government began to focus on trade, commerce, and investment agreements in the immediate region. And while such agreements have targeted the advancement of U.S. economic interests, they have also created larger virtuous cycles that have had a largely positive effect for many of the countries partnering with the United States. Among them are the dramatic deepening in economic interdependence between Mexico and the U.S., the creation of greater opportunities for routine social and cultural interactions with most countries in the North American region, and progress toward understanding better each partner's sensitivities and priorities. Such greater understanding, in turn, has created a "platform" that enables working jointly in appreciating and accepting differences while solving problems together – in effect, creating a habit of cooperation, rather than one of at times substantial conflict and disagreement.

In these regards, Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) became the default route for economic (and broader) engagement in North America, and the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between Canada, the United States, and Mexico, became the model for such agreements in the region and beyond. In fact, though much less well known than NAFTA, the Central American-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR), which included seven countries – Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and the United States, and which came into effect in 2006/7 for most countries and in 2009 for Costa Rica – has also created economic bonds that have led to cooperation in other areas (such as broader development and security) not included in the Agreement.

"Security" – primarily defined as disrupting drug production, targeting criminal gangs involved in trafficking in drugs and other contraband, undermining the ability of governments in the region to

adhere to the rule of law and move forward with essential social and political reforms, interdicting and disrupting the distribution and repatriation of profits from drugs, *and border controls* – has been a constant U.S. policy priority in the last three decades. Since September 11, 2001, however, preventing would- or could-be terrorists from gaining access to the United States via its land borders has become the top political and policy priority of the United States and colors most everything the nation does. As a result, cooperation between U.S. law enforcement agencies and their counterparts in the immediate neighborhood *defines* U.S. relations with individual countries in the region and stands at the top of the list in the day-to-day conduct of bilateral and regional affairs. Understandably, of course, the security/terrorism issue becomes more relevant the physically closer a state is to the U.S., meaning that intelligence and security cooperation with Canada and Mexico have become integral parts of a common North American approach to security. It also means that the incentives – and pressures – for both the U.S. and its two immediate neighbors to work extremely closely are virtually irresistible.

III The Primacy of Migration

1. Canada

It is migration, however, and migration from Mexico, Central America, and Cuba, that is the most constant and complex issue area in America's engagement with the region. To be sure, there is substantial migration from and to Canada, with about 840,000 Canadian-born persons residing in the U.S., and about 340,000 U.S.-born persons residing in Canada (U.N., *Trends in International Migrant Stock*, 2015). Citizens of the two countries have never been subject to a visa requirement to enter each other's country, and migration between them has a rhythm and history of its own. As a result, it has developed deep social, cultural, and economic roots, bound together by close ethnicity and geopolitical affinities. It is thus not surprising that migration is not an issue between the two countries or that the economic, socio-cultural, and labor market "integration" of Canada and the U.S. is deep and continues to deepen. And NAFTA is contributing further to that integration without the existence of central institutions a la Europe.

2. Latin America

Migration from the rest of the Hemisphere is much more complex and takes three main forms. First, it has attracted well-educated professionals and wealthy individuals from throughout Latin America, as well as dissidents who fled the region's various authoritarian and totalitarian regimes. In fact, the national composition, routes of entry, and time of entry to the U.S. chronicle both the recent political history of parts of Latin America but also U.S. sensitivities toward and "engagement"/involvement in that history. These flows have turned Florida, and particularly Miami, into the "capital" of the Americas. Second, it continues to grow at rapid rates because the U.S. immigration system relies heavily on family immigration. This reliance (almost seven out of ten permanent immigrants enter the U.S. through the family stream) has allowed total immigration from the region to grow enormously, led by Mexican nationals and followed by nationals from the three Northern Triangle countries of Central America – Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras (see Figure "Immigrants from Mexico and the Central American Northern Triangle, 1980-2015").

Immigrants from Mexico and the Central American Northern Triangle Countries, 1980-2015



Source: Migration Policy Institute tabulation of data from the U.S. Census Bureau's 2010 and 2014 American Community Surveys, and 2000 Decennial Census. Migration Policy Institute tabulation of data from 2015 Current Population Survey.

And third, it attracts substantial numbers of unauthorized immigrants – both visa overstayers and illegal border crossers – from virtually all Latin American and Caribbean countries.

3. Mexico and Central America

The protagonist in the story of Hispanic migration to the United States, however, is Mexico. Mexican migration to the U.S. goes back about a century-and-a-half. During that time, Mexicans built the infrastructure and provided the workers for agriculture and most other economic activities in the U.S. Southwest, much as European immigrants did for the rest of the country. Moreover, Mexico also provided the workers that filled many of the farm jobs America's young men left in order to fill the ranks of the military during both world wars; and supplied U.S. agriculture the workers it needed through a 22-year (1942-1964) temporary worker program known as the "bracero" program. That program, in turn, led to the extraordinary dependence of U.S. perishable crop farmers on Mexican (and in recent decades, Central American) workers. And as Mexican workers began to move beyond agriculture to the construction and low-wage manufacturing and services sectors, and spread throughout the United States (see Table "Immigration to the U.S. from Mexico and the Central American Triangle" to note the doubling of the Mexican-origin population every decade from 1980-2000), Mexico became the largest single immigration source country to the United States (see Figures "Unauthorized Population in the United States, 1990-2014") and "Immigrants from Mexico and the Central American Northern Triangle, 1980-2015").

Immigrants from Mexico and the Central American Northern Triangle Countries, 1980-2015

Country of Origin	1980	1990	2000	2010	2014	2015
Mexico	2,199,200	4,298,000	9,177,500	11,711,100	11,714,500	11,905,636
El Salvador	94,400	465,400	817,300	1,214,000	1,315,500	1,349,876
Guatemala	63,100	225,700	480,700	830,800	915,600	1,063,314
Honduras	39,200	108,900	282,900	522,600	588,300	641,753

Source: Migration Policy Institute tabulation of data from the U.S. Census Bureau's 2010 and 2014 American Community Surveys, and 2000 Decennial Census. Migration Policy Institute tabulation of data from 2015 Current Population Survey.

The symbiotic relationship between the needs and preferences of U.S. low-wage sector employers and Mexican workers looking for work grew to an ever deeper mutual dependence over the course of many decades. That story, however, is in the process of being rewritten. Beginning in 2007, a number of forces combined to reduce total net migration from Mexico to the United States to about zero. These forces include the redoubling of U.S. enforcement efforts and a focus on mass deportations; the massive job losses that followed the Great Recession of 2008 (which centered particularly in sectors that had become dominated by unauthorized Mexican workers, such as construction and low-level services) and the slowness of the U.S. labor market recovery; Mexican demographics (especially the end of Mexico's long demographic transition); and steady Mexican economic growth that saw an enormous growth in and stabilization of Mexican middle classes.[3]

The slowing of illegal migration from Mexico, however, has not been matched by a similar reduction in illegal entries and stays from the three Northern Triangle Central American countries, whose nationals now account for approximately half of all apprehensions at the U.S. southern border. Migration from these three countries continues to be overwhelmingly unauthorized. Much of that migration has its origins in American involvement in that region's murderous civil wars of the late 1970s and 1980s. In recognition both of American complicity in these wars and of the fact that deportations to these three countries would simply add to their political precariousness, the U.S. has offered many of the illegally resident citizens of these countries "temporary" protection from deportation. As a result, immigration – legal and illegal – from these countries has continued to grow.

The various ways of engaging with neighbors briefly discussed here should be understood as what they are: ideal types which, in reality, have very permeable boundaries that allow one policy to spill over into one or more of the others. As a result, ideology spills into economic relationships, negatively, through embargoes and other instruments of economic isolation (Cuba), but also positively, through special migration relationships (once more, Cuba) and various forms of development and other assistance (Central America). For instance, Cubans who manage to leave their island have long enjoyed extremely privileged access to the U.S., and, since the mid-1990s, the U.S. has made available 20,000 visas for Cuban family reunification per year, as long as the applications are made in Cuba. Moreover, Cubans reaching U.S. soil can stay, while those intercepted by U.S. authorities before they land in the U.S. are returned to Cuba. As for Central America, U.S. development and other investments in that region, together with the opportunities that CAFTA creates, have translated into obtaining these countries' deep cooperation in curtailing travel though their territories of persons from certain nationalities who are of particular U.S. security concern. Moreover, and more recently, these countries have been accepting the returns of

[3] See Papademetriou et. al, *Thinking Regionally to Compete Globally: Leveraging Migration and Human Capital in the U.S., Mexico, and Central America* (Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2013).

unaccompanied minors and related family members who had traveled with them, whose applications for asylum had been rejected by U.S. authorities.

Projected Shares of U.S. Population, by Race and Ethnicity, (%), 1970-2040



Notes: The Asian Non-Hispanic population includes individuals who identified as Pacific Islanders. Hispanics are of any race. Other races are included in totals but not shown in graph. Projections of U.S. population for 2020, 2030, and 2040 were adapted from projections by the Pew Research Center for the year 2065.
Sources: MPI analysis of census data from the U.S. Census Bureau for 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000, and from the American Community Survey (ACS) for 2010 and 2014. D'Vera Cohn, "Future Immigration Will Change the Face of America by 2065," Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, October 5, 2015, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/10/05/future-immigration-will-change-the-face-of-america-by-2065/.

If this thumbnail sketch of the various sets of relationships between the U.S. and the region has a common thread running through it, it is that country or sub-region and/or issue-specific U.S. interests, rather than a grand scheme that has an identifiable common strategic thread that is pursued systematically, has defined U.S. policy toward the region. But despite terminological differences regarding a "neighborhood" policy, the basic premise behind U.S. policy toward the immediate region has indeed been to create a network of relationships that protect and promote U.S. interests by engaging countries of particular interest in ever deeper economic relationships that, over time, spill over into more complex social and political bonds. (A perfect example of this point is the extraordinary influence that Cubans in Florida exert not only in shaping U.S. policy toward Cuba, but also in broader U.S. electoral politics.) While such relationships tend to be highly idiosyncratic, their clear aim (and, often, effect) is to insulate the U.S. from a variety of external challenges while also allowing it to benefit economically from closer contacts. Another and a more notable and visible effect of these closer ties is the relentless "Hispanicization" of the United States (and the reaction to it in some parts of the country and among many voters with Republican Party affiliation). In fact, by 2040, Hispanics are projected to make up 21 percent of the U.S. population (see Figure "Projected Shares of U.S. Population, by Race and Ethnicity, (%), 1970-2040" and Table "Projected Shares of U.S. Population, by Race and Ethnicity, (%), 1970-2040").

Projected Shares of U.S. Population, by Race and Ethnicity, (%), 1970-2040

	1970	1980	1990	2000	2010	2014	2020	2030	2040
White Non-Hispanic	84	80	76	69	64	62	60	57	54
Black Non-Hispanic	11	12	12	12	12	12	13	13	13
Asian Non-Hispanic	1	2	3	4	5	5	6	8	10
Hispanic	4	7	9	13	16	17	18	19	21
Other	0	1	1	3	3	3	3	3	3
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Notes: The Asian Non-Hispanic population includes individuals who identified as Pacific Islanders. Hispanics are of any race. Other races are included in totals but not shown in graph. Projections of U.S. population for 2020, 2030, and 2040 were adapted from projections by the Pew Research Center for the year 2065.

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(In 2014 Mexican-origin persons accounted for nearly two-thirds of that total – see Figure "Shares of Hispanic Population in the United States, by Ethnicity, (%), 1970-2014" and Table "Shares of Hispanic Population in the United States, by Ethnicity, (%), 1970-2014").

Shares of Hispanic Population in the United States, by Ethnicity, (%), 1970-2014



Note: The 1980 Census registered Hispanic respondents who did not identify as Mexican, Puerto Rican, or Cuban as "other not specified." As a result, some of the increase in the category of "other" in 1980 is explained by respondents who may have identified as Dominican, Guatemalan, Honduran, or Salvadoran.
Source: MPI analysis of census data from the U.S. Census Bureau for 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000, and ffrom the American Community Survey (ACS) for 2010 and 2014.

Shares of Hispanic Population in the United States, by Ethnicity, (%), 1970-2014

	1970	1980	1990	2000	2010	2014
Mexican	62	59	61	59	65	64
Puerto Rican	18	14	12	10	9	10
Salvadoran	0	–	3	2	4	4
Cuban	8	6	5	4	4	4
Dominican	1	–	2	2	3	3
Guatemalan	0	–	1	1	2	2
Honduran	0	–	1	1	1	1
Other	10	21	15	21	12	12
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

Note: The 1980 Census registered Hispanic respondents who did not identify as Mexican, Puerto Rican, or Cuban as "other not specified." As a result, some of the increase in the category of "other" in 1980 is explained by respondents who may have identified as Dominican, Guatemalan, Honduran, or Salvadoran.

Sources: MPI analysis of census data from the U.S. Census Bureau for 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000, and from the American Community Survey (ACS) for 2010 and 2014.

In no other case is this spill-over effect more evident that in the by now almost organic, *and two-way*, cooperation between the U.S. and Mexico on virtually all important issues – from sharing responsibility over the two countries' common border (including, in the last few years, preventing most Central Americans from transiting through Mexico to the U.S. border) to non-public but nonetheless evident commitments to treating longer-residing unauthorized immigrants from Mexico (and Central America) with increasing countenance. While such cooperation is not always obvious to the naked eye, and the bilateral relationship is not the only – or perhaps even main – reason for such ever deeper collaboration (the power and maturity of civil society advocacy on behalf of persons from the region has been a remarkable political development in the United States), the fact is that it has been happening more and more organically all the time. And this is despite the sharp political rhetoric from many in the U.S. Congress, as well as by anti-Mexican and anti-Central American immigration activists and anti-illegal immigration campaigners. Many of these activists are clearly concerned about the growth of Mexican and Central American populations in the United States. And some of them probably subscribe to the simplistic proposition that "all" persons from the region are poorly educated, don't speak English, demonstrate little commitment to the United States, and are in the U.S. illegally – *and that they are all "Mexicans."* Such sentiments, however, are mostly a reflection of ignorance, a certain amount of ethnically-based prejudice, and, most importantly, resentment about *how* the growth of these populations has occurred – that is, its illegality. While neither government publicly acknowledges the depth of such cooperation, its reach and breadth are clear to those who follow this issue and reflects a "steady-as-she goes" policy toward Mexico by successive U.S. Administrations going back to the presidencies of George Bush (1989-1993) and Carlos Salinas (1988-1994).

IV Potential Lessons from the Way the U.S. Has Been Engaging with Key Countries in its Region

This brief excursion into U.S. engagement with its immediate region allows one to make a number of general observations. Those observations will by definition have to be qualified and, in some instances, highly qualified by the unique history of America's engagement with the region.

As a matter of course, all U.S. engagements reflect the country's economic, political, and military pre-eminence, as well as its global ambitions, reach, and sense of responsibility for defending the post-WWII political order. In this sense, successive generations of American foreign policy elites,

and those that influence them, have subscribed to and pursued policies that have placed U.S. geo-political and geo-strategic interests, and economic advantage, front and center. For them, and as befits a still unequalled global power, both collaborative and competitive relationships focus on friends and adversaries "worthy" of attention. In this largely still valid scenario, and with the exception of Canada, the Hemisphere matters relatively little. Nonetheless, when other, perhaps less strategically vital issues are put into the mix, and the policy lens focuses more sharply on "softer" security interests and on the immediate region, the rest of the North American neighborhood comes more into focus. And when that happens, the relationship with Mexico, and less consequentially with Central America, becomes one that is worthy of deeper study, and possibly one that holds a number of somewhat soft and indirect lessons for other parts of the world.

United States and Mexico: Two-Way Trade in Goods, 1994-2015



Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce (1994-1998 from U.S. Census Bureau).

Some of these lessons are as follows: economic (really, trade) relationships are critical in setting the preconditions for deeper engagements. Trade agreements, and particularly NAFTA, by institutionalizing the context in which commercial, investment, and trading relationships occur, have set the stage for closer contacts that go beyond such purely economic contacts and toward a more fundamental interdependence (Figures "United States and Mexico: Two-Way Trade in Goods, 1994-2015" and "United States and Mexico: Two-Way Trade in Goods and Services, 1999-2015" document most clearly the growing economic interdependence since NAFTA went into effect).



Such interdependence, in turn, enables the much deeper cooperation that one sees between Mexico and the United States. But for all this to work well, it takes understanding each other's interests well, ever better economic fundamentals, strong governments that pursue a commitment to democratic values, transparency and the rule of law, equal measures of imagination and good will, sustained effort, *and time*.

In these regards, the deepening relationship between the United States and Mexico resembles to a substantial degree the evolution of Germany's relationship with Poland in the 1990s. At that time, Germany *in effect* "pushed out" its borders with Poland to Poland's eastern borders, thus creating a buffer zone against illegal migration and, more generally, fraudulent refugee claims. In return, Germany committed to actively support Poland in a bid for EU Membership – which it did, quite effectively, beginning in the mid-1990s. In the U.S.-Mexico case, the carrot for ever deeper cooperation on border and security issues is less publicly explicit. At the turn of the 21st century, it focused on a migration "grand bargain," whereby Mexico would get a "migration deal" that offered it a deeply preferential migration relationship – a deal scuttled as a result of the 9/11/2001 terrorist attack on the United States. And both in 2006 and 2007, and, most notably, in 2013, there were massive efforts to "legalize" the status of unauthorized immigrants in the United States, about 60 percent of whom were Mexicans. While these legislative efforts failed, the political will to offer most unauthorized immigrants some relief continued in 2014 with a series of Presidential Executive Actions that have been challenged, and are still pending, in the U.S. Court system.

U.S. Foreign Assistance to El Salvador, FY2010 - FY2014

U.S. Funding Agency	Current U.S. Dollars
USAID	251,494,189
Department of Defense	46,437,454
Department of State	27,807,991
Department of Labor	10,000,000
Millennium Challenge Corporation	9,837,399
Peace Corps	9,130,391
Inter-American Foundation	5,612,712
Department of the Treasury	3,357,784
Executive Office of the President	1,802,361
Trade and Development Agency	1,729,742
Department of Energy	1,425,810
Corps of Engineers, Civil	397,513
Department of Health and Human Services	194,000
Department of Justice	173,217
Department of the Interior	169,133
Department of Agriculture	159,256
Environmental Protection Agency	100,000
Total	**369,828,952**

Source: USAID, 2016.

The U.S. has also pursued an active policy of providing substantial amounts (by U.S. standards) of foreign assistance that goes well beyond the typical bounds of development and humanitarian aid. Figure “U.S. Foreign Assistance (FY1995 – FY2014)” documents the amount of U.S. foreign assistance to the region since 1995. The data tell the complex story of such assistance, from its emphasis on reducing the production and distribution of drugs in Colombia, to assistance to El Salvador immediately following that country’s election of a government that put in power the very groups that U.S. interventions in the 1980s had opposed, to the concerns about the very stability of Mexico as drug and related syndicates began to challenge and undermine the Mexican Government. What the data do not show is the diverse sources of such aid, often involving as many as ten or more U.S. government departments. Table “U.S. Foreign Assistance to El Salvador, FY2010 – FY2014”, focusing on assistance to El Salvador between 2010 and 2014, gives a sense of the wide representation of various U.S. government interests in El Salvador, and their relative contribution.

U.S. Foreign Assistance (FY1995 - FY2014)



Source: USAID, 2016.

Projected U.S. Population, by Race and Ethnicity, 1970-2040



Notes: The Asian Non-Hispanic population includes individuals who identified as Pacific Islanders. Hispanics are of any race. Other races are included in totals but not shown in graph. Projections of U.S. population for 2020, 2030, and 2040 were adapted from projections by the Pew Research Center for the year 2065.
Sources: Migration Policy Institute (MPI) analysis of census data from the U.S. Census Bureau for 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000, and from the American Community Survey (ACS) for 2010 and 2014. D'Vera Cohn, "Future Immigration Will Change the Face of America by 2065," Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, October 5, 2015, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/10/05/future-immigration-will-change-the-face-of-america-by-2065/.

As noted, the U.S.-Mexico relationship is maturing all the time, though not necessarily because of agreements on the most difficult issues, but because of an understanding that key policy objectives from either side are better achieved through broad cooperation than confrontation. And nothing sets the stage for such cooperation better than the relentless generational-cum-ethnic shift[4] that the changing composition of the U.S. population implies for foreign policy (see Figures "Projected U.S. Population, by Race and Ethnicity, 1970-2040" and "Hispanic Population in the United States, by Ethnicity, 1970-2014" and Tables "Hispanic Population in the United States (in Thousands), by Ethnicity, 1970-2014" and "Projected U.S. Population (in Millions), by Race and Ethnicity, 1970-2040").

[4] As equally striking as the data portrayed in Figure "Projected U.S. Population, by Race and Ethnicity, 1970-2040" are recent projections by the Pew Research Center to 2065. These projections focus on the ethnic composition of the U.S. immigrant population and suggest that in 2065, Asian immigrants will make up 38 percent of that population, followed by 31 percent for Hispanics, 9 percent for Blacks, and 20 percent for Whites. Mark Hugo Lopez, Jeffrey Passel, and Molly Rohal, *Modern Immigration Wave Brings 59 Million to U.S., Driving Population Growth and Change Through 2065: Views of Immigration's Impact on U.S Society* (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, 2015), http://www.pewhispanic.org/files/2015/09/2015-09-28_modern-immigration-wave_REPORT.pdf

Hispanic Population in the United States, by Ethnicity, 1970-2014



Note: The 1980 Census registered Hispanic respondents who did not identify as Mexican, Puerto Rican, or Cuban as "other not specified." As a result, some of the increase in the category of "other" in 1980 is explained by respondents who may have identified as Dominican, Guatemalan, Honduran, or Salvadoran.
Source: MPI analysis of census data from the U.S. Census Bureau for 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000, and from the ACS for 2010 and 2014.

Hispanic Population in the United States (in Thousands), by Ethnicity, 1970-2014

	1970	1980	1990	2000	2010	2014
Mexican	4,824	8,772	13,375	20,868	32,916	35,371
Puerto Rican	1,417	2,035	2,632	3,401	4,683	5,320
Salvadoran	18	–	563	711	1,827	2,100
Cuban	594	822	1,058	1,248	1,884	2,046
Dominican	84	–	517	797	1,509	1,764
Guatemalan	35	–	267	406	1,108	1,325
Honduran	35	–	127	237	731	813
Other	785	3,146	3,296	7,537	6,072	6,512
Total	7,792	14,775	21,835	35,205	50,730	55,251

Note: The 1980 Census registered Hispanic respondents who did not identify as Mexican, Puerto Rican, or Cuban as "other not specified." As a result, some of the increase in the category of "other" in 1980 is explained by respondents who may have identified as Dominican, Guatemalan, Honduran, or Salvadoran.

Source: MPI analysis of census data from the U.S. Census Bureau for 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000, and from the American Community Survey (ACS) for 2010 and 2014.

Projected U.S. Population (in Millions), by Race and Ethnicity, 1970-2040

	1970	1980	1990	2000	2010	2014	2020	2030	2040
White Non-Hispanic	170.5	180.5	188.0	194.5	196.9	197.4	199.9	203.6	205.8
Black Non-Hispanic	22.3	26.2	29.2	33.7	37.9	39.3	43.3	46.4	47.7
Asian Non-Hispanic	1.5	3.6	7.0	10.4	15.0	16.9	20.0	28.6	38.1
Hispanic	7.8	14.8	21.8	35.2	50.7	55.2	60.0	67.9	80.0
Other	0.9	1.7	2.0	7.5	8.7	9.9	10.0	10.7	9.5
Total	203.0	226.8	248.0	281.3	309.2	318.7	333.2	357.2	381.1

Notes: The Asian Non-Hispanic population includes individuals who identified as Pacific Islanders. Hispanics are of any race. Other races are included in totals but not shown in graph. Projections of U.S. population for 2020, 2030, and 2040 were adapted from projections by the Pew Research Center for the year 2065.

Sources: Migration Policy Institute (MPI) analysis of census data from the U.S. Census Bureau for 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000, and from the American Community Survey (ACS) for 2010 and 2014. D'Vera Cohn, "Future Immigration Will Change the Face of America by 2065," Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, October 5, 2015. http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/10/05/future-immigration-will-change-the-face-of-america-by-2065/.

As Latino- and Asian-background leaders assume greater responsibility in the economic and political realms, one must wonder whether the traditional U.S. commitments to Europe, or Israel and the Middle East, will continue to define U.S. policy, or whether the ethnicity and experiences of Latino and Asian leaders will begin to create greater openings for these regions. In that line of speculation, President Obama's pivot to Asia puts forth a provocative proposition, that is, when the U.S. will also pivot more toward Latin America and what shape that pivot will take. And it remains to be seen whether that pivot, when it occurs, will use more FTAs as the model for taking intra-Hemispheric relationships to the next level. It will also be interesting to observe whether Mexico will become the model of how to relate with other major countries in the Americas and, finally, when and under what conditions the U.S. will engage with economically growing but more corrupt and institutionally not-yet-fully-stable countries in rest of the Hemisphere.

External Portfolio Investment and Foreign Direct Investment in Mexico (US$ millions), 1990-2014

Year	External Portfolio Investment	Foreign Direct Investment
1994	–7,415	10,973
1995	10,377	9,526
1996	–13,962	9,186
1997	–4,329	12,830
1998	–901	12,757
1999	–10,580	13,881
2000	–1,742	18,110
2001	–5,010	29,861
2002	–100	23,932
2003	–4,220	18,554
2004	–3,338	24,821
2005	13,487	24,861
2006	1,607	20,901
2007	800	32,320
2008	–18,026	28,793
2009	19,273	17,756
2010	–32,377	26,168
2011	–49,642	23,328
2012	–72,265	19,492
2013	–49,500	44,886
2014	–47,356	24,154

Note: Foreign direct investment, (net inflows (BoP, current US$)) refers to direct investment equity flows in the reporting country. It is a category of cross border investment associated with a resident in one economy having control or a significant degree of influence on the ownership and management of an enterprise that is resident in another economy. Ownership of 10 percent or more of the ordinary shares of voting stock is the criterion for determining the existence of a direct investment relationship. Here the foreign direct investment looks at the flows into Mexico. Portfolio investment, net ((BoP, current US$)) is defined as covering transactions in equity securities and debt securities. Here the portfolio investment looks at investment flows out of Mexico.

Source: World Bank.

To revert once more to the U.S.-Mexico relationship, one has to understand better the effects of that interdependence. Specifically, and as Tables “External Portfolio Investment and Foreign Direct Investment in Mexico (US$ millions), 1990-2014” and “Top 5 Countries, External Portfolio Investment and Foreign Direct Investment in Mexico ($US millions)” point out, the economic relationship has become completely a two-way one. In fact, over time, and contrary to much of the rhetoric surrounding this year’s U.S. presidential election contest, recent Mexican investments in the U.S. and the jobs that go with them outpace U.S. investments in Mexico by significant amounts. Moreover, many of the products that cross the Mexico-U.S. border, regardless of direction, are produced in “shared (integrated) supply chains.” Furthermore, and to make this last point more emphatic, as much as 40 percent of the content in Mexican finished goods that are exported to the United States is made in the United States – which almost amounts to “joint manufacturing” (Seely, June 1, 2016).

Top 5 Countries, External Portfolio Investment and Foreign Direct Investment in Mexico ($US millions)

Mexican External Portfolio Investment, 2015		Foreign Direct Investment in Mexico, 2012	
United States	49,244	United States	8,514
Brazil	2,551	Japan	1,812
Luxembourg	1,036	Canada	1,755
Spain	412	Netherlands	1,392
United Kingdom	347	Germany	787

Sources: IMF and OECD

What the long-undulating Mexico-U.S. relationship suggests is by now self-evident. It takes (a long) time for relationships to become so deep as to change the terms under which each party relates to each other. One can get to that point a bit faster if no mistakes are made and there are few (or no) "U-turns," but the route will always be somewhat circuitous. And most significantly, there is nothing in the present European neighborhood that can be compared to the U.S.-Mexico relationship – particularly in terms of the sheer volume of one country's presence in another (Mexicans in the United States) and the political and economic heft to which numbers can translate. Nonetheless, there are certain candidates that, with wise and deep investments, can play a similar role in the medium term. Morocco, Turkey, and Egypt can certainly be such candidates, even if today there are prohibitive obstacles to pursuing such relationships with the two latter countries.

V Recommendations

Considering the idiosyncratic nature of U.S. engagement in and relationships with its immediate region, any recommendations must take into account what may be unique and what may be reproducible and, more importantly, worthy of abstracting out and emulating. Considering these self-imposed conditions, three ideas may be most useful:

- The emphasis on addressing root causes, extremely appealing as it may be, is really a very difficult and deeply circuitous route to addressing illegal immigration and other deeply troubling behaviors, such as violence and terrorism. Three things may suffice to make this point. The investments such a policy would require would need to be massive. And such investments must focus on things that could make a difference, such as investing deeply in building up the partner country's human capital infrastructure. Moreover, the effort would require persuading employers both to engage in training and transferring some of their lower-value-added production facilities "over there." Furthermore the effort would need extraordinary patience, that is, it would require taking the "longer view" about how to measure success. This is anything but easy. And the inevitable difficulties, ranging from corruption to unexpected instability, will simply make sticking with the policies extremely trying. Finally, the analytical literature (and experience) makes it very clear that as countries progress along the path to development, and until a certain (but difficult to predict accurately) growth is achieved, migration will actually grow, rather than decline (the "migration hump" rule). Altogether, the path to addressing root causes as a means of reducing, significantly, unwanted migration will always be strewn with uncertainties and difficult-to-avoid traps.

- Europe must focus on developing and implementing systematically – and, when needed, forcefully – a foreign policy. In the absence of such policy, and considering the reluctance in most capitals to empower, and then trust, "Brussels" with the necessary authority and

resources, key European players must develop and pursue an inter-governmentally agreed and pursued foreign policy. In either scenario, the pursuit of such policy will be more successful if it engages the entire government (in the case of state-led efforts) or the entire Commission (if the EU leads the effort). Migration *and all the adjacent policy domains that it affects* must become a "whole of government" effort if it is to have a chance to bear fruit. And the standard refrain that one hears from European leaders about values must be both adhered to *and* modified to incorporate an adherence to all aspects of the rule of law (including those that apply to economic migrants) and, when necessary, to change laws to reflect the realities of a continent whose wealth, social support systems, and perceived unwillingness to do the harder things will make it ever more attractive to economic migrants from all around the globe.

- At the end of the day, Europe cannot control the things that it cannot control. That is, almost regardless of what it does, it will have to contend with increasing – and often very large – migration pressures. Simply put, this means that key member states (the inter-governmental option) and/or EU institutions will have to do the hard things they have shown themselves incapable (in fact, unwilling) of doing: vastly increase their investments in external border controls; find the courage to remove virtually all economic migrants (that is those who have no right to be in Europe); and apply much greater efforts and much deeper investments in interior controls, with a focus on the one activity that was "invented" in Europe: enforcement at the workplace (employer sanctions). The massive U.S. investment in enforcement, an effort that many Europeans consider inappropriate, even grotesque, *and* a waste of money, in fact makes the case of the importance of controls both in keeping the size of unauthorized entries and stays in check but also in conveying to the public that someone is "minding the store" and that illegal immigration will not be tolerated.

Structures of European Neighborhood at a Time of Change

Philipp Blom

I Introduction

> "I cannot help fearing that men may reach a point where they look on every new theory as a danger, every innovation as a toilsome trouble, every social advance as a first step toward revolution, and that they may absolutely refuse to move at all."
>
> Alexis de Tocqueville

> "To live in any true sense of the word is to reject others; to accept them, one must be able to renounce, to do oneself violence, to act against one's own nature, to weaken oneself; we conceive freedom only for ourselves – we extend it to our neighbours only at the cost of exhausting efforts; whence the precariousness of liberalism, a defiance of our instincts, a brief and miraculous success, a state of exception, at the antipodes of our deepest imperatives."
>
> Emil Cioran

Less than a decade ago, the European Union appeared to be a complicated but essentially unshakable alliance whose economic success and soft power exercised a magic pull on its neighbors. Liberal democracy, it seemed, had won the battle of history; the lure of high living standards and personal freedom proved irresistible. Today, this vision seems positively Panglossian. Europe, the best of all possible worlds, finds itself mired in economic stagnation, and threatened by populist isolationism and the real possibility of breaking up. A geopolitical and cultural neighborhood is disintegrating.

Neighbors are given, not chosen. We depend on their solidarity, whether or not we may agree with them. If this solidarity is not forthcoming, both sides are damaged, lessened. Neither can hope to tackle challenges which transcend the power of the individual. Now, as the forces of history quicken in a time of global transformation, the European neighborhood has been fractured and its glaring, basic fault lines exposed. Attitudes to migration clearly divide the societies formerly under Soviet rule (including East Germany) from western countries with their very different post-war development. The Brexit discussions were informed by the idea of Britain's exceptional status, anti-European populists are scoring unprecedented wins and are already leading European governments, faith in the single currency is shaken, the influx of refugees opens up further deep divisions.

This is the attempt of an historical analysis of the immediate future. The idea seems paradoxical, but its aim is to look beyond the immediate imperatives of politics at larger underlying structures that will shape our societies and our politics during the next decades. To understand the challenges of European neighborhood, one must identify historical structures and geopolitical shifts. In a global ecology and economy, one must also enlarge our concept of neighborhood.

The most important historical structure is written in stone: A small promontory off Asia, pre-historic Europe was the goal for successive waves of immigration, cultures accumulating on a land mass limited by water on three sides. Mountain ranges form natural dividing lines, rivers create a directed economic and cultural connectedness along their course. Regions along the Danube have always looked and leaned east more strongly than those along the Rhine, the Elbe, the Rhone. Regions without strong natural borders and those situated between larger neighbors – Alsace and Lorraine, Poland, Ukraine, Catalonia, the Balkans – always were vulnerable and frequently contested.

Geography provides an immutable framework for cultural interaction. Within this space grew conflict and cooperation, a set of historical instincts shaped by the constant presence of cultural difference within a geographically limited space whose sea borders allowed neither expansion nor escape. Overlaying this cultural geography is a thin crust of an idealistic heritage born out of the Enlightenment and promoted by socialism, a universalist, humanist approach to life. As the essayist Emil Cioran reminds us in his dark observation quoted above, liberalism is a fragile good, the triumph of collective insight and experience over tribal instinct.

Historically, the profusion of competing cultures, languages, faiths and power claims created an intensity of confrontation and interaction unknown to cultures developing with fewer outside ties and encounters, in significantly larger areas, or behind geographical barriers. One reason for Europe's rapid development to becoming the predominant global power was precisely this pressure to keep abreast of the often hostile neighbors and if possible ahead of them, to trade with friendly strangers and subdue those who posed a threat, or who could be beaten easily. In part at least, Europe's cultural and political rise is due to its geography.

II Transformative Factors

This geographical image, however, suggests a static model of European neighborhood, a slow evolution of relations between liberal democracies with overlapping as well as conflicting interests. This has been the point of departure for many analyses, but it is misleading. In a global context, the continent is facing a more fundamental set of challenges and its interior dynamic suggests that peaceful coexistence and cooperation must be sought not only between liberal democracies, but increasingly also with authoritarian and anti-democratic, anti-European forces within and between European societies.

Some of these challenges are immediately apparent – a growing wealth gap, migration, integration, overstretched welfare budgets, terrorism, employment and a significant demographic imbalance – and drive public discussion and government policies. Of these, the demographic overhang will vanish within a generation, leaving Europe as a continent with populations shrinking faster than even the most ambitious immigration plan could compensate for. This will create its own challenges: further concentration in urban areas, more empty villages and a continuing corrosion of traditional social structures. The real issues to be aware of, however, lie elsewhere.

1. Industry 4.0

Three other factors will present vastly greater potential for political and social conflict in the near future. The first is the revolution of Industry 4.0: the continuing automation of the workplace, the pervasive spread of digitization. Scientific studies estimate that within one generation fifty percent of all jobs – from taxi driver to accountant, surgeon and service personnel – will be done by robots. Even if this estimation might prove too high, the argument that the new world of machine labor and algorithms will create as many opportunities as it destroys appears shortsighted. Robots and computers cannot only navigate, construct, calculate and administer, they are increasingly also able to control, repair, design and write the code that drives them. Unemployment is set to rise to unprecedented levels.

In highly industrialized countries, full employment is a thing of the past. Our economies will be able to remain productive while requiring less and less human labor. A host of political, social and philosophical issues is raised by this development, from questions about surveillance and democratic oversight to economic challenges (what will people live on?), to civil liberties and a

further splitting of society into digital mandarins and precarious, uneducated and possibly unproductive consumers, the development of artificial vs. human intelligence, and the question of the value of our civic existence which has hitherto been tied to productive and remunerated work. What is certain, however, is that it will change our societies profoundly.

2. War and Terrorism

An increasingly bellicose and potentially unstable Russia forms another, potentially deeply serious threat to European security, even raising the specter of renewed warfare on the continent itself. While it has to be conceded that some of Russia's grievances against NATO and the EU are legitimate, it is paramount to understand that an unpredictable and imperially ambitious Moscow is now being treated by strategic forecasters once more as a realistic military threat, while even in peacetime it forms a gravitational center for proponents of expansionist politics and reactionary social agendas not only in eastern Europe, but across the continent. At the same time, the USA, for decades the military protector of its European allies, has transferred its strategic interests to the Pacific. After a period in which Europe lived effectively outside of history, history is coming back to the continent.

Another threat, resulting from Europe's past and present global involvements, is constituted by wars on its south-eastern periphery, particularly in the Middle East, and by their secondary effects, such as mass migration and terrorism. This is a post-colonial conflict under the guise of a war of religion. There is no clear path to controlling the destabilizing impact of this highly volatile situation.

3. Climate Change

The third factor will have the most profound effect, and will be felt globally: Climate change is already an observable reality. While on other continents rising sea levels, desertification, extreme weather events and changing weather patterns will most probably have catastrophic consequences for hundreds of millions of humans within the next generation, Europe will feel mostly the indirect consequences of this global drama. Those directly affected by environmental change and the resulting emergencies will seek out its shores in increasing numbers. Some of Europe's allies and trading partners on other continents will be deeply affected by conflicts over water, epidemics, famines, civil wars and regime changes. The flow of fossil energy around the world will become less secure. Migration routes will create a new, unofficial and uncontrollable globalized world.

This globalization of misery and instability will impose vast political challenges. Europe's relations with its neighbors must be understood in a postcolonial and partially neocolonial context – it is certainly viewed from this perspective by Europe's southern neighbors. Even Islamist terrorism is nourished by the history of colonial humiliation and postcolonial failures of integration. One of the first symbolic acts of ISIS was to burn a map showing the Middle Eastern borders agreed on in the Sykes-Picot Agreement. If Europeans find it easy to forget the history of colonialism, their neighbors have longer memories, especially as local elites have frequently collaborated in creating neocolonial structures of trade, economic aid and military alliances. The frequently justified resentment growing from this situation will also be one determining influence on Europe's dealings with its neighbors in times of crisis.

Demography, automation, an unstable east and the unpredictable upheavals of climate change will not only affect Europe's neighborly relations; it is already reconfiguring relationships between different social groups across and within our societies.

4. Us and Them

Inside Europe, the most noticeable of these changes is the rise of right-wing populism. Voters no longer seeing themselves represented by the traditional parties are empowering a politics of resentment which shifts the entire democratic debate. The “others” (mostly in the shape of migrants and refugees) and “the elites” are the designated enemies in a struggle for self-determination and national purity. As the pressures of global change grow with increasing climate change, their effect on European societies will lend even greater buoyancy to populist movements and their leaders, creating deeper rifts within populations and between neighbors.

In the long term, the case of further European integration is overwhelming: Global challenges demand powerful alliances, no nation-state can tackle issues such as climate change, migration, global finance or international trade on its own, and in an age in which currencies are traded on foreign stock markets and states cannot control or even estimate the future value of their debts and their assets, national sovereignty is a populist illusion. One caveat, however, presents itself, a persistent and dangerous complication: If Europe were a democratic and effective federal state and were swept by a wave of populist fear of migration, modernity and change, would it not be a question of time until the president was called Orban or Le Pen? How can democracy defend itself against its democratic abolition? For the first time in the history of the EU, its still fragmented power structure reveals a surprising strength.

The exit of a single country or even the collapse of the common currency may prove less problematic than the rise of illiberal anti-Europeanism aiming for a fractured continent without a global voice, without the ability to influence global developments and their European impact. Down this way madness lies, and with it very plausible scenarios of war, civil war, dictatorships, failing economies, shattered societies and widespread devastation. This scenario may seem extreme, but after the European crises within the last twelve months, which were not foreseen by either the political or the academic community, it is no more absurd than the suggestion of cataclysmic conflict sounded to the wealthy and cosmopolitan elites in Europe in May 1914.

The stakes are high.

III The Politics of Trauma

Historians are expected to provide lessons to be learned from the past, but humanity learns little if anything from its own history. Despite being equipped with more highly developed technologies and with a vastly better understanding of nature, we are still engaging in tribal battles, clinging to magical thinking and feeling and behaving atavistically.

There are insights to be gleaned from history, patterns to be identified and analyzed, but it is almost impossible to transfer this knowledge to other historical periods, other cultures, other economic and ecological conditions. The past shapes societies not through lessons from history, but through reactions to trauma. Much like individuals and families, severe traumata hang not only over victims and perpetrators themselves, but also over their children and grandchildren. The western European determination to avoid war at all costs, to create stability through wealth and to eschew ideological battles in favor of political pragmatism was a reaction to three decades of highly ideologized and devastating wars, civil wars and genocide between 1914 and 1945.

As three generations have passed, the trauma of the war no longer shapes political instincts. Authoritarian rulers and illiberal democracies are once again admired and emulated, the

emancipation of women, homosexuals and other groups questioned as signs of western decadence, racist stereotypes – now disguised as a critique of foreign cultures – are resurgent. Shaken by the consequences of globalized financial capitalism, a growing portion of the electorate embraces the politics of resentment.

The results of this reaction to decades of trauma are illustrated by the American publicist Robert Kagan in his *Washington Post* article, "This is how fascism comes to America" (May 18, 2016). Kagan reflects on the rise of Donald Trump to presidential candidate and paints a picture which is painfully recognizable in a European context:

> "What Trump offers his followers … is an attitude, an aura of crude strength and machismo, a boasting disrespect for the niceties of the democratic culture that he claims, and his followers believe, has produced national weakness and incompetence. His incoherent and contradictory utterances have one thing in common: They provoke and play on feelings of resentment and disdain, intermingled with bits of fear, hatred and anger. His public discourse consists of attacking or ridiculing a wide range of 'others' — Muslims, Hispanics, women, Chinese, Mexicans, Europeans, Arabs, immigrants, refugees — whom he depicts either as threats or as objects of derision. His program, such as it is, consists chiefly of promises to get tough with foreigners and people of nonwhite complexion. He will deport them, bar them, get them to knuckle under, make them pay up or make them shut up….
>
> Republican politicians marvel at how he has 'tapped into' a hitherto unknown swath of the voting public. But what he has tapped into is what the founders most feared when they established the democratic republic: the popular passions unleashed, the 'mobocracy.' Conservatives have been warning for decades about government suffocating liberty. But here is the other threat to liberty that Alexis de Tocqueville and the ancient philosophers warned about: that the people in a democracy, excited, angry and unconstrained, might run roughshod over even the institutions created to preserve their freedoms. As Alexander Hamilton watched the French Revolution unfold, he feared in America what he saw play out in France that the unleashing of popular passions would lead not to greater democracy but to the arrival of a tyrant, riding to power on the shoulders of the people."

Faced with the very real possibility of similar authoritarian, xenophobic and nationalist movements entering government and turning the clock back to the nineteenth century (something our economies have already done to a large extent by re-creating an almost unrestrained laissez-faire capitalism), we must acknowledge that these beliefs are widespread and seductive, and that they are by no means necessarily the losers of history. In the long run authoritarian regimes may crumble, but, as Keynes reminded us, in the long run we are all dead. Over the next decade or two a collapse of the EU and a pervasive authoritarian turn are real possibilities in Europe.

The underlying tensions are global, but they are played out in different variations according to the different modes of historical experience. They are likely to be intensified within our societies as conventional politics will continue to be outflanked by radical and frequently authoritarian alternatives. One important question will therefore be not how to strengthen ties between liberal democracies, but how to coexist with illiberal and authoritarian neighbors whose interests are genuinely divergent from our own. Living together in Europe may become a question of sleeping with the enemy.

IV Fortress Europe?

The question of Europe's coexistence with its global neighbors will be determined by how much Europe is going to wall itself in. Already the Schengen Agreement is suspended, already borders have been armed with fences and militarized, already Europe is attempting to broker deals with regimes from Turkey to Sudan to keep refugees from reaching Europe, and despite this, the number of drownings in the Mediterranean continues to rise. It is the burning shame of the European project and its rhetoric of universal human rights.

Europe is faced with a genuine and insoluble dilemma. It cannot possibly absorb all those willing to risk their lives trying to reach its shores. Neither its financial resources nor its social peace and economic development would allow this. At the same time, it is not only morally despicable but also practically impossible to retreat behind a wall and keep all migrants out. Global mobility, lucrative trafficking networks and Europe's long border make this unrealistic, and if migrants are not given a clear path towards integration, education, employment and citizenship, they will soon form vast, illegal communities in European cities, as well as a parallel, grey economy including sweatshop work and organized crime. At the same time it has proven highly problematic to exercise a stabilizing influence in the refugees' countries of origin, where western interference has already created a legacy of oppression.

The arrival of hundreds of thousands of migrants from underdeveloped, undemocratic and war-torn countries means that many of the problems which European rulers created and from which western countries frequently profited are now being carried into our own societies. The integration of great numbers of frequently uneducated men and women with genuinely different cultural habits and expectations into western societies presents a genuine challenge. Will it be worth it?

V Living with Difference

From a historical perspective this challenge has been met before many times. The history of Europe as the development of more or less stable peoples and cultural communities is an invention of the nationalist nineteenth century. European history is one of large population movements, of conflicts surrounding assimilation and integration, of mass expulsions and uneasy cohabitations, of newcomers and old inhabitants, of insiders and outsiders – and of cultural and economic flourishing as a result of attracting new populations, new workers, new skills, new perspectives. In almost every case, this process initially produced social conflicts and mutual hatred, frequently also violence.

Successful integration occurs not immediately, but over generations. Most migrants were poor and unskilled, frequently they spoke different languages, had different customs and adhered to different confessions in times of religious hatred. Our genetic and cultural past bears the marks of the accumulation of layers of migration, conflict and eventual integration, which have woven the dense web of European identities.

The presence of others, of cultural difference, is a constituting experience in European history. Whenever difference was constructed as a threat and, with the advent of Christianity, as heresy, it was also used for political ends. From the expulsion of the Jews from the Iberian Peninsula to that of the Huguenots from France and Protestants from Austria, to the eastern European pogroms, the displacement of millions after World War II and the mass killings during the wars in the former Yugoslavia, different ethnic and religious identities were also subject to demonization, deportation and ethnic cleansing.

The nineteenth century provided a new appearance for this ancient tribal hatred. Nationalism elaborated theories of cultural superiority and purity, of (frequently constructed) national languages, canons and historical narratives, cutting through layered and complex European identities and frequently destroying them by force. Europe experienced waves of iron-fisted cultural homogenization.

This constant threat of oppression, on the one hand, and the need for cooperation with foreigners and unbelievers who were trading partners or otherwise indispensable, on the other, also fostered another intellectual tradition which gained momentum during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: Europeans needed a strong concept of tolerance, a social contract with strangers which kept society from lapsing into persecution and civil war. In an increasingly urbanized world, a theory of peaceful coexistence was a crucial prerequisite for social stability.

Tolerance could be argued pragmatically, but it was also carried by an idea whose time had come: the equal rights and freedoms of every individual, regardless of factors designating difference. Europe's intellectual answer to living with difference was to buttress the rights of the individual vis-à-vis those of the community, turning the necessity of living with difference into a cultural strength.

Universal human rights were propagated by thinkers belonging to the Enlightenment, which succeeded eventually in its struggle to supplant the old cultural assumption of the natural inequality of all human beings into a proclamation of universal equality. Compared to the social realities and ideological givens of the day, these claims sounded deranged and dangerously subversive. Opponents denounced the idea of human rights as being against the order of creation and against natural law.

The critics of the Enlightenment were right to fear the end of the feudal world in the face of the claims of Enlightenment thinkers, but nobody could foresee how far-reaching their consequences would be. By strengthening the rights of the individual against those of the group (the kingdom, the Church, the State, the clan, the family), proponents of the Enlightenment paved the way not only for the end of slavery, but also for the separation of Church and State, universal suffrage, women's emancipation, the labor movement, sexual and reproductive self-determination, etc.

The transformative notion of basic human rights has its roots in the historic experience of the cost and the benefits of living with difference in Europe. In an increasingly interdependent and mobile world this repository of experience and the continuing discussions about it may be one genuinely valuable contribution Europe could make to the global issues unfolding at present. Living with and learning from difference transcends culture and religion, and will be crucial to the success or failure of societies worldwide as migration movements impact established social and economic structures.

VI Two Dreams

The idea of regarding every individual as inherently valuable and of rights being universal and unalienable is a social fiction, just like religion is. It is a projection of hope, an aspirational master narrative, not a description of reality. It does not exist outside of the societies which practice it, it is not necessary to the economic and cultural success of a society, and at three centuries of age it is a very recent notion whose realization and continued existence depend on strong institutions and civic values.

As global transformations are unfolding, two master narratives, two dreams have the potential to inspire political action, and to unite or divide societies within and against one another. The first of these may be called a liberal dream. It traces its origins to the Enlightenment. It speaks of human rights and of individuals, of self-determination and of freedom. It has created western societies and their moral framework, and has spread around the world not only through colonialism, but also through post-colonial liberation movements.

In recent decades, however, it has been revealed that this liberal dream is by no means always humane. On the one hand, it can express itself as a Rawlsian project of inclusion and solidarity if the freedom of all is interpreted as the freedom of those who are weakest, but can also become a morally anarchic, libertarian or neo-liberal nightmare, abandoning the weak to the freedom, the greed and superior resources of the strong.

VII Near-Fatal Flaws

The liberal dream has some very obvious strengths: Citizens of liberal democracies tend to be more wealthy and more educated, live more securely, more healthily and longer (even if the increasing wage gap and for-profit management of public resources in western societies pushes all these indicators backwards for those on the bottom half of the income scale).

At the same time, this liberal dream is compromised both by its own sweeping energy and by its past. Culturally, it sacrifices a sense of place for a sense of space – it opens up physical spaces and possibilities to be conquered and exploited, but it also forces its freedom on everyone, sapping every sense of belonging, of tradition, purpose, a universal meaning, a sense of place. This kind of freedom may be necessary, but it is also frequently resented and experienced as tyrannical, especially as our economy is cumulating additional demands for flexibility and constant self-invention.

The second flaw of the liberal dream is of a historical nature. The emancipation brought to formerly oppressed or discriminated people in the west depended on stable institutions, on courts and enforceable laws. It depended on the wealth of societies which had grown rich through colonial exploitation, slavery, serfdom and the exploitation of industrial laborers. It depended for its success on the misery of millions of people who were denied these very rights. This is not a strong position from which to argue for universal principles and to lecture others today.

The rhetoric of universal human rights was developed to transcend social and religious divisions within Europe, but few Enlighteners actively sought to enlarge their purview in political terms: Few actively opposed slavery, and the French revolutionaries had no intention of granting equal rights to women.

The struggle to transform these aspirations into political realities was long and arduous. Before the postcolonial movements it was also mainly centered on Europe and the USA (where the emancipation of the slaves led to the bloodiest and most traumatic war in the nation's history) and was long thought by many to be quite compatible with colonialism and the exploitation of the landless poor at home. Grown out of a vastly less mobile world, universal human rights were long mainly a political metaphor used in particular European conflicts, not a genuinely global ambition.

VIII Belonging and Superiority

The moral ambivalence of this liberal dream is the central point of criticism from its opponents, which one might call adherents of an authoritarian dream. It restores the sense of place by attacking the liberal dream as the suicide of the west: morally bankrupt, arrogant, decadent, unmanly and culturally doomed. It sees people not as individuals but as part of historical or religious collectives, of cultures with fixed historical identities and conflicting destinies. It restores transcendence to the world.

This authoritarian dream is often born out of humiliation and a sense that the Enlightenment and the experience of modernity and globalization have derailed humanity from the course ordained by (divine) providence. It unites such seemingly disparate actors and movements as Vladimir Putin and European rightwing populists, Donald Trump and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Hindu nationalists in India, the Sharia courts of Saudi Arabia, neo-fascist mobs in western capitals and the aspiring "martyrs" of the so-called Islamic State. They all tend to believe in the inherent superiority of their own culture, in a return to the nation and to an imaginary past, and in closing societies with walls and trade barriers. They also are defined by their enemies, share a faith in traditional gender roles and sexual identities, a strong tendency to suppress free speech, as well as the conviction that cultural difference within societies is deplorable and ought to be eliminated.

These two dreams, liberal and authoritarian, have become the cultural metaphors we use to describe the world as well as the ideological poles between which we will have to find a path to a livable future. They confront each other in debates as well as on the battlefield. This confrontation has the potential not only to destroy the Enlightenment dream, but also to lead to a future in which an aging, authoritarian, rich Fortress Europe suppresses dissent at home and sinks refugee boats in the Mediterranean, while accommodating itself with an Orthodox Greater Russia and an Islamic Caliphate in the Middle East.

The authoritarian dream promises a retreat from modernity, simple truths, traditional values and ruthlessness against enemies, real or imagined. The tragedy of the liberal dream is that its answers will always be couched in social and theoretical complexity, relative values, historical entanglements and political compromise.

IX Human Rights - Indivisible?

One central challenge to the liberal dream is that it is in danger of being overwhelmed by its own promises. If western moral ideas are, at least in terms of empirical outcomes, superior to others which have less regard for the life and dignity of individuals, if human rights are universal and indivisible, then how can we pay authoritarian rulers such as Erdoğan (and before him Gaddafi) to keep refugees from crossing our borders, no matter how brutally? How can we continue to profit from exploitation and oppression in our name? The problem is not just ethical, but also practical: Dividing universal human rights into a two-class system with first-class rights for the west and second-class rights for the rest degrades them to a simple apology for privilege.

Torn between a liberal and an increasingly aggressive authoritarian dream and exposed to the forces of the digital revolution and of climate change and their secondary effects, such as rising unemployment and mass migration, Europe will have to decide between simply defending its privileged status quo as long as possible, or allowing and encouraging a social, political, economic and environmental transformation which may result in different societies, and very possibly in less security, less wealth, and a less predictable social reality, but which will also open up the road

towards cultural diversity, sustainable economies, and enlightened alliances solid and flexible enough to carry through the next decades. This is not entirely a matter of choice. Our societies are already experiencing the first shocks of a global transformation that is set to continue. Knowing this and being able to model the effects of climate change gives us – the first generation in history to have such an opportunity – a window into our own future, as well as instruments to shape and manage vast and inexorable change.

The necessity of such a radical transformation, however, rarely plays a prominent part in Europe's political debates. This may change as the effects of global warming and digitization become more obvious and have more drastic effects, and it will politicize the European conversation. The confrontation between liberals and authoritarians outlines different directions, and shatters the illusion of living in a pure economy, a consumer paradise outside of history, and forces us to imagine the kind of Europe we want to be living in in twenty or thirty years, and how to cope with the greatest threats to its safety. This fault line is likely to open wider and is threatening to tear apart not only European societies, but also the union they have formed.

After six decades of virtually unchallenged rule in Europe, the liberal dream is coming under attack. How can this attack be averted? It is difficult for a historian to give concrete policy advice – the discipline teaches too much about good intentions and unintended consequences. Still, some patterns are discernible, and some extrapolations legitimate.

X Navigating Transformation

The initial and most important observation is that no empire has yet foundered due to its openness to innovation. Change, especially social change, is hard to bear, and as the economist Karl Polanyi argued, it is the task of each government to slow down change until it becomes socially digestible, but this upheaval will take place whether or not we wish for it, and it is already taking place.

It was a pragmatic and courageous openness to change that gave the Netherlands its Golden Age during the seventeenth century, that created a mighty Prussia out of a sandy hinterland, shaped societies such as the USA and Canada, the post-war miracle in Japan and the evolution of social attitudes throughout the west. Isolation and social as well as cultural rigidity, on the other hand, caused the collapse of Spain as a global power, the inability of China to defend itself against colonial aggression during the nineteenth century, the vanishing of the Ottoman empire at the beginning of the twentieth, and the eventual downfall of the Soviet Union.

The transformation our societies will undergo will be pervasive and no doubt accompanied by conflict. Full employment will cease to be a meaningful political goal as more and more humans are replaced by machines. With unemployment and productivity rising in parallel, it will become necessary to prevent the wealth created in the process from accumulating in too few hands and from undermining the structures and controls of our democracies. The role of work in our societies will have to be reappraised.

Those with few skills and little education will be the losers of this process, especially as this new precarious class is not organized, does not formulate common goals and consistently votes in lesser numbers than other social groups. Still, many voters are convinced, rightly in part, that the established parties no longer offer truly alternative visions and no longer listen to (non-voting) underprivileged citizens, and they are voting for a radical alternative promising to be their voice. They will continue to form a reservoir of resentment and discontent which contains, allied with the

activism of those afraid to lose the wealth and the rights they already possess, the constant danger of what Robert Kagan called “mobocracy.”

The success of peaceful coexistence within Europe’s societies will depend on how effectively these disaffected constituencies can be reintegrated into a narrative of political hope. This demands not spin doctors but economic security which can be achieved only in economies adapted to the digital revolution, sustainable in their use of natural resources, their ecological impact and their production of waste.

XI Building Walls or Building Bridges

The integration of Europe’s growing migrant and refugee populations forms another, more highly visible challenge. Here, too, the historical perspective suggests that migration, while problematic in the short term, is almost always enriching for societies within two or three generations. The current debate surrounding European migration is one between building walls and building bridges, though increasingly it seems to shrink to a discussion about how high the wall should be. Proponents of openness are losing out to popular sentiment and media coverage.

The resulting controversy about and occasionally with people of different cultural and ethnic backgrounds and different faiths has become disturbingly identitarian. “European” or “Judeo-Christian” values are played off against visions of a retrograde and culturally alien Islam. The challenge to our society will be to promote an ideal of shared social wealth resting on binding agreements and laws which are secular and thus enable the practice of different cultural traditions within the same framework of cooperation.

The social conservatism of parts of the migrant populations has a remarkable overlap with the attitudes of the populist right, potentially putting open societies under pressure from two sides. Only if liberals are able to persuade a majority within their societies of the value and utility of their social vision can they hope to anchor them in the public discussion. Among the new Europeans, the key to embracing liberal values will lie in jobs and opportunities, and in education. Failing in this respect would lead to disintegration and social catastrophe. The example of France shows how this process occurs: The first and largely secular generation of migrants from the Maghreb countries was lured with the vision of a culture-blind *République* offering opportunity for all, but the reality was one of racist prejudice, social exclusion, marginalization in the *banlieues*, and eventual bitterness, the direct antecedent of a radicalization and Islamization of their children and grandchildren.

After sixty years of artificial quiet, history has returned to Europe, and with it existential challenges. If European societies are to avoid the worst environmental and social impact of climate change and the destructive social consequences of the digital revolution, it is imperative (though not likely) that politicians and opinion leaders engage in a conversation with their electorates, paving the way for radical transformation that is willed and guided, rather than for the cataclysmic change that comes with the collapse of the walls erected around a continent focused on maintaining at all costs a static vision of its privileged status quo.

The European network of geographical neighborhood, political alliances and overarching integration will be subjected to considerable polarization by social pressures amid economic change and heightened global instability. As populist right-wing politics are reaching for government across Europe, living with neighbors will mean finding the least damaging way of coexisting with ideological opponents as well as the forging of new alliances.

As long as Europeans are not willing to transcend national interest for the sake of a common future in an increasingly perilous global neighborhood, their societies will adapt at different speeds, and with different rates of success. Escalating social tensions may be contained, but may also lead to violent conflict within and between societies. Depending on the speed and intensity of the ecological, economical and social transformations ahead, instability and, flowing from it, authoritarian rule may become a serious threat to western democracies, or even replace them outright. Wealth tends to insulate societies against political violence and regime change, but another financial crisis like that of 2008 could turn the continent into one giant Weimar Republic.

The history of living with difference within European societies suggests that encouraging diversity, defining limits of tolerance and protecting individual rights have been key elements of economic and cultural growth, while pursuing cultural or ethnic purity frequently escalated to violence and destruction. For liberal ideals, this situation presents an existential challenge. Only if they succeed in defending their ideas and demonstrating their beneficial outcome will they remain part of an increasingly radicalized political discussion.

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Trilogue Salzburg

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